Estimating the inventive activity of UK firms : product and process invention by Siler, Pamela A.
ESTIMATING THE INVENTIVE ACTIVITY OF UK FIRMS
PRODUCT AND PROCESS INVENTION
Pamela A. Siler
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 1984
ABSTRACT
1
This thesis concerns the development and estimation
of models of firm decision-making with respect to inventive
activity. The thesis is unique in its separate treatment
of improvements to the firm's product technology and
improvements to the firm's production technology. The
two types of inventive decisions are separated in both the
theoretical and empirical sections of the thesis. The
firm decision-making models of product and process invention
are tested on the 180 largest manufacturing firms in the
U.K. While a number of U.S. studies have been undertaken
using this cross-sectional approach, there have been no
comparable studies using U.K. data.
Empirical tests in the thesis are conducted using
mid-1970"s patent data as the measure of inventive
activity. Difficulties surrounding the use of this and
other possible measures of technological change are high¬
lighted in the study. The measurement of a number of
independent variables influencing inventive activity,
such as technological opportunity, is also discussed.
Major findings of the thesis are concerned with the
effect of firm size, industry concentration and technolo¬
gical factors on product and process invention. While
the study is mainly concerned with the 180 firms taken
as a whole, a breakdown of results by general industry
category is provided.
I declare that this thesis has been composed by
myself and that the work incorporated in it is my
own.
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1.1 The Economist's Interest in Technological Change
The recognition of technological change, or the
addition to society's stock of technical knowledge, as a
distinct topic for economic analysis has been relatively
recent. Only within the past two decades has there been
a steady progression of work related to technological
change as an economic variable, at least partially
determined by economic forces. Prior to this time
technology was generally accepted by economists as a
variable determined outside the economic system. Although
a few earlier economists might be interpreted as taking
a more endogenous view of technology, this approach was
not pursued or emphasised by their followers.
Economists' interest in technological change goes
back to Adam Smith who discussed the impact of new
machinery on the division of labour. Smith (1950, p.14)
also made some brief observations concerning the source
of the new machines, which might be invented by: (1)
common workers to assist them in their jobs; (2) those
in the business of machine-making; and (3) philosophers,
'whose trade it is not to do anything, but to observe
everything.' Other early economists, such as Ricardo
(1970), also evaluated the impact of new techniques of
production, but not in any depth and only in connection
with other interests."'"
1. Ricardo, for example, discussed the effect of
improved machinery on the costs of production
and selling prices in foreign markets.
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Marx paid considerable attention to the role played
<1
by technological change in capitalist development. In
particular he (Marx, 1894) pointed to the effect of
continuous improvements in machinery on the rate of
profit. Yet Marx is credited by many analysing his
work as having an exogenous view of technological change _
determining but not determined by economic phenomena.^"
Rosenberg (1976) argues, however, that Marx has been
misinterpreted and that a correct interpretation of his
work would stress the mutual interactions between
economic variables and technology.
In this century Schumpeter was instrumental in
bringing technological change to the attention of
4
economists. In his analysis of business cycles, he
(Schumpeter, 1939) characterised new technology and
particularly new products, as having an unstabilising
effect on an industry, as capital was withdrawn from
older businesses and made available for new purposes.
These instabilities tended to right themselves however,
and their effect was not cuaiulatire. in the long-.un
Schumpeter (1934) saw the process of innovation, which
he designated as the entrepreneurial function, as
one of the elements playing a central role in economic
development.
Schumpeter (1928, p .384) may be best known with
respect to technological change for his view that
'trustified' /
1. See Hansen (1921) for a discussion of Marx's
technological determinism.
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'trustified' rather than 'competitive capitalism' was
the market structure most conducive to a rapid rate of
change. In 'trustified capitalism' innovation met with
less friction due to a longer term view towards investment
and the power to accumulate reserves.
While emphasising the importance of technological
change in economic life, Schumpeter did not explicitly
address the process by which new technical knowledge was
generated."1" Therefore while it determined economic
events, technological change itself, was treated as an
exogenous variable.
Also in the 1930's, Hicks, in considering the
labour-saving or capital-saving bias of technological
2
change, developed an economic theory of invention.
Hicks argued (1932, p.124) that 'induced inventions'
were the result of a change in the relative prices
of the factors of production.
Changed relative prices would stimulate the search for
new methods of production which would use more of the
now relatively cheaper factor and less of the expensive
one, which' was expected to be labour. According to Hicks,
'induced /
1. Schumpeter (1934, pp.84-85) separates the use of
knowledge by the entrepreneur or innovation from
the creation of knowledge or invention, describing
them as entirely different economically and
sociologically. Invention, he points out, does
not necessarily lead to innovation or on its own
produce any economic effect at all.
2. Hicks (1973, p.76) later argued that the traditional
labour-saving verus capital-saving classification was
inappropriate. A more appropriate classification
for inventions was their 'forward-bias' (towards
consumption) or their 'backward-bias' (towards
investment).
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'induced inventions' could be contrasted to all of the
rest - or 'autonomous inventions' which were not
dependent on relative price changes, and therefore not
necessarily labour-saving.
Hicks' theory stimulated considerable discussion
concerning the bias of technological change."1" However,
it does not seem to have stimulated economists to investigate
the economically induced process of change at the level
which invention takes place, with the firm or individual.
This may be due to Hicks' emphasis on the benefit to the
user of inventions rather than to the producer, which
might be a different firm or individual. He (Hicks, 1932
p.121) refers to the profit-motive as an incentive for
firms to adopt cost-reducing inventions, stressing the
benefits in terms of liberated resources which increase
the 'National Dividend'.
Interest in technological change was further
stimulated when, in the mid-1950's, empirical findings
were reported showing it to be the major determinant of
2
economic growth in the US; economy over recent decades.
Although considerable controversy developed concerning
these results, they were reputable enough to provoke
economists /
1. Salter (1960) challenged Hicks' theory of induced
invention, proposing instead that any advance which
reduced total cost would be welcomed by an industry,
whether it be labour-saving or capital-saving.
2. These findings are briefly discussed in section 1.2.
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economists into considering technological change as an
area for serious inquiry. As Abramovitz (1956, p.11)
remarked, it was 'in a sense sobering, if not discouraging
to students of economic growth' that the major contribution
was made by a phenomenon economists knew little about.
By the early 1960's, theories were emerging which
treated technological change as an endogenous variable.
Schmookler (1962, p.l) declared that 'technological
progress is intimately dependent on economic phenomena'.
His point was that the incentive to produce an invention,
like the production of any other good, was affected by
the excess of expected returns over expected costs.
In the last two decades there has been significant
activity amongst economists in expanding, challenging
and testing endogenous theories of technological change.
This thesis will follow that line in testing endogenous
theories at the firm level in the United Kingdom.
The development of technological change as an
economic area of study points to a dichotomy which will
be emphasised in this thesis - the distinction between
technological changes in products and changes in
production processes. The general approach in previous
studies has been to restrict the discussion to either:
cost-saving inventions, as emphasised by Hicks, or
product-enhancing inventions bringing greater revenue
to the firm from the market place and as emphasised by
Schmookler. This study's approach will be to recognise
both /
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both types of inventions and to explore the economic
1
rationale behind each type.
A much neglected feature of Schmookler's workf
which this thesis emphasises is his insight that every
industry has two technologies: a 'product technology'
or the technical knowledge used in creating and improving
products and a 'production technology' or the technical
knowledge used in producing products (see Schmookler,
1966, p.88). Schmookler concentrated on product changes
in the capital goods industry, which reduced costs in the
industry purchasing and using the capital goods.
In concluding this section, it is worth remarking
that although interest in the subject has increased
substantially over the past two decades, technological
change remains outside the generally accepted body of
economic theory. Compared with the current somewhat
overwhelming popular interest in the subject, the
economists' interest must still be seen as weak.
1.2 Economic Effects of Technological Change
This.thesis, in considering the generation of new
technical knowledge by firms, concentrates on the net
benefits of technological change which the firm can
internalise. However, in doing so, it is useful to
keep the wider social benefits and costs of technological
change in mind, particularly if any assessment is to be
made of the performance of firms in generating new
technology from society's point of view. In this
section, the positive and negative effects of new
technology /
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technology are outlined, first at the aggregate level
I
and then at the firm level where technology is generated.
The effects of new technology on the industries within
which the firm operates are also discussed.
Aggregate effects An interest in technological
change by economists is fully justified given its
importance in determining economic welfare. Technological
change can increase welfare quantitatively, generating
increases in real income per head. New knowledge concerning
the techniques of production has the effect of shifting
the production boundaries outward, giving increased output
for the same level of inputs. Alternatively by using
fewer labour inputs to get the same level of output,
leisure can be increased. This is relevant not only in
industrial production but also household production,
where improved domestic appliances can reduce labour time.
Changes in technology also improve human welfare
in a qualitative sense with the introduction of new and
improved consumer products. Usher (1964, p.280), treating
the introduction of new products as the 'archtype of
economic progress,'shows that technological change leads
to the creation of entirely new production possibilities,
enabling communities to move to higher indifference
curves?" More recently Rosenberg (1982, p.4) emphasises
the 'bewildering array of entirely new goods' which point
to product innovation as perhaps 'the most important
long-term contribution of technical progress to human
welfare.'
There /
1. Usher proves graphically that any commercially profitable
product invention confers a net benefit on the community
as a whole.
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There has been considerable effort amongst
t
economists to measure the quantitative benefits of
technological change in the form of increased
productivity at the aggregate, industry and firm
levels. The much more difficult measurement of
the qualitative benefits has not understandably
received the same attention, although recently some
, , ma.de _ . , . . 2
progress has been in this direction.
It should be stressed that not all of the
effects of technological change are beneficial. Social
costs of new technology may include pollution, a faster
rate of exhaustion of natural resources, the proliferation
of nuclear weapons which may be increasingly difficult
to control and prolonged structural unemployment.
For example, Giarini and Louberge (1978) point out
that technological change affects pollution both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Such changes allow
a larger population to consume a greater amount of
goods thus compounding the waste problem. Also new
and perhaps toxic materials may be resistant to the
natural recycling process. Paradoxically technology can
also aid in solving many of the problems it creates, as
new methods for dealing with industrial and domestic waste
are introduced and as new production techniques are
introduced /
T. Lancaster's (1966) theory of consumer demand using a
'goods-characteristics' approach has aided the
analysis of product quality changes. The theory
has been applied empirically through the use of hedonic
price indices. For an example, see Cowling and
Cubbin (1971) .
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introduced, which reduce the amount of resources devoted
1
to a given amount of output.
The threat of technological unemployment is
particularly troublesome at the present time as capital
machinery embodied with the new microelectronic
technology replaces labour. An important question is
whether the increased rate of growth due to the use of
new technology in production processes and its application
in new products will create more jobs than are destroyed."'"
Even if an increase in employment proves to be the case,
the benefits of the new technology will not be shared
evenly throughout society. A period of prolonged
unemployment for many in the traditional heavy industries
seems inevitable, as the distribution of skill require¬
ments changes. These issues however, while of great
importance, are not the concern of this thesis and will
not be further discussed.
Effect on Aggregate Growth Rates Economists'
interest in the subject of technological change, as
mentioned previously, was stimulated by the findings of
Solow (1957) and others in the 1950's that this
phenomenon, rather than an increase in factor inputs
played /
1. For a discussion of the effect of new technology
on employment see Bourdon (1979) and Freeman,
Clark and Soete (1982) .
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played the dominant role in determining 20th century
growth."1" In such macro-level growth studies an
aggregate production function approach was used.
Productivity improvements due to technological change
were measured as a residual after the increase in labour
and capital inputs were accounted for. A measure of
technological change therefore became its quantitative
effects on the growth of productivity.
Not all economists have attributed such an over¬
whelming role to technological change in the growth
process. Critics of the Solow findings argued that not
all the residual productivity increases should be
identified as attributable to new technology. For
example, empirical studies in which adjustments were
made for quality changes in factor inputs assigned a much
2
smaller role to innovation in determining growth.
Also Leibenstein (1966) has argued that significant
increases in aggregate productivity stem from 1 X-efficiency'
or the use of capital, labour, management and knowledge
to greater capacity. This narrows the difference between actual
costs ana minir.al attainable costs for a given level of output.
Despite some question as to the extent to which new
technology determines productivity increases, a relation¬
ship between the growth in knowledge and the growth in
output /
1. For a review of aggregate growth studies see Kennedy
and Thirwall (1972). Nelson (1981) summarises
more recent studies of aggregate productivity growth.
2. Criticisms of the aggregate production function
approach to productivity growth are found in both
sources in footnote 1.
- 11 -
output has been established and accepted by economists.
Mqre recently attention has turned to explaining the
slowdown in productivity growth during the 1970's."*"
Griliches (1980a)finds, in an empirical study using U.S.
data, that it is not a slowdown in investment in new
technology, but more likely the collapse in the productivity
of the new technology which is the contributing factor to
2 . .
slow growth over the last decade. He more positively
notes that surveys of new technological possibilities
seem to contradict any notion that productive innovations
have been exhausted. For Europe and Japan, Giersch and
Wolter (1983) and Linbeck (1983) suggest that the end of
the technological catch-up period (with the United States)
played a part in the slowdown in productivity growth.
It should be noted here that it is the use of new
technical knowledge, rather than its production, which is
important to economic growth. In fact, studies show
little relationship between a country's level of R & D
expenditure /
1. The Royal Economic Society held a 1982 conference
on the recent slowdown in productivity growth.
A number of the papers presented are found in
The Economic Journal (March 1983). The Giersch
and Wolter and the Linbeck studies cited in the
text are included.
2. Griliches, estimating investment in new technology
as R & D expenditure, cites a number of factors which
might explain the fall in productivity of R & D
including: (1) the large fraction of R & D investment
devoted to environmental and regulatory constraints
on firms; (2) the slowdown in capital growth in which
new technology is embodied and; (3) the chancy and
fickle process of invention.
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expenditure, which may be looked upon as an input into
the 'knowledge production function', and its aggregate
growth rate."'" Thus while a country may not devote a
large amount of resources to knowledge production, it
may be an extensive purchaser of technical knowledge
through licensing arrangements. Another explanation for
the lack of a relationship between R&D and aggregate
economic growth, is that much R&D effort goes into final
product improvements which are not likely to be included in
growth indices.
Tests of the relationship between R&D activity and
the rate of growth of output have been somewhat more
2
successful at the industry and firm levels. However, a
number of economists, including Griliches (1973) have
pointed out the difficulties posed by product improvement
at the industry level. If much of the R&D expenditure
is devoted to improved capital goods, productivity
improvements will show up in industries using these goods
and not necessarily in the originating industry. Domar
(1969, p.45) referred to a similar phenomenon when he noted
'the striking micro-character of the process of invention
and technical change'. He suggested that it might be
possible to distinguish between active industries largely
responsible for their own technological improvements from
passive ones which enjoy the fruits of other industries
efforts.
1. For a review of the evidence see Kennedy and Thirwall (1972)
2. See for example Griliches (1973) and Mansfield (1980).
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Effects at the firm and industry levels The recent
1
advent of microelectronics, rendering traditional
production processes and products obsolete, has
accentuated the role of technological change in a firm's
economic performance. The growth, profitability or mere
survival of firms in some industries depends on the rate
at which innovations are introduced or at which innovations
made by other firms are imitated.
Technological change bestows economic benefits on firms
by allowing them to introduce new production techniques
which lower costs. Lower production costs lead to greater
profits at a given level of output or a larger sales volume
if the firm's product is price elastic. It is important to
note that firms do not necessarily have to produce the
knowledge leading to new production techniques themselves.
In fact Salter (1960), Eichner (1976) and others argue
that most production process changes occur through the
purchase of improved capital goods, embodying new technology.
New technical knowledge also allows a firm to introduce
new and improved products which enable it to capture
larger market shares and earn more profits. If the firm
is in an industry where competition is on the basis of
product technology, rather than price, it may be forced
to continually make product changes, merely to survive.
A number of economists and industrialists argue that
the essence of a firm's competitive strength in the modern
world is the technical uniqueness of its product and not
its low price. In particular, technological product
rivalry /
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rivalry is emphasised as a major factor in a firm's
1
ability to capture export markets. Pavitt (1980) concludes
that U.K. firms are producing unsophisticated machinery
and consumer durable goods embodying little technological
advance. This lack of product sophistication has been
named as an important factor in the loss by the U.K. of
industrial markets to the rest of the world, accentuating
the problem of 'de-industrialisation'. More positively,
an increasing attentiveness to product innovation has been
advocated as a means of halting the decline of U.K.
industries.
It is also argued that British firms should enter as
rapidly as possible the emerging 'high-tech' industries
of microelectronics, information technology and bio¬
technology. These industries are seen as the providers
of the markets, profits and jobs of the future. Many
would go a step further and argue that the rapid diffusion
of microelectronic applications throughout British industry
is necessary if substantial portions of industry are merely
to survive.■
Although the above advice seems to reflect the
concensus, it has not been accepted without question. For
example, Jewkes (1972) argued in favour of producing the
'mundane' rather than the 'airy-fairy stuff.' He supported
his case with evidence (although somewhat dated now) showing
that the products growing fastest in world trade are not
those with a high-technology content. His frontrunners




However, in relation to the traditional industries,
Aujac (1973) observes that as technologies become more
science-based, there will be growing technical interdepen¬
dence of economic activity. Inventions in one industry
will affect products and techniques in other sectors
which were once considered unrelated. This certainly
has been the case in the watch industry, which has been
transformed in the last decade by advances in electronics
and which was one of Jewkes' traditional industries
earlier in the decade.
Lastly, changes in technology have a significant
effect on the size of firms and the levels of concentration
within industries. New techniques of production may have
the effect of either increasing or reducing the minimum
optimum scale of plant necessary to achieve lowest
average cost of production."'' Whether concentration is
increased after a technological change which allows for
an increase in the scale of production depends on the
growth of the market in the industry concerned. If
demand is stagnant or increasing at a relatively slow rate,
the dominance of a few firms in the industry is likely to
increase. The introduction of product innovations by
firms can also affect concentration by changing market
shares in favour of a few leaders. Technological product
superiority can act as an effective industry entry barrier.
Given /
1. Although technological change through the nineteenth
and most of the twentieth century has generally had
the effect of increasing the minimum optimum scale
(MOS) of plants, the pattern may be changing somewhat.
Bollard (1983), Gold (1981) and Jones (1983) cite
instances of new technology leading to reductions in MOS.
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Given the effects of technological change described
i
in this section, it would be hard to ignore the importance
of technical knowledge as an economic resource worthy of
investigation. In this thesis we are especially concerned
with explaining the production of new technology by firms,
considering both the benefits and costs of knowledge
generation. Although firms would have no incentive to
generate new knowledge if there were no gains they could
internalise, it is not true that all the benefits of new
knowledge will accrue to the generating firm. Other firms
who are able to imitate the new knowledge in their
processes and products will also be beneficiaries.
Firms face other difficulties in appropriating all
of the benefits of their own knowledge generation. If a
firm in the capital goods industry produces a product
invention which is applied in an improved machine, it is
likely to see some of the benefits going to the purchasing
and using industry. The consumer could also benefit if
due to the machine, there is a fall in the final product
price. Mansfield's and other's findings (1977b) show private
rates of return from industrial innovation (the first use
of new technical knowledge) to be much lower than the
social rates of return when the external beneficiaries are also
considered (other firms and consumers). It is useful to
keep such external benefits, as mentioned above in mind, in
considering the firm's decision to divert resources to
the generation of new technical knowledge.
1.3. /
- 17 -
1.3 Definitions and Distinctions
1
The phenomenon of technological change has, up to this
point, been referred to in a general or popular sense."'"
However, prior to proceeding with an economic analysis
in the subject area, it is important to define the concept
more precisely and to distinguish it from other associated
concepts. It is also useful to define and describe the
separate stages of the process of technical knowledge
production and use, which will be referred to throughout
the thesis.
A Definition of Technological Change Technology,
according to Kennedy and Thirwall (1972, p.12) may be
defined as 'a body of useful knowledge pertaining to the
art of production'. It consists, quoting Nordhaus (1969a,
p.4) of such things as 'blueprints, labour skills, computer
programs and engineering formulas', which are useful
in producing goods. Technology or technical knowledge,
used in this thesis interchangeably, may be distinguished
from basic or general knowledge, which consists of the
laws of nature and general scientific principles. Basic
knowledge is knowledge for its own sake, without any
application in mind. It can however, be used, together
with labour and capital, to produce technical knowledge.
Technological /
1. The term technical progress is also commonly used,
sometimes in place of technological change. Economists
however, generally use the phrase 'technical progress'
to refer to the changes in national product over time
that cannot be explained by input increases. It
refers to an effect of technological change rather than
to change itself. For a discussion, see Norris and
Vaizey (1973, pp.24-25).
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Technological change then, is a change in the body
1
of technology no matter what the cause. The technical
knowledge base may expand over time as more and more
knowledge is accumulated. An expansion in knowledge
might result from: the formal research effort of firms,
the government or universities; the inventive effort
of an individual; experience in production or 'learning-
by-doing ' ; or even a chance discovery. With reference
to the definition above, technology is also subject to
contraction as some knowledge becomes obsolete or no
longer useful.
Technological change has been distinguished by a
number of economists from technical change or a change
in production techniques. The distinction is important
because known, but previously unused, techniques
may be applied due to, for example, a change in factor
prices. A change in technique represents a movement
along the production-possibility frontier, rather than
a movement of the frontier itself, which is technological
change.
It should be noted that much of the overall product¬
ivity increase in an economy over time, which has been
associated with technological change, may not fit into
the definition used here. For example, the process
of diffusion of technical knowledge throughout an industry,
which may significantly increase productivity may involve
no expansion of the knowledge base. Salter (1960)
pointed to the long lag between the adoption of new
techniques /
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techniques in the 'best-practice' firms in an industry
and the other firms.
Product and Process Technologies It is essential
for the purposes of this thesis to differentiate, as did
Schmookler (1966), between an industry or firm's product
technology and its production or process technology. A
product technology consists of a body of knowledge
concerning the technical characteristics of the firm's
products, as distinguished from design or merely visual
characteristics. A process technology consists of a
body of knowledge concerning the method by which a given
product is produced. Schmookler viewed the two types
of technologies as related but none-the-less distinct.
In principle this may be valid, however in practice, as
we shall see in the following chapters, the separation
of the two bodies of knowledge may be more difficult.
Technological change, as previously mentioned, may
result by chance discovery or as a by-product of the
production process itself. However, as science-based
technology becomes more important to industry, corporate
inventive activity has become increasingly formalised in
the research laboratory. It is useful therefore to
define and describe the separate states of the formal
knowledge production process and the use of this knowledge
in commercial ventures.
Research and Development The firm takes a first step
toward technical knowledge production when it initiates a
research and development program. It diverts scarce
resources /
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resources to purchase capital, labour and materials to
f
be devoted to this purpose. Research and Development
expenditure (R & D) is officially defined as follows:
creative work undertaken on a systematic
basis to increase the stock of scientific
and technical knowledge and to use this
stock of knowledge to devise new
practical applications
The government, for the purposes of compiling statistics
classifies R&D expenditures into the three categories
below:
Basic research is original investigation
undertaken in order to gain new
scientific knowledge and understanding.
It is not primarily directed towards any
specific practical aim or application.
Applied research is also original
investigation undertaken in order to gain
new scientific or technical knowledge.
It is, however, directed primarily towards
a specific practical aim or objective.
Experimental development is the use of
scientific knowledge in order to produce
or substantially improve materials,
devices, products, processes, systems
or services.2
It is clear from the above definitions that basic
research /
1. see Central Statistical Office, Research and
Development Expenditure and Employment (1976, p.2)
In compiling U.K. official R&D statistics, the
definition agreed upon by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is used.
2. See reference cited in footnote 1.
-2 1-
research expenditure is associated with the production
of basic knowledge and not technical knowledge. Although
a few firms undertake basic research, R&D surveys show
that it is mainly an activity of the government and of
universities."'" This is to be expected since basic
research is not aimed at practical applications which
can be exploited commercially by a firm. Basic research
is however, indirectly important to the firm, since
the resulting basic knowledge may be used in the pro¬
duction of more applicable technical knowledge.
In reference to the definitions cited above, applied
research is most closely associated with technological
change, since it is aimed at producing new practical
knowledge. Development expenditure, according to the
official definition, is concerned with the use of such
knowledge for specific production purposes. The official
definitions however, leave some doubt as to where applied
research activities end and developmental activities
begin. Both seem to be directed toward practical goals.
If we go beyond the official definitions and examine
the objectives of the two types of expenditures more
closely, the distinction between development and applied
research can be strengthened. Taylor and Silbertson
(1973, p.61), in their comprehensive study of the U.K.
patenting /
1. Official statistics show the total expenditure on
R&D carried out by private industry to be
broken down as follows: 3.4% on basic research,
18.9% on applied research and 77.7% on development.
See Bowles (1981, p.99, table 3).
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patenting system, explain the difference as follows:
1
... these activities are usually fairly
distinct, even though they frequently
take place in the same establishment.
Research is generally distinguishable
in practice as being work directed to
the discovery of the principles of a
new product or process, including the
construction of small-scale mock-ups
or working models, while development
comprises the conversion of principles,
formulae or models into saleable
products or commercially-viable processes.
It is clear that the expected outcomes of
applied research and development activities differ.
Applied research is expected to result in what may be
labelled invention; development in innovation. Develop¬
ment expenditure is not in principle an input in the
production of technical knowledge; rather it occurs
after the new knowledge is produced. In practice
however, additional knowledge may be created while products
or processes are being developed for commercial uses,
even if this is not the primary objective of the
development phase. This seems likely to occur especially
in the case- of minor improvements to products and
processes, as opposed to major discoveries.
Invention and Innovation Applied research, as
mentioned above, results in invention, which most economists
define as the creation of new technical knowledge. Taylor
and Silberston (1973) stress that inventions are new
technical possibilities which may or may not develop into
actual commercial use. They (Taylor and Silberscon,
1973, p.27) define invention as:
the /
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the creation of 'potential' new
' products or processes, i.e.,
designs, specifications or models
that embody the essential working
principles of useful technological
discoveries.
Taylor and Silberst,on (1973, p.27) distinguish invention
from innovation, which according to them is:
... a general term to refer to the
whole process of converting inventions
into full-scale production operations
including investment in new plant and
equipment for the purpose.
It should be recognised however, that there is not
always a tidy separation between the two activities of
invention and innovation. In fact some economists
argue that the two activities should not be separated
from an analytical standpoint. For example Langrish,
et. al. (1972, p.7) view the two as 'inextricably
interlinked because they stand in a mixed causal
relationship' innovation resulting from invention and
invention itself from the process of commercialisation of
ideas. Parker (1974) agrees with this analysis, seeing
the two activities becoming more closely associated as
corporate rather than individual invention becomes more
and more important.
In this thesis we shall use the Taylor and Silbe.rs ton
definitions, separating invention or the creation of new
technical knowledge from innovation or the first use of
the knowledge in a commercial venture. This is partially
because /
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because it is felt that the two activities can be
I
separated in principle. Certainly not all inventions
are commercially exploited, as the definition states,
they merely have the potential to become new products
or processes. When new technical knowledge is used
for innovation purposes, it may be only after a
considerable lag-time representing the development stage.
Also, the two processes of invention and innovation may
require quite different skills. Pavitt and Soete (1980)
suggest that innovative activities involve corporate
strategy, production and marketing skills and professional
competence beyond the laboratory and patenting department.
Product and Process Inventions This thesis in
concentrating on the generation of new technical knowledge
will focus on invention. In order to be consistent
with our previous distinction between a firm's product
and process technologies, the distinction between a
product and process invention will also be made. A
process invention is defined here as one which potentially
reduces the inventing firm's costs of production. A
product invention, on the other hand, may potentially be
converted into a new or improved product with the aim
of increasing the firm's market share or moving it into
an entirely new market.
In practice the distinction between process and product
inventions may become blurred and in some cases arbitrary.
For example, it may be that a new process which reduces
the cost of producing a product may also alter it in some
way /
- 25 -
way. This problem is faced later in the thesis in the
1
empirical work when patents are classified as either
process or product inventions.
It should also be pointed out that a product
invention in the capital goods industry, is from an
aggregate economic point of view a process invention in
that it does not lead to any qualitative change in final
goods. However, while this may be true from an
aggregate or even an industry viewpoint, from the point
of view of the firm, which may be competing on the basis
of its product technology, the product distinction is
valid.
The Diffusion of New Technical Knowledge Using our
definitions, the various steps in a chain leading
to the wide use of a new technology can be shown as below:
Research Invention Development -»■ Innovation Diffusion
The last step in the chain, technological diffusion occurs
when the new technology spreads in use to firms other than
the innovating firm and becomes part of an industry's
accepted technology. This diffusion process occurs both
for new process knowledge and new product knowledge. A
number of factors determine the length of the diffusion
stage including patent protection, the ability of firms
to imitate or 'invent around' patents, the profitability
of the original innovation and the size of investment
required to implement the new technology.
Although /
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Although the diffusion of new technical knowledge will
1
not be the main concern of this thesis, it is important
to demonstrate that the various stages of the chain shown
above are related. Firms produce new technical knowledge
to use it in profit making ventures. If after inventing
and introducing a new product, a firm finds that its
competitors can imitate it very quickly, the rate of
return to invention and therefore the incentive to
invent may be diminished. However, a firm introducing a
new product in a capital goods industry, would benefit
from its innovation being diffused in the production
technology of the using industry very quickly. While
invention is the prime concern of this thesis, innovation
and diffusion are related and important to our under¬
standing of the inventive process.
1.4 The Measurement of Technological Change
In order to test the theoretical models of technological
change developed in this thesis, an adequate measure of
new technical knowledge is required. Yet it is difficult
to find an accurate measure of something as intangible
and as abstract as knowledge.
The measure of technological change chosen for this
study is the number of patents accepted from a firm by
the U.K. Patent Office over a period just exceeding one
year. While the practical procedures followed in
assigning patents to firms are outlined later in the
chapter on methodology, in this introduction it is useful
to discuss the general problems surrounding patent data
as /
as an index of technological change. It is also useful
to- review alternative measures, which have been used in
other studies.
Alternative Measures of Technological Change Initially
technological change was measured indirectly or by its
effect on productivity growth. Using a production
function approach, the residual or the increase in output
unexplained by the increases in capital and labour is
attributed to technological change. There are many
drawbacks to this approach however, as outlined in
section 1.2 (see pp. 9-12 ). From the standpoint of
this firm-level study the approach is unsatisfactory
because it does not consider the generation of new product
technology, which may, if the firm is in the capital goods
sector, contribute to another firm's productivity growth.
Two more direct measures of technological change are:
(1) R&D expenditures made by a firm or alternatively
employees engaged in R & D activity within the firm and;
(2) the number of patent applications made by a firm or
patents issued to a firm. These are also the two most
frequently used measures in firm and industry studies.
This is to a large extent due to data availability,
although somewhat less information is available in the
U.K. than in the U.S.
A potentially superior measure of technological
change is a list of a firm's contributions to new
technology over a period of time, ideally weighted by
some index of their quality. This information however
is /
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is costly, in terms of resource time, to compile.
1
While a number of U.S. studies have made use of new
product introduction as a measure of technological change,
such studies have been limited in their industrial scope.
Comanor (1965), in a study of 57 firms in the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry, used the number of new products
introduced,weighted by sales in the first two years
after introduction,as his measure of technological change.
In compiling his measure, Comanor gathered information
from an industry consultant and a marketing research
firm. Others, including Baily (1972) for drugs and
Mansfield (1969) for steel, petroleum refining and
bituminous coal industries, have used trade associations
and professional journals to compile lists of major
technological changes made by firms.
In the U.K., the Science Policy Research Unit at
the University of Sussex has compiled data concerning
over 2000 significant innovations in British industry
from 1945 to 1980 (Townsend et al., 1981). The data
base however, does not cover invention or incremental
innovations made by firms and the authors themselves have
some concern over the representativeness of the sample
of innovations. Due to limited resources and the
intention to evaluate a relatively large number of firms
involved in inventive activity across industries, the
choice of a measure of technological change in this thesis is
narrowed to R & D or patent data.
The Use of R & D Data to Measure Technological Change
Research /
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Research and Development expenditure and employment in
1
R&D activities are frequently used measures of
technological change, especially in U.S. studies. R&D
reflects the flow of inputs into the production of new
knowledge, generally undertaken in the industrial research
laboratory. In this sense it represents those activities
of the firm formally dedicated to technology changes and
accounted for as such in its records. The data is likely
to underestimate then, technological changes originating
on the shop floor as the result of production activity
itself. This is however, not so bothersome in a study
of large firms as it would be in a study of small firms,
where informal inventive activity would be expected to
be proportionately greater. It would be important
however in a cross-industry study, as industries
differ in the extent to which their research activities
are formalised in laboratories.
The use of R & D data to measure technological
change in this study is problematic both from a practical
and theoretical standpoint. In the U.K., although R&D
data is collected by the government on a regular basis from
firms, the information is published at the two and three
digit industry level only. Unfortunately no
comprehensive publication of R & D statistics at the
firm level is available. In the United States
economists have benefitted from the publication of firm
level /
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level R&D employment data.1
It would be possible of course, to compile U.K.
firm R&D data from the primary source, using a survey.
There is some evidence however, that such surveys do
not obtain high cooperation from firms. Schott (1976)
for example, surveying the largest 300 U.K. manufacturing
firms concerning their applied R&D expenditure, found
2
only 42 per cent cooperating with the survey .
Aside from the practical problems of data collection,
it is also questionable whether R & D as an input into
the knowledge production process is theoretically a good
proxy for the output of the process. Industries and
firms may differ in their ability to produce new technical
knowledge from given amounts of R & D expenditure. Some
firms may be more efficient than others in knowledge
production. Also the flow of basic knowledge to
industries might differ substantially, allowing greater




1. Information concerning firms' R&D employees in
the U.S. is published in Industrial Research Labor¬
atories in the United States by the National
Research Council, National Academy of Sciences.
2. Although the questionnaire's response rate was 59.3
per cent, of the 178 replies, 34 reported that they
undertook R&D but would not cooperate with the
survey. An additional 17 firms did not complete
questions related to the size of R & D activities.
Of the 127 firms fully cooperating, another 63
reported no R & D activity (see Schott, 1976, p.81).
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The Use of Patent Data to Measure Technological Change
1
The number of patents registered by a firm is taken in
this thesis to be an index of the firm's inventive
activity or of its production of new technical knowledge.
Although patent statistics have recognised disadvantages,
it is argued here, that if interpreted carefully, they can
provide a useful index of technological change. It is
important to emphasise, as Schmookler (1966) did in his
patent based study, that patent statistics are merely an
index of inventive activity. No attempt is being made
with the patent data to quantify in an absolute sense
new technical knowledge produced by firms.
A theoretical advantage of using patented inventions
as a measure is that they fit conveniently into our
definition of technological change in section 1.3. As
Boehm noted (1967, p.124) in his study of the
administration of the U.K. patent system: 'Patent law,
as part of the law of intellectual property, establishes
a property right in technical knowledge.' Although
legally complex, the definition of an invention is in its
essential characteristic quite clear, according to
Boehm (1967, p.125):
it sets out to ensure that patent
protection is available only to
technical developments which are
new. Newness or novelty is the
keystone of the laws' attempt to
define invention.
To be accepted as patented inventions, new technical
developments must pass two tests; the novelty test -
an /
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an inventive step must have occurred; and a relevancy
test - the knowledge must apply to a manner of new
manufacture. Examples of areas beyond the limits of
patent protection are agriculture, horticulture and
basic scientific principles, although a method of using
a basic scientific principle in manufacture can be
patented.
The practical advantage of an available patent data
base at the firm level is also a consideration. However,
if the deficiencies of patents as a measure of
technological change as compared with other measure were
significant, the practical advantage could not on its own
justify using the measure. It is argued here, that
compared with alternative measures, all of which have some
disadvantages, patents are an adequate measure for this
study. It should be noted that while patent data is
available at the firm level, it is by no means easily
compiled. A description of the compilation of the patent
data base is left to Chapter 7.
Despite the definitional convenience described above,
patents as a measure of technological change have serious
shortcomings which must be recognised. Two major
criticisms of patent statistics are summaried by Boehm
(1967, p.138):
As a measure of inventive activity they are
dearly defective - not all inventions are
patented and the greatest and the most
nugatory of inventions score equally what¬
ever their technological or economic value.
Such /
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Such limitations have caused some economists, including
1
Leonard (1971) , to regard patents as too unreliable a
measure to assess inventive activity. Taylor and
Silberston (1973) while acknowledging their usefulness
as a rough indicator of inventive activity for some
purposes, are doubtful about using them in a statistical
analysis of market structure or size of firm on
technological performance. Since this is what this
study intends to do, the limitations described above must
be examined more closely.
Variations in the Propensity to Patent The first
critical point made by Boehm, that all inventions are not
patented, is important if we regard the number of patents
issued to a firm as an index of technological change. A
firm may decide that the expense of patenting an invention
is not justifiable considering the benefit received.
This may be because the invention is not sufficiently
valuable in economic terms or because the protection given
by a patent is not of sufficient value. The firm may
decide not to patent certain knowledge if it fears
that disclosure may lead to imitation by competitors.
This would be particularly true of in-house inventions
which do not appear in the market place and therefore
can be kept secret. There is a risk involved however in
non-patenting in that the firm has no property right
over the new knowledge which it has created.
There is some limited evidence on the extent to which
firms regard patents as important protection of their
technical knowledge, at least that knowledge which is
carried /
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carried to the innovation stage. In a U.S. study of
industrial patenting and imitation in four industries,
Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981, p.909) found that
70 per cent of the 48 innovations studied were patented.
The importance placed on patenting in the U.S. study
varied considerably between industries however, with the
drug industry regarding patents as most valuable. Patents
in the electronic and machinery industries were regarded
as of doubtful validity and offering little protection.
In the U.K., Freeman (1974) in his study of success
and failure of industrial innovation, found that almost
all of the innovators studied, both successful and
unsuccessful, took out patents and regarded them as
important. Freeman (1974, p.83) in another study used
patents to measure innovative activity in the plastics
industry, viewing the data as 'more useful than is
commonly believed'. He did stress the limitations of
patent data however, which include the variation between
firms and industries in their 'propensity to patent'.
The variability in the propensity for firms to
patent among industries must be considered in a study
such as this, which includes firms from an industrial
cross-section. Differences in inter-industry patenting
propensities can be attributed to a variety of factors.
For example, Scherer (1965a,p.1101) attributed the
'profuse' patenting in the chemicals industry to the
ease of gaining market positions through 'manipulated
molecule' patenting. The drug industry as sub¬
component /
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component of the chemicals industry seems particularly
prone to such profuse patenting, although the threat
of imitation along with the objective of a higher
market share seems a likely cause.
Pavitt and Soete (1980) while referring to innovative
activity rather than inventive activity, find that patent
data appear to underestimate innovative activity in
aerospace and motor vehicles just as R & D statistics
provide an underestimate in mechanical engineering and
in fabricated metals."1" With regard to aerospace,
Scherer (1965a)notes that aircraft makers and other
defense specialists seldom seek patent protection on
inventions made under government contract since they are
obliged to extend either exclusive rights or at least a
royalty-free license to the purchaser. On the other hand,
R&D expenditure may underestimate technological changes
in industries lacking formal R&D laboratories, such as
fabricated metals and mechanical engineering, whereas
patent data pick up informal inventive effort.
Although the variability in the propensity to patent
among industries is troublesome, it is by no means
disastrous for our study. As Scherer (1965a) points out,
empirically the inter-industry variation in the propensity
to patent can be viewed as a random disturbance, unless
of course it is correlated with an independent variable.
It /
1. This thesis later, in Chapter 8, challenges the
Pavitt and Soete assertion with regard to motor
vehicle patenting.
- 36 -
It therefore imparts no bias in an empirical study, but
1
does increase the unexplained variance in patenting
activity among firms. It is important however, to
recognise the possible correlation which Scherer suggests.
The propensity to patent may also vary with firm
size and vary for types of inventions made by a firm,
whether product or process. Taylor and Silbertson
(1973) argue that there are reasons to expect that the
propensity to patent to be inversely related to firm
size. They suggest that large firms may patent less per
unit of R & D (or sales) than small firms in the same
field, because the former's R&D programmes include a
higher proportion of non-patentable work in development.
They add that the complex R&D projects undertaken by
large firms require larger inputs per patentable
invention for technical reasons. Furthermore, Comanor
and Scherer (1969) found in a U.S. study that small
firms had a greater propensity to patent than large firms,
who could rely on their market and technological dominance
to protect.their innovations.
Another plausible hypothesis is that the propensity
to patent is greater for new product knowledge than new
process knowledge. This, in fact, is the finding of
Comanor and Scherer (1969) in the U.S. Processes can
be more adequately protected by industrial secrecy than
products which are disclosed when they reach the market
place. This dichotomy is important to this study which
separates the two types of inventions and must be recognised
in /
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in the empirical analysis to follow.
Another consideration is the proneness of patent
data to variation over time. Due to secular trends in
the data, Mueller (1966) argued against the use of
patents in time series analysis. He was encouraging
however, of their use in cross-sectional analysis
providing the data were averaged over 3-5 years to account
for short-term fluctuations. Because of limited
resources for the compilation of firm patent data, this
cross-sectional study covers a shorter period of time
than that recommended by Mueller. Our chosen period
however, can be broken down into two shorter sub-periods
to give us a check on fluctuations in patenting activity
among selected firms.
Varying Patent Quality In this study the inventive
activity of a firm is represented by the number of patent
specifications accepted by the U.K. patent office from
the firm over a little more than one year. Thus the
second point made by Boehm in his criticism of the use
of patent data is applicable to this study; that is that
every patent is given equal weight regardless of the
technological or economic value of the invention. Patents
which open up entirely new technologies and those whose
significance is trivial are weighted equally.
Norris and Vaizey (1973, p.38) list the four possible
dimensions of the magnitude of an invention as follows:
A. /
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, A. Technical past - the magnitude of
the technical problem overcome
B. Technical future - number and size
of subsequent inventions that follow
C. Economic past of invention - cost of
invention in resources
D. Future yield or economic future -
discounted present value
Such dimensions however, are extremely difficult to
measure. Dimensions A and B would require technical
expertise in the relevant area along with some difficult
predictions, while C and D would require a substantial
amount of economic data. Bosworth (1973) has developed
and used at the U.K. aggregate level a measure of the
economic value of an invention; that is the number of times
a patent is renewed. In this study however, such a
measure is prohibited as 4885 patents would have to be
traced.
Although the lack of a weighting system is a deficiency,
some consolation is gained from the pattern patenting
activity actually takes. An analysis of a firm's patents
over a period of time is likely to show a cluster of patents
rather than a single patent related to any change in a
particular production process or product. For example,
in this study's patent data base there are five patents
from Pilkington Brothers concerning glass fibres to re¬
inforce cement. A patent count therefore gives an
index of activity taking place in an inventive area over
a period of time, partially picking up B above.
Comanor /
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Comanor and Scherer (1969) view the underlying
differences in patent value as a random variable, much
like the variation in inter-industry propensity to
patent. They add that a patent count is not very
different from a count of R & D employees which assumes
that each employee is of equal value as an inventive input.
They (Comanor and Scherer, 1969, p.393) caution however,
that the quality of patents might vary so widely that the
'central tendencies would be literally drowned in variance'
causing one to question whether results are meaningful
or only 'statistical noise'.
Taylor and Silberston (1973) expressing doubts concerning
the validity of patent counting as a measure of technological
change, warn that patents' variation in economic significance
may not be random as between firms of different size. There
appears to be no evidence to support this assumption other
than findings that R&D per patent increases with firm
size. As noted previously, this pattern could be attributed
to a number of causes, including inefficiences and lack of
formal R&D programes in smaller firms, other than more
complex and valuable patenting by large firms. In fact a
tentative finding of Sander (1972) in the U.S. was that
patent complexity has no relation to firm size.
Comanor and Scherer (1969), in comparing a count of
patents from 57 US pharmaceutical firms with two other
indices of technological change, attempted to test whether
the differences in patent quality overwhelm any association
between patents and technological change. They found
that both patenting and R&D were correlated with the
introduction of new drugs in the 57 firms. In fact a
number of studies, including those by Scherer (1965a) and
Mueller /
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Mueller (1966) have found a significant association between
R&D and patenting activity at the firm level. This
{
caused Mueller (1966, p.36) to remark that there
appeared to be a 'significant relationship between what
goes into the inventive process and what comes out of it.'
Given the findings above and considering the
disadvantages and advantages of both measures of
technological change, patent statistics are considered
to be the best measure for this study. Although this
section has pointed to significant drawbacks of the
data, if the limitations are recognised and care is
taken in analysis, a count of patents issued to a firm
should provide a useful measure of inventive activity.
1.5 The Need for Further Study
Given the important economic effects of technological
change outlined in this chapter, an interest by economists
in the allocation of resources to its production is fully
justified. Although a considerable amount of work in
the area has been done in the last two decades, including
a good deal of empirical work, very little of this has been
Undertaken in the U.K., using U.K.data. As Kennedy and
Thirwall (1972) stated in 1972 in relation to work on
technological change in the UK, there has been a lack of
research on research. Since that time there
have been a few empirical studies, but much more evidence
is needed to establish whether or not theories which have
been tested successfully using U.S. data are just as valid
for the U.K. Also, no previous study has examined the




In addition Schmookler's separation of a firm's
product technology from its process technology has been
ignored by many undertaking studies of technological change,
although this was an important part of his work. This
study, by way of contrast, emphasises this distinction both
in the theoretical and empirical models developed to
explain firm inventive activity.
In the next dhapter a brief profile of industrial
inventive activity in the U.K. is presented. The Chapter
is intended to give an overview of the extent and dis¬
tribution of both R&D and patenting activity among
industries. Chapter three sets the stage for the
development of models of inventive activity, by examining
the nature of technical knowledge as an economic variable.
Here any peculiar features of knowledge are considered
with a view to the implications for the allocation of
resources to the production of knowledge.
In chapters four and five a review of previous
theoretical and empirical work concerning the production
of knowledge by the firm is offered. Here, any improve¬
ments which can be made in developing our own models will
be emphasised.
Chapter six develops theoretical models concerning
the firm's decision to undertake inventive activity. Here
distinctions between product and process inventions are
emphasised. In chapter seven the problems faced in
applying the theoretical models to the available data,
including patent data, are explained. Chapter eight
then /
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then reports the results of the empirical tests. Chapter
nine evaluates the methodology used in the thesis,
particularly with regard to the approach to further study.
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CHAPTER TWO
A PROFILE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN U.K. INDUSTRY
1 •
Prior to launching a study of the inventive activity of
the largest firms in the U.K., it is useful to gain some
perspective of the amount of resources devoted to techni-
logical change, both in the aggregate and among industries.
This chapter outlines the major trends in the allocation
of resources to new technology, offering comparisons
between the U.K. and other western industrialised
countries. An assessment of the overall contribution
of the largest firms in the country is also presented.
Due to the availability of R&D statistics at
the aggregate and industry levels, much use of this data
will be made in this profile chapter. The government
in the U.K. has compiled and published R&D statistics
by two and three digit SIC levels" since 1964 . The latest
survey year for which data is available is 1981; however,
at the time of this writing, detailed industry statistics
were available only to 1978. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
European Economic Community's statistical division
(Eurostat) are data sources for international R&D
comparisons.
Other measures of inventive and innovative activity
used in this chapter are patent data, data on employment
of scientists and engineers, from the Census of Production,
and significant innovations compiled by the Science
Policy/
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Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. A source
of patent data for international comparisons is the U.S.
Office of Technological Assessment and Forecast which
publishes U.S. patent data, by country of origin and by
industry.
2.1 Aggregate R&D Expenditure in the U.K.
Despite the measurement difficulties outlined in the
last chapter, aggregate R&D statistics give us some
perspective of the total amount of organised effort
devoted to technological change. According to official
estimates, research and development expenditure in the
U.K. accounted for approximtely 2.3 per cent of GDP
1
in the latest survey year, 1981. This percentage,
as shown in Table 2.1a below, has returned to the level
achieved in the 1960's after falling in the early to
mid 19 70's.^ It should be noted that in 1972, the survey
3
year most relevant to our study, there was a drop
in real R&D expenditure over the previous year of 1969.
This trend continued in 1975, but since 1978 a significant
upturn in real expenditure on R&D is evident
1 The figure here refers to R&D expenditure in the
fields of science and technology and excludes the
social sciences and the humanities.
2 Since the percentages in Table 2.1a are calculated
using current-priced data, changes in them may
reflect the effects of relative price movements
in R&D compared with general price movements. The
highly labour intensive nature of R & D implies costs
rising faster than the general price index over the
1970's.
3 Patent data used in the empirical analysis of this
thesis cover acceptances in 1975. If a three to
four year lag of patents on R&D is correct, 1972













































































































































































































































































Table 2.1a shows, in a breakdown of R&D expenditure
by performer, that industry spent 6 per cent more in
real terms in 1981 over the previous survey year of
1978. The three years to 1978 saw a rise of over
16 per cent, while in the three years to 1975 real
industrial R&D expenditure actually fell. Industry
in 1981 performed about 56 percent of total R&D.
The industrial section shown in Table 2.1a is composed
of private industry, the public corporations and the
research associations. Private industry accounts
for the great majority of expenditure by the industrial
section; 89 per cent in 1978 (Bowles, 1981, p. 98).
Not all of the R&D work performed by private
industry is internally funded, however. As shown in
Table 2.1b, a significant amount, or about 32 per cent,
was funded by the government in 19 78 , down or. the gover¬
nment's share in 1972. Preliminary 1981 estimates show
the percentage of government financed R&D expenditure in
private industry to be 34 per cent (see British Business,




Funding of R&D Performed by Private
Indust ry 1972 and 1978
1972 1978
Sector Providing R&D % of R&D % of
Funds £ mil Total £ mil Total
Government 268.0 36. 3 652.6 32.2
Universities - - - -
Public Corporations 8.9 1 .2 39.9 1 .9
Research Associations . 3 - - ~
Private Industry 412.6 55.8 1184.5 57.5
Overseas 49.5 6.7 173.9 8.4
Total 739.2a 100.0 2061.2a 100.0
Sources: J.R.Bowles, 'Research and Development:
Expenditure and Employment in the Seventies.'
Economic Trends, No. 334 (August 1981), p.98
Table I.
CSO Research and Development Expenditure and
Employment (London: HMSO, 1976) p. 8, Table 1A
aFigures may not add to totals due to rounding.
Another important breakdown for the purposes of this
thesis is the type of R&D work carried out - basic research,
applied research or development - particularly by private
industry. In 1978 of the total amount of R&D (current
expenditure) performed by private industry, 77.7 per cent
was allocated to development, 18.9 per cent to applied
research and 3.4 per cent to basic research (see Bowles,
1981, p. 99). Corresponding figures (from the same
source) for government performed R&D are 53.1 per cent
to development, 26.7 per cent to applied research and
17.8 per cent to basic research, with 2.3 per cent
unallocated. More recent 1981 estimates show expenditure
by private industry on basic and applied research to
have/
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fallen slightly, with more emphasis placed on development
(see British Business, 9 December, 1983, p. 751).
Overall, the figures show a concentrated effort in industry's
case in developing inventions for commercial exploitation.
Although less pronounced, the government also spent a
majority of its efforts in the development area.
2.2 Inventive Effort by Private Industry
A brief look at R&D expenditure figures by broad
industry group shows electronics, chemicals and aerospace
to be the leaders in terms of total spending. Table 2.2a
shows, however, that the positions of these three leaders
have changed over time. Real expenditure on electronics
doubled over the period shown, bringing it up to first
place in 1981. In contrast, the volume of spending on
aerospace has decreased since 1964, although spending
increased over the three years to 1981 so it again leads
chemicals. Motor vehicles and other electrical engineering
have also experienced a decrease in real R&D spending while
mechanical engineering has recovered from a low point in
1972. While R&D employment figures generally confirmed
expenditure trends, it is noteworthy that employment in
aerospace did not change between 1978 and 1981 (see




R&D Expenditure by General Industry Group at
Constant 1975 Prices for Selected Years, 1964-1981
£ million
1964 1972 1978 1981
All manufactured products







1365 1377 1512 1661
197 231 284 277
115 94 118 124
222 302 442 511
82 68 69 53
100 97 88 80
391 367 285 337
260 219 226 173
Sources: Business Statistics Office, 1978 Industrial
Research and Development Expenditure and Employment
Business Monitor M014 (London: HMSO, 1980), p.5
Table 1.
"Statistics Industrial Research and Development in
the U.K." British Business (9 December 1983), p.751
Table 2.
As noted in the previous section, a significant
percentage of the R&D undertaken by private industry is
financed by the government. Table 2.2b shows that the
percentage varies greatly by industry group, with the
government making substantial contributions in electronic
engineering and in aerospace. Electronics and aerospace
are two of the three R&D leaders in terms of industry
spending as pointed out from Table 2.2a. Chemicals, the
third spending leader, has a negligible contribution by the
government. It is also noteworthy that while government
funding for aerospace continued to be substantial in 1981,
the proportion was down significantly from previous
survey years. While mechanical engineering suffered a
10 percentage point drop in the proportion of government
funding for R&D from 1964 to 1978, the percentage figure
was up again in 1981. This corresponds to a rise in real




Percentage of R&D Expenditure in Private Industry
81Financed by the Government in Selected Years 1964—
Per cent of Total
1 964 1 972 1 978 1981
All manufactured products 36 37 37 3 4
Chemicals and allied products 1 - A1
Mechanical Engineering 16 9 6 1 3
Electridal Engineering
(including electronics) 36 41 48 na
Of which: Electronics 48 46 53 50
Motor vehicles 1 AI 4 1
Aerospace 84 85 72 68
Sources: Business Statistics Office, 1978 Industrial
Research and Development Expenditure and Employment
Business Monitor M014 (London: HMSO, 1980), p.6,
Table 3.
"Statistics Industrial Research and Development in
the U.K." British Business (9 December 1983) p.751,
Table 6.
In order to examine the comparability of the various
measures of technological change, the Science Policy Research
Unit (SPRU), at the University of Sussex, gathered
information from several sources to examine industry shares
of innovative activity in 1975. Table 2.2c below, which
reproduces the SPRU's work, shows industrial innovative
activity as measured by R&D, patenting in the U.K. and
U.K. patenting in the U.S. Both total and industry (non¬
government) financed R&D figures are presented. The
sectoral shares of patenting in the U.K. were calculated
by the SPRU from data provided by the U.K. Patent Office
and required converting from a patent classification system
to an industrial classification, based on work by Boehm
(1967). The figures for U.K. patenting in the U.S. are
























































































































































































































The two patenting measures presented in Table 2.2c
were found to have a correlation coefficient of .95 which
is significant at the one per cent level. The correlation
coefficients of total R&D with the two patenting measures
are low: .41 for U.S. patent shares and .42 for British
patent shares, both significant at five per cent (Townsend,
1981, p. 102). The rather low correlation, however, may
be due to the difficult task of converting the patent
classification scheme to an industrial classification
scheme. We shall return to this point later when looking
at the Boehm conversion system in more detail.
It should be noted from Table 2.2c that, once again,
the three leaders in terms of total R&D funding are electri¬
cal and electronic engineering, aerospace and chemicals.
As expected, the sectoral share of aerospace declines once
government is excluded as does electrical and electronic
engineering, but to a lesser extent.
Somewhat surprising is the high share of mechanical
engineering of total patenting and the much lower share
of the sector in total R&D. This is also true, but less
pronounced for both instruments and metal goods. The
authors suggest the importance of small firms in these
. , , - , , an extent
industries, which rely to much less * on formal R$D
programmes,as an explanation for the deviations.
Another notable divergence in Table 2.2c is the
higher sector share of innovative activity in motor vehicles
when R&D is used as a measure as opposed to when patenting
is used as a measure. These results, however, might be
/attributable
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attributable to the difficulties in converting the patent
classification to an industrial classification, which, as
will be emphasised later, is particularly troublesome
for the motor vehicle industry. Likewise, the much
higher share of pharmaceuticals in R&D than in patenting
could be due to patent classification difficulties within
the chemical industry. Reports of the importance of
patents to firms within the drug industry (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner,
1981) make the low share of patenting in the table
particularly hard to accept. Also notable is the much
higher share of patenting in the U.S. by the British
pharmaceutical industry.
A further indicator of importance, from the standpoint
of this thesis, is some measure of the research intensity
among industries. Such a measure is presented in
Table 2.2d, which shows R&D expenditure as a percentage
of sales for general industrial categories and for
selected industries which have high research intensities.
Table 2.2d shows that the three industry leaders in
terms of total R&D are also highly research intensive
when their R&D expenditure is measured against sales.
Chemicals, electrical and electronic engineering and
aerospace along with scientific instruments have high
R&D to sales ratios. The percentages for scientific
instruments decline, however, over the time period shown,
as do those for aerospace. Again, the figures for aero¬
space point to the heavy dependence on government funding

















ALL MANUFACTURING 1.53 0.99 1.61 1.12
Food, drink, tobacco 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.34
Chemical & allied products 2.45 2.44 2.24 2.23
Pharmaceutical products 8.12 8.12 10.38 10.38
Synthetic rubber, resins
and plastics 2.66 2.66 1.79 1.79
Other chemicals 2.10 2.06 2.07 2.05
Iron and steel 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45
Non-ferrous metals 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.34
Mechanical Engineering 0.80 0.75 0.93 0.93
Scientific instruments 3.12 2.33 1.85 1.58
Electrical Engineering 5.07 3.02 7.18 3.80
Electronic computers 10.32 7.06 16.08 13.18
Electronic components
including tele¬
communications 8.00 4.13 12.06 4.80
Ships and marine engines 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.57
Motor vehicles 1.49 1.49 1.45 1.40
Aerospace 21.13 4.02 18.52 5.73
Metal goods not elsewhere
specified 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27
Textiles and man-made fibres 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39
Leather, leather goods and
fur clothing and footwear 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Building materials and
abrasives 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.42
Pottery, china and glass 1.40 1.40 1.02 1.02
Timber and furniture 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Paper, paper products
and publishing 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
Rubber and rubber goods 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.84
Other manufactures 0.54 0.50 0.84 0.83
Sources: Business Statistics Office, 1978 Industrial Research
and Development Expenditure and Employment, Business Monitor M014
(London: HMSO, 1979), p.25, Table 19.
Business Statistics Office, 1975 Industrial Research and Development
Expenditure and Employment, Business Monitor MO 14 (London: HMSO 1980),
p.27, Table 19.
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intensive industries of pharmaceuticals, electronic
computers and electronic components become even more so
over the period shown. The increases in intensity are
especially pronounced in the two electronic industries
for total R&D, which includes government funds.
The motor vehicle industry which had a significant
share of R&D expenditure in Table 2.2c also has an above
average research intensity if only company funded R&D
is counted. Mechanical engineering, which also scored
well, especially in shares of total patents in Table 2.2c,
has a research intensity below average for all manufacturing
industries as docs the metal goods industry.
Another indicator of inventive activity or the
technological bias of an industry is the proportion of
employees who are scientists and engineers. As stated
by Bosworth (1981) , persons with such qualifications may
be employed not only in R&D laboratories, but also in
on going production, in the installation and testing of new
techniques and equipment and in advertising and marketing.
The latest available data in this area is from the 1971
census of production. It is broken down by three digit
SIC classes and is used later in this thesis in the
empirical analysis. Here, in Table 2.2e, industries which
have high densities of scientists and engineers are
presented in order of density. Again, industries in the













Synthetic Resins and Plastics
Radio and Electronic Components
Aerospace Equipment
Scientific and Industrial Instruments












Source: Department of Industry, Persons with
Qualifications in Engineering Science Technology,
Studies in Technological Manpower No. 5 (London:
HMSO, 1976), Table 1.
Office of Population, Census 1971 Great Britain,
Part 4 (London: HMSO, 1975) , pp.246-251, Table 34.
aQSE: Person holding a first qualification at
degree level or above in engineering, technology
or science.
2.3 International Comparisons
Research and Development spending has a similar impact
on the U.K. economy as it does on that of her major
international rivals. If total R&D spending is taker, as
a percentage of GDP, the figures obtained for the European
Economic Community, the United States and Japan are around
1.8%, 2.4% and 2.0% respectively for 1977 (Eurostat, 1982,
p.57). As seen in Table 2.1a, Britain has a percentage
of about 2. 3, up from 2.1% in the 1970's.
A similar pattern exists if we concentrate only on
R&D expenditure in manufacturing industry. Table 2.3a







































































































































































































research intensity. If, however, we isolate R&D
expenditure financed by manufacturing industry itself,
a different picture emerges. The U.K. falls to fifth
place in the table above only Belgium and Canada and
equivalent to Germany. The two different patterns
point to the comparative importance of government funding
of industrial R&D in the U.K. Table 2.3a shows also
the superior position of the U.K. in terms of R&D financed
by manufacturing industry in the 1960's as compared to
the 1970's. The increase in research intensity of Japan
over the period is also notable.
Table 2.3a points to the importance of government
financed R&D in manufacturing in the U.K. as compared to
other countries. In fact, like the U.S., the government
in the U.K. funded more than 30 per cent of industry
performed R&D. In 1977, the comparable percentages for
other OECD countries were: 20-30 for France and Norway;
10-20 for Canada, Germany, Italy and Sweden; and under
5 in Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Pavitt, 1981,
p. 104).
Unlike most other OECD countries, government funding
has had a strong influence on the pattern of R&D spending
in British industry. In the U.K., such funds have been
concentrated in the aerospace and electronics industry.
Some have argued (for example, Kaldcr, 1981) that the
large scale British commitment to defence orientated
R&D is an integral part of the U.K.'s industrial decline.
On the other hand, it is also commonly argued that the
huge/
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huge expenditure on R&D in the defence industry in the
U.S. has aided technological change in other industries,
such as the computer industry. We will not deal with
this question further except to note that a higher pro¬
portion of U.K. government R&D funds go to defence than
any other EEC country (see Pavitt, 1980, p.45).
Although the U.K. retains a respectable ratio of
R&D spending to total GDP, its share of total industrial
R&D spending by all western industrialised countries has
declined. Table 2.3b shows the shares of selected CECD
countries in total and industry financed OECD industrial
R&D. The U.K.'s share decline in industry financed
R&D is more severe than its decline in total R&D spending.
Among the U.K. industries shown, only chemicals, by a
slight margin, and aerospace, by a wider margin, increased
their shares. During the time period,the U.S. shares




Shares in OECD Industrial R&Da in Selected
Countries 1 967&75 (p.ercentage 3)
Indus try
Total R&D Financed R&D
1 967 1975 1967 1975
United States 62.9 51 .4 49.4 45.7
France 6.4 6.9 5.9 6.2
Germany 8.6 11.4 11.6 12.5
Japan 7.3 12.8 11.9 17.3






Other Transport 8.9 6.4
Machinery 12.6 7.3
Metals , Metal
Products 11 ^I I » J 7.5
Source: Keith Pavitt, "Technology in British
Industry: a Suitable Case for Improvement." in
Charles Carter (ed) Industrial Policy and Innovation
(London: Heinemann Ltd, 1981) p.94, Table 7.2.
Figures for foreign country's share of patenting
in the U.S., from the U.S. Office of Technological
Assessment and Forecast, also show a decline in the U.K.
share between 1963 and 1978, and a substantial increase
1
in the Japanese share . Pavitt (1981) who compared ten
OECD1s countries' share of industrial R&D activity in
1975 with their share of U.S. patenting, found the two
measures to have a high significant correlation. He
also found this to be the case for the individual sectors
i
Pavitt (1981, p. 95) presents figures from the U.S.
OTAF which show the U.K. share of U.S. patenting
falling from 21% in 1963 to 11% in 1978 and the
Japanese share rising from 5% to 28% for the same
period.
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of chemical, electrical and and electronic engineering
and non-electrical machinery. Only in aerospace was
the correlation quite low. These results contrast
with the low correlation found by the Science Policy
Research Unit between the share of industrial R&D among
industries in the U.K. and their share of U.K. patenting
in the U.S., as previously noted.
2.4 Inventive Effort Among Firms in the U.K.
Research and development expenditure and employment are
highly concentrated in a few firms in the U.K. Table 2.4a
shows that the largest 100 R&D spenders accounted for 91 per
cent of the estimated total of private industrial R&D
expenditure in 1978 and 89 per cent of employment. The
picture is one of even greater concentration if only
government funds for industrial R&D are taken; 76 per
cent gees to the largest five spenders.
Table 2.4a



































Source: Business Statistics Office, 1178 Industrial
Research and Development Expendire and Employment,
Business Monitor M014, (London: HMSO, 1980) p. 23,
Table 16.
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It is also a fact that the majority of R&D is
conducted by firms which are large. Table 2.4b breaks
down R&D expenditure in private industry by firm size.,
in terms of the number of employees. It is clear from
the Table that the largest firms in the U.K. , or those
with over 10,000 employees, conduct the greatest share
of R&D across all product groups. The importance of the
largest firms, however, varies across industries. In
chemicals and mechanical engineering a high share of R&D
is conducted by medium-sized firms, with 1000-9999 employees.
In motor vehicles, electronics and electrical engineering,
and aerospace the largest firms dominate.
As noted previously, R&D expenditure data may reflect
the technological activities of the largest firms much
better than smaller ones due to the lack of formal R&D
laboratories in smaller firms. It is essential,
therefore, to consider another measure of technological
change and its relationship to firm size. Fortunately
the Science Policy Research Unit has provided recent data
on over 2000 significant innovations in British industry
from 1945 to 1980^ . Their analysis of innovating firms
by size is presented in Table 2.4c. The table shows the
distribution of significant innovations, grouped in five




The 2293 innovations, which were identified by industry
experts, covered 30 industrial sectors accounting for
58 per cent of manufacturing output in 1975. See
Townsend (1981, p.1).
TABLE2.4b










































































Source:BusinesstatisticOffi ,Industr alResear hand DevelopmentExp nditurea dm loyment.1978,Busi essMonitoO4 (London:HMSO,1980),p.22Table4.
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Table 2.4c shows that throughout the time period, over
half of the significant innovations were introduced by large
firms of 10,000 or more employees. Also, the largest
category of firms replaced medium sized firms as
innovators over the time period to some extent. The
table also shows very smalI firms , or those wi th
less than 200 employees, to be responsible for slightly
over 10 per cent of the significant innovations in
British industry. These results confirm earlier findings
by Freeman (1971) on the role of small firms in innovation.
Therefore, while the two measures of technological change,
R&D and significant innovations, show different patterns
as far as small firms are concerned, the predominance of
the largest firms is evident from both measures.
Table 2.4c
Percentage of Innovations in each Firm Size
Category,Five Year Periods, 1960-S0
Number of 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74a 1975-80a
Employees
1-199 11 ,.0 13.0 11.0 12.0
200-499 6..0 7.0 7.0 6.0
500-999 5,.0 5.0 4.0 3.0
1 ,000 - 9 ,999 27..0 23.0 19.0 13.0
10,000 and over 51 . 0 52.0 59.0 66.0
200..0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Townsend et.al., Science and Technology
Indicators for the U.K. (Sussex: Science Policy Research
Unit, 1981), p.44, Table 5.1.
aThe figures presented for the 1970's are weighted
percentages, assuming the same industrial sectoral
mix of innovations as from 1960-70.
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A breakdown of significant innovations into industrial
sectors shows considerable variation in terms of the size
distribution of the innovating firms. As shown in Table 2.4d,
large firms are comparatively strong in most chemical
sectors, industrial plant, electronic and electrical
equipment other than electronic capital goods and in the
process industries of cement, glass and food. It is
notable that medium-sized firms introduce fewer significant
innovations in chemicals than their R&D share (from Table
2.4b) would suggest. They are the strongest group,
however, in machine tools, mining machinery and broadcasting
equipment. Small firms contribute large shares of inno¬
vations in the mechanical engineering industries, instruments,
leather and footwear and electronic capital goods.
2.5 Summary
It is clear that a study of the technological changes
made by industry is timely, given Britain's falling share
of international research and development and patenting.
While the U.K. has maintained a position comparable to
her rivals ir. the percentage of total resources devoted to
R&D, the percentage of resources devoted by manufacturing
industry itself to technological change fell behind
other countries .during the ISVCPs. While government R&D -funding for
manufacturing industry is comparatively high, in the UK it only
impacts upon electronics and aerospace.
The published data available to us indicate that the








































































Source: Townsend et.al., Science and Technology
Indicators for the U.K. (Sussex: Science Policy
Research Unit, 1981), p.46, Table 5.2.
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research intensive industries of electronics, chemicals
and aerospace in the U.K. If patent data, rather than
R&D data, is used as an indicator of technological change,
then the mechanical engineering industry also appears
strong. The Chapter also shows that industrial R&D
is undertaken predominantly by a few firms which are
large. While small and medium-sized firms make notable
contributions to the significant innovations, here also
it is the large firms which dominate. There is some
justification, therefore, for an examination of the
inventive activity of the largest firms in the U.K.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE NATURE OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge, an unusual economic variable in many
respects, can be considered both an output and an input.
It is an output of the firm's research and development
process and in turn an input into its production process.
If a theoretical model of the generation of technical
knowledge by the firm is to be developed, it is
essential to examine some of the peculiar characteristics
of knowledge as an economic commodity. Particularly we
shall want to question whether or not these characteristics
have an impact on the incentive for firms to produce this
intangible commodity.
Inquiries into the nature of knowledge as an
economic good owe a debt to Arrow (1971) , who examined
the allocation of resources to invention from a welfare
economics perspective. Arrow argued that due to the
peculiarities of knowledge as a commodity, the
competitive system failed to achieve an optimal allocation
of resources to inventive activity. The peculiarities
noted by Arrow (1971, p.164) of 'indivisibility,
inappropriability and uncertainty' led him to predict a
downward bias in the amount of resources devoted to
producing knowledge.
This chapter reviews the peculiar characteristics of
knowledge put forth by Arrow, considering their contribution
to an underinvestment in knowledge production. Some
analysis is provided of the extent the attributes actually
apply /
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apply to the new technical knowledge produced by firms.
A discussion of the methods devised both by the state and
by firms themselves to cope with the difficulties
surrounding inventive activity is also included. Of
interest here is whether the difficulties involved in
knowledge production affect the types of firms, in terms
of size and market structure, likely to invent. The
chapter is concluded with a discussion of the allocation
of resources to inventive activity. Here Arrow's
characteristics leading to underinvestment in invention
are weighed against forces providing for the possibility
of overinvestment. Throughout the chapter, justifications
for government intervention in industrial inventive
activity are considered.
3.1 The Indivisibility Argument
A commodity is said to be characterised by
'indivisibilities' or 'lumpiness' if once produced its
services are indivisible among users. Though such goods
as bridges and roads are expensive to produce, they have
marginal user costs which are negligible. An optimal
allocation of resources to such goods therefore, calls for
a price of zero and unlimited distribution. Because
these conditions prevent the private sector from adequately
allocating resources to their production, goods possessing
the indivisibility characteristic are known as public goods.
It has been argued that knowledge, as an economic
commodity, exhibits the same 'indivisibility' characteristic
as /
- 70 -
as described above. Arrow (1971, p.170), who views
1
research and invention as devoted to the production of
information, asserts that a given piece of
information is by definition an indivisible commodity.'
While generally expensive to produce, once obtained,
information is relatively easy for others to assimilate.
Therefore, the duplication or transfer of knowledge can
occur at very low social cost. In this respect Usher
(1964, p.279) likened knowledge to "...a road broad enough
to accommodate any amount of traffic without congestion
and durable enough never to be in need of repair.'
The indivisibility characteristic leads to the
classic resource allocation problem with respect to
knowledge production. Arrow (1971, p.172) summarised
the situation as follows:
... any information obtained, say a new
method of production, should, from the
welfare point of view, be available free
of charge (apart from the cost of trans¬
mitting information.) This insures
optimal utilisation of the information
but of course provides no incentive
for investment in research.
Arrow added (1971, p.172):
In an ideal socialist economy, the reward
for invention would be completely
separated from any charge to the users of
the information. In a free-enterprise
economy, inventive activity is supported
by using the invention to create property
rights; precisely to the extent that it
is successful, there is an underutilization
of the information.
The lumpiness of knowledge therefore caused Arrow to
suggest a role for the state or a non-profit organisation
in /
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in its generation and dissemination.
1
The indivisibility argument, as it relates to
technical knowledge however, may be overstated. As
Nordhaus (1969a)points out, the transfer costs of technology
are not as low as usually supposed. While the transmission
cost of information may be very low, the costs of absorbing
technology in a production process could require a consider¬
able amount of resources. Knowledge may be embodied in
particular labour skills or in capital equipment which must
be purchased or developed by firms. In this respect the
low marginal costs of information transfer may be less
valid for technical knowledge than for general knowledge.
3.2 The Inappropriability Argument
An added problem for the producers of new technical
knowledge is the difficulty in appropriating all of the
benefits from it. This is because the external economies
associated with an intangible item such as knowledge are
hard to contain. While the patent system and the
technological lead-time gained by innovators help alleviate
the approprlability problem, the typical invention remains
only partially appropriable. This tends to aggravate
the problem of market underinvestment in knowledge
described in the last section.
Benefits to Imitators The generation of new technology
bestows external benefits on firms other than the knowledge
generating firm, who are able to use or imitate the new
technology in their own production processes and products.
The /
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The value added by the new knowledge for its producer
I
is therefore reduced, in turn reducing the incentive to
invent. In fact, as Taylor and Silberston (1973)
note, there may be a disincentive, since copying firms
would be in a superior position to the inventor, obtaining
the benefits of the new technology without the costs of
producing it. This argument relies on the low transfer
costs of knowledge, explained in the last section.
The 'inappropriability' problem is partially solved
by the establishment of legal property rights in new
knowledge in the form of a patent system. Under this
system, the Crown awards exclusive control over an invention
for a period of up to twenty years to the inventor who
first discloses it1. The patentee acquires the right,
enforceable by law, to decide who shall and who shall
not use his patented invention.
The patent system however, only partially solves the
problem of appropriability, since competitors can and do
'invent around' or imitate patented inventions. The
inadequacies- of the legal property right over knowledge
are described by Arrow (1971, p.170) as follows:
However, no amount of legal protection can
make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of
something so intangible as information. The
very use of information in any productive way
is bound to reveal it, at least in part.
Mobility of personnel among firms provides a
way of spreading information. Legally imposed
property rights can provide only a partial
barrier, since there are obviously enormous
difficulties in defining in any sharp way an
item of information and differentiating it
from other similar sounding items
1. The length of time for which a patent can be awarded and
renewed was increased in 1981 from 16 to 20 years. A prime
argument in favour of the extension was to increase
appropriability.
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Demsetz (1969) however, is not as pessimistic about
1
the possibilities of appropriating the value of inform¬
ation through the patent system as Arrow. He suggests
that the extent of appropriation would be increased by
increasing resources for policing patent infringements.
While acknowledging that all theft of information cannot
be eliminated at reasonable costs, he argues that
knowledge is not a unique asset in this respect.
Patent protection is now, however, the only means by
which firms may appropriate the benefits of their
inventions. As noted by Matthews (1973), the position
of technological leadership gained by the innovating firm
before rivals are able to imitate, is more important in
most cases than patent protection. Due to lags and
frictions in the information transfer process, the
rewards for R&D are not competed away instantly. There
are however, wide variations in imitation rates among
industrial innovations, as reported by Mansfield and others
(1977b). This in turn leads to considerable differences
in appropriability for inventing and innovating firms.
This matter shall be taken up in greater detail after a
description of the other external economies surrounding
knowledge generation.
Other External Economies Even if a firm producing
technical knowledge had no imitators, it is unlikely to
be able to internalise the full benefits of its
inventions. Substantial benefits are likely to be
reaped by the firm's customers, either final consumers or
other /
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other firms. Mansfield et.al (1977b) ,p. 148) show
graphically that a product invention in the capital goods
industry may have the effect of lowering prices of the
final goods produced by the capital equipment. Alter¬
natively instead of consumers reaping the benefits of the
invention, the firm purchasing and using the improved
capital good might attempt to reap most of the resulting
cost reductions in increased profits.
Mansfield and others (1977b) also show that there are
benefits external to the innovating firm for both product
innovations sold directly to final consumers and for
process innovations used by the innovating firm itself."'"
Consumer product innovations may reduce the cost of a
particular household activity such as operating dish¬
washers. The potential price-reducing benefits of a
process innovation reducing costs to the using firm is
analogous to the case of the capital goods innovation
already noted.
The external benefits described above together with
the externalities due to imitation would have to be
considered in arriving at a social as opposed to a private
rate of return to invention. The social costs of
invention /
1. Treating new product inventions as the archtype of
economic progress, Usher (1964) shows through the
use of indifference analysis that any commercially
profitable invention confers a net benefit on
the community as a whole and that some inventions
are worth undertaking to the community as a whole
even though they are unprofitable under a patent
system.
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invention and innovation, for example parallel research
efforts and uncommercialised research, would also have
to be considered. An important empirical finding of
Mansfield et al. (197 7b, p.157) , when they calculated
rates of return to 17 industrial innovations in the U.S.,
was that private rates of return were generally lower
than social rates of return. In fact, in about 30 per
cent of the cases, the private rate of return was so low
that no firm with hindsight would have invested. On the
other hand the social rates of return to these innovations
was so high that from society's point of view the
investment was well worth while. The important point is
whether the private returns to invention are high enough
relative to alternative investments to induce firms to
undertake R&D. As Griliches (1958) notes, the social
rate of return to the invention and development of nylon
was likely many times higher than the private rate of
return; yet profits were high enough to induce DuPont
to follow through without a public subsidy.
A further externality which is very difficult to
calculate is the role new technology plays in stimulating
and prompting further inventive activity. It is often
argued that it is not only basic knowledge which acts
as an input into the production of technical knowledge,
but also technical knowledge itself. Also Usher (1964,
p. 279) notes that 'most research yields at least some
useful by-products that cannot be appropriated', these
being /
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being due to 'the subtle relations among the branches of
I
research' which cause new knowledge in one area to be
unexpectedly helpful in solving problems in another area.
Factors Affecting the Degree of Appropriability The
degree to which a firm can appropriate the benefits of the
technical knowledge it generates varies considerably
depending on the properties of the knowledge itself and the
industrial structure the firm operates within. Some
technological changes will be more susceptable to imitation
than others, reducing the returns to the inventor.
The effect of market structure on the firm's ability
to appropriate the rewards of its inventions, and there¬
fore on its incentives to invent, has been the subject
of much study and controversy. This is because the
effects of market structure on appropriability may be
opposing and offsetting. The situation is further
complicated by the effect of market structure on other
factors (factors other than appropriability), such as
lack of competitive incentive, on the inventive activity
of firms.
It is argued, on the one-hand that the extent of
appropriability is higher in monopolistic of oligopolistic
industries than those more closely approximating perfect
competition. This is because the external economies
associated with the benefits of cost-reduction or product
enhancement may be easier to internalise if the firm
has a good deal of market power. Rather than consumers
benefit from cost reducing inventions in lower prices,
the /
-li¬
the firm may benefit from increased profit margins. Firms
with little market power may not have this option. Matthews
(1973) cites the competitive industries of agriculture and
building as examples of appropriability so low that R&D
must be done by thoseother than the producer; e.g. suppliers
or customers, the government or cooperative associations.
On the other hand market structure affects the rate of
imitation of new technical knowledge which in turn affects
appropriability and the incentive to invent. The effects
here are far from straightforward. Obviously the fewer
the number of firms in the industry the lower the number
of potential copiers. However the strength of response
is not determined by numbers alone but also by the degree
of technological rivalry, which may be intense among
oligopolists. The threat of imitation is further
complicated by potential entrants to the industry. We
might expect the firm to reduce its inventive activity if
its inventions are likely to be copied quickly by rival
imitators. Inventing firms can at the same time be
imitating firms and the scramble for market shares through
technological rivalry may boost the inventive effort of
all firms in an industry. The effect of market structure
on the incentive to invent will be discussed further in
following chapters.
Market structure is not the only factor affecting
imitation rates. Imitation costs and lags may be higher
in some industries than others. Mansfield (1968, 1977),
who /
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who has undertaken considerable empirical work in the
1
area, has found the range of response to be significant.
In a simple model of the imitation of process inventions,
Mansfield et al. (1977b),cite prime determinants of
rapid imitation to be high profitability and a low
required level of investment. These factors were also
important to the speed of imitation of product innovations,
together with the existence of patents, the ease of
inventing around them and the growth in sales of the
product innovation. It is argued that where sales of the
innovations are growing rapidly, the chance for an
imitator to gain a foothold is enhanced.
Parker (1974, p.49) adds that unless a monopoly
exists or a company has a 'watertight patent position,
the imitation rate is outside of its control.' This
influences the risk involved for a firm in assessing
future revenues from its new technology.
Taylor and Silberston (1973) also refer to the strength
of the patent position in determining the likdihood of
imitation. Regarding the infringement of patents by
competitors, they (Taylor and Silberston, 1973, p.20)
suggest that 'strong patents or those which are defendable
in court as 'novel methods of manufacture' are unlikely
to be infringed upon. This is especially true if they
are°significant commercial value to the firm, causing it
to be wary of copiers. The case is different for weak
patents which may not withstand a court test."'" If these
are /
1. Very few patent disputes actually reach the Court.
Like that in other countries, testing of U.K.patents
is unofficial, consisting of 'infringement and counter-
infringement'. (See Taylor and Silberston, 1973, p.14)
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are of commercial value they are more likely to be
copied without a protest from the patentee who may not
wish the weakness of the patent exposed.
Another factor affecting appropriability is the type
of invention, either product or process. To the extent
that process inventions are more likely to remain secret
than product inventions, whose technical feature are
revealed on the market place, one would expect their
appropriability to be greater. Matthews (1973) however,
disagrees,predicting the benefits of process innovations
to be less appropriable than product innovations.
Very limited evidence provided by Manfield et al. (1977b,
p .160) in this area shows the differences between
social and private rates of return to be higher for
products than processes, although the difference is not
statistically significant.
The degree to which the firm can internalise the
benefits of its inventions affects its incentive to
invent. Therefore to the extent that degrees of
appropriability differ among industries and types of
inventions, the allocation of resources to inventive
activities may be distorted. Matthews (1973, p.14)
states the problem as follows:
... the appropriability of the results of
R&D varies greatly between different
cases. So at least as important as the
general underutilisation of resources to
R & D as a whole is the likely mis-
allocation within R&D between projects
of differing degrees of appropriability.
We /
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We shall return to this problem of misallocation of
R&D funds after reviewing the 'uncertainty' characteristic.
3.3 The Uncertainty Argument
The expenditure by firms on research and development
can be viewed very much like an investment decision, with
the expectation of a future stream of revenues in exchange
for a given capital cost. Therefore, like any other
investment decision, the estimation of future expected
benefits involves an element of risk. It is argued by
a number of economists however, that the risk involved is
considerably greater than conventional types of investment
in capital equipment. Arrow (1971, p.172) explains that
due to its very nature, invention must be looked upon as
a very risky business:
The central economic fact about the processes
of invention and research is that they are
devoted to the production of information. By
the very definition of information, invention
must be a risky process, in that the output
(information obtained) can never be predicted
perfectly from the inputs ...
Since it is a risky process, there is bound to
be some discrimination against investment in
inventive and research activities.
Others addressing the problem of uncertainty in
R&D activities have stressed the distinction between
risk or what Nordhaus (1969a, p.55) describes as 'mild
uncertainty' and true uncertainty. Under risky conditions,
the firm can calculate estimates of the probability
distribution of returns and act accordingly . However
under true uncertainty such estimates are unmeasurable.
Inventive /
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Inventive and innovative activities, it is argued, are
likely to be characterised much more by uncertainty than
risk.
The Reaction of Firms to the Uncertainty Problem
Available evidence shows that firms deal with uncertain¬
ties of invention and innovation by adopting a very
cautious approach. They favour projects which are short
term and with the objectives of making very small advances
in technology. In addition it is often argued that to be
induced to undertake more important R&D projects, firms
require a very high estimated rate of return.
In order to investigate firm strategies to minimise
risk, it is useful to distinguish between the technical
uncertainties associated with R&D and the market
uncertainties. Technical risks are those associated
with successful completion of an R & D project with an
output representing new technical knowledge. Market risk
is associated with the liklihood of the commercial success
of a new technological development. A consensus would
agree that market risks prove the more difficult for the
firm.
Technical risk depends to a great extent on the
complexity and size of the technological development sought.
While fundamental research and radical product and process
inventions may be characterised by high degrees of
technical risks, projects which seek only minor technical
improvements are not very risky.
Certainly /
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Certainly the available evidence shows that R&D
projects undertaken by firms are not characterised by
high levels of technical risk. Schott (1976, p.86), in
her survey of applied R & D in the largest 300 firms in
the U.K., found that 60 per cent of technically successful
R&D projects were completed within two years. In the
U.S. Gerstenfeld (1970) and Mansfield (1968) also found
project completion times to be low. Schott comments
that while the short-term nature of R & D makes the
likdihood of radical new innovations small, the cumulative
effect of small improvements can be large. Schott's
findings are consistent with those of Hamburg (1966, p.71)
and Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman (1969, p.72-88) who in
studies of important inventions attributed only 26 per
cent and 20 per cent respectively to corporate R&D
laboratories.
A number of U.S. studies have examined the expected
probability of technical success (prior to project launch)
for R&D projects undertaken by firms. Gerstenfeld
(1970, p.22) calculated an average probability of success
of .71 for 170 firms. Mansfield (1968, p.57) found
expected probabilities to be .80 by the project team and
over .50 when corrected for the project team's optimistic
bias, for seventy R&D projects in one leadings. U.S.
p. 1firm .
1. The actual success rate for the 70 projects was 44
per cent, however only 16 per cent of the failures
were attributed to technical problems. Most
failures were attributed to changes in project
objectives and changes in the priorities of the firm.
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A more recent study by Mansfield et al. (1977a,p.24)
f '
however found the estimated probabilities of technical
success for R&D projects to vary greatly among 16 firms.
Parker (1974) argues that technical risk is not an
independent variable, but one subject to a good deal of
influence on the part of the firm. For example, a
firm can decrease the risk of its R&D investment
expenditure by diversifying among projects with some
statistical independence.1 A firm might also adopt
parallel R&D efforts toward one particular technical
problem, raising costs, but increasing the probability
of success. These types of risk lowering activities
of course, favour the large firms with access to
considerable resources for R&D.
Mansfield (1968) however argues that corporate R&D
laboratories seldom resort to parallel R&D efforts to
lower risks, precisely because the risks they take are
so small. As evidence he (Mansfield, 1968, p.60)
cites findings concerning 45 R & D projects, showing
actual expenditures exceeding budgeted expenditures by
20 per cent only in 15 per cent of the cases. Other
work by Mansfield et al(197^)shows that cost over-runs for
R&D projects are greater for new products than product
improvements or for riskier types of projects.
It /
1. Nordhaus (1969, p.56) cautions however that when the
distribution of returns to research is highly
irregular this result does not hold.
- 84 -
It seems generally accepted that the market risks of
t
R&D are greater than the technical risks assumed by
firms. This is because market risks are much more
susceptible to outside influence. The reactions of
both the firm's competitors and consumers must be
predicted far in advance of the market launch of the
innovation, if future revenues are to be estimated
correctly. There is the further threat of technological
obsolescence, cutting off revenues abruptly. Schott
(1976, p.89) found that virtually all innovations of
large U.K. firms were regarded as obsolete by their
twentieth year and 36 per cent between their fifth and
tenth year. She found product obsolescence to occur
more readily than process obsolescence.
The evidence concerning market risk is much weaker
than that concerning technical risks taken by firms.
Mansfield et al. (1977a,p.24) find for a small sample
of U.S. firms, that the probability of economic success
(given commercialisation) for the majority of firms is
over .70 for the R&D undertaken. The definition of
economic success used here is a rate of return on
commercialised R&D over that available on other
investment opportunities. In an earlier study by
Mansfield (1968, p.59), it was found that the
probability of market success of commercialised projects
was .40.
Park jggests that the actions of firms with
respect /
respect to inventive and innovative activity show that
management must regard market risks as high,
pew resources are allocated by firms to R & D activities.
Table 2.2d in chapter Two shows that for all manufacturing
industry, R&D represents only 1.12 per cent of sales.
We have already noted the short term nature of R & D
projects and evidence on payback periods shows that these
are short also, indicating a preference for non-risky
ventures. Gerstenfeld (1970, p.22) in a survey of 170
U.S. firms found the average payback period to be 4.26
years for large firms and 3.50 for others. This suggests
that large firms take a slightly longer term view. The
rate of return to R & D projects should be expected to be
high to induce firms to undertake the riskier types. On
profitability there is mixed evidence however, which is
difficult to analyze without knowing the importance of the
innovations introduced.
A number of studies, for example Mansfield (1968, p.58),
show very high rates of return to R & D projects, well over
100 per cent. However, later research by Mansfield et al.
(1977b,p.157) shows the median private rate of return to
17 innovations to be about 25 per cent, with much variation
and including some very low rates of return. The 17
innovations in the U.S. were described as of average or
routine importance, not major breakthroughs.
Another point should be made on the distinction between
the risks involved in open-market product innovations and
in /
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in-house process innovations. While process innovations
t
involve only technical uncertainties, product innovations
involve both technical and market uncertainties. This
led Freeman (1974, p.227) to conclude that the majority
of firms would have 'a powerful incentive most of the
time' to avoid radical product innovations, product
differentiation and process innovation'.
While the above conclusion might hold for radical
new products, the evidence shows that firms spend the
majority of their R&D funds on product innovations,
although these could conceivably amount to small steps
at differentiation. In Schott's survey (1976, p.85)
the largest U.K. firms spent 63 per cent of their R&D
funds on product innovations and the rest on process
innovations. In a U.S. study by Gerstenfeld (1970) the
development of new products was overwhelmingly the priority
use for R&D funds, followed by the improvement of
existing products and the development of new processes.
Therefore, despite the extra market risk, product
innovations, are still looked upon more favourably .
According to Parker (1974) this is because management
believe that greater impact is made on markets by selling
new products than existing products at cheaper prices.
He adds that such attitudes show an aversion to price
competition and a desire to differentiate products to
avoid rivals' encroachment.
Finally, it should be noted that not all firms are
risk /
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risk- averse. Firms, 'for example undertaking R & D in
1
biotechnology, are taking very large technical risks
as well as market risks, with very high expected rates
of return. Freeman (1974, p.237) explains that the risk
aversion of entrepreneurs varies significantly with some
types more likely to gamble. These include: (a) small^
firm innovations; (b) large firms which can diversify
their R&D portfolio, thus taking on a few uncertain
investments; and (c) large and small firm innovators
whose 'animal spirits' lead them on and without realistic
estimates of probable returns.
Arrow's Solutions to the Uncertainty Problem Arrow
(1971) examined a number of possible solutions to the
problem of risk and underinvestment in inventive activities.
One solution has already been mentioned. This is the conduct
of R & D by large firms who are able to undertake a large
number of projects simultaneously, thus lowering risk.
This solution was not favoured by Arrow however. An
alternative proposal was to separate the act of risk-
bearing from invention itself, with investors buying shares
in inventors' proposed projects. A difficulty develops
here however known as the 'moral hazard', whereby the
investors cannot be assured of the best efforts of the
non-risk bearer, the inventor. This curtails the shifting
of risk; providing an explanation of large internal
financing of R & D projects (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982).
Another solution, favoured by Arrow, to the under¬
investment /
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investment problem, is to give the government the
responsibility for producing or at least financing the
production of technical knowledge. This would provide
a more diversified portfolio of investment projects,
as with the large firm, but unlike production by the
large firm, the new knowledge would tend to get greater
use. Demsetz (1969) however, questions whether the
government would always be more risk-taking than private
enterprise. He argues that in those cases where
technological success is synonymous with political success,
such as in putting a man on the moon, risky projects
would be undertaken. However, in cases where new
technology is associated with negative political effects
such as unemployment, the government might be more risk
averse than private enterprise. It could be counter-
argued however, that this latter case might be interpreted
as an investment decision based on all private and social
evidence of
costs and benefits, rather than*a risk averse government.
3.4 The Allocation of Resources to Invention
The preceding arguments concerning the indivisibility,
inappropriability and uncertainty which characterise
technical knowledge1, lead to the prediction of a downward
bias on the part of firms in the allocation of resources
to invention. Moreover, within this limited allocation,
a further misallocation is predicted, due to differences
in the extent of, for example appropriability among
industries /
1. The arguments apply even more strongly to general
knowledge.
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industries, firms and types of R & D projects.
1
While the patent system is designed to allow for
industrial investment in invention, it has been demonstrated
that it only provides a partial solution to the problem
surrounding the production of technical knowledge by firms.
Furthermore with patents differing in importance and ease
of infringement between industries, there is no guarantee
that it lessons the misallocation problem. As Taylor
and Silberston (1973, p.28) explain:
Implicit in any proper economic defense
of the patent system is that it encourages
the 'right' amounts and types of innovation,
i.e., the right allocation of resources
between different types of invention and
innovation and between these and other
activities in the economy.
Taylor and Silberston add that there are a number of ways
that the patent system could encourage misallocation.
For example the monopoly benefits of a patent might draw
resources away from conventional investment activities
and into R&D. It also might encourage wasteful research
devoted to inventing around existing patents or divert
resources from non-patentable to patentable inventions.
It is possible that the sources of bias leading to
an underinvestment in inventive activity will be partially
or wholly offset by forces leading to overinvestment. In
fact, there are some good arguments supporting an over¬
investment in technical knowledge production.
Hirschleifer and Riley (1979, p.1405) argue that
imperfect /
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imperfect property rights in knowledge offset what
1
otherwise might result in an excessive 'rush to invent'.
This is due to the 'common property resource nature'
of undiscovered knowledge. While many can enter the
race for the solution to a technical problem, there
is usually only one winner. As Matthews (1973) points
out, if the return for being first in a field is large
there is potential for overinvestment. And there are
few social returns from multiple research efforts, except
in cases where there is a large benefit for an earlier
solution.
There is also potential for overinvestment in
knowledge production due to the nature of competition in
certain industries. When firm market shares and profits
depend on technological product differentiation, the
incentives to invent, innovate and imitate become very
high. As with advertising rivalry, the incentive to
increase R&D effort in an attempt to increase market
share also provides a justification of a continued
programme qf defensive imitation. As with advertising,
the game of technological product rivalry can become
self-defeating. When all firms in an industry spend
large sums on R & D for this purpose, the net effect
becomes somewhat of a 'prisoners's dilemma' in that
market shares remain approximately the same and profits
are much lower than if firms had agreed to curb R&D
spending through cooperation. Technological competition
will be addressed in more detail in following Chapters.
These /
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These additional considerations with respect to the
1
incentive to invent make any analysis concerning the
allocation of resources to R & D more difficult. It
is very likely that the strength of counter forces leading
to underinvestment and overinvestment in knowledge
production differ considerably among industries and types
of invention; process, product, risky and non-risky.
This suggests that the need for government intervention
in private industrial R&D varies greatly among cases.
As Matthews (1973, p.30) remarks:
The idea that non-appropriability
and risk call for across-the-board
subsidies to R & D is a very crude
one; when allowance is made for
imperfect competition and other
complications, this idea has to be
greatly qualified. Hence the
need for selectivity in government
action.
3.5 Summary
Despite the evidence provided in Chapter two point¬
ing to the importance of large firms in industrial R&D
and in the introduction of significant innovations, we
should expect the majority of inventions from the
corporate R&D laboratory to represent small advances
in technical knowledge. This is the result of firms'
reaction to risk, an important characteristic of
knowledge production. While somewhat abstract as
notions, the characteristics of knowledge reviewed in
this chapter give important insight into the firm's
decision /
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decision to invest and what type of R & D projects are
supported. Moreover, since factors such as
appropriability and risk vary considerably amongst
industries and types of projects, they can cause a
great deal of 'noise' in any empirical analysis of firm
inventive activity. If they cannot be accounted for




THE THEORY OF FIRM INVENTIVE ACTIVITY
Theories of inventive activity can be classified in a
number of ways. A general classification is based on
their either exogenous or endogenous view of the
development of new technical knowledge. The traditional
view of invention was that it was due to individual
curiosity and inspiration. This view falls under the
exogenous school in the Schumpeterian tradition. Here
the supply of inventive output is inelastic with respect
to economic variables. It should be emphasised that
although Schumpeter has an exogenous view of invention,
he viewed innovation as the role of the entrepreneur
and very much dependent on economic variables. Because
we consider the firm in our analysis to be both inventor
and innovator, many of Schumpeter's hypotheses concerning
innovators will be considered in this chapter.
More recently, there has been a shift in emphasis
to endogenous theories, which attempt to explain
invention a.nd innovation as economic phenomena. The
endogenous school owes much to Schmookler (1954, 1966,
1972) whose view was that inventive activity was led by
the forces of demand. It is under the endogenous approach
that the role of the firm as an inventor becomes important,
with R&D costs and revenues from inventive effort
becoming crucial to inventive decision-making.
In this chapter the theoretical basis for inventive
activity /
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activity by the firm is reviewed. It begins with a
1
discussion of the Schmookler demand-led theory of
invention and proceeds to theories associated with the
costs of invention, firm size, market structure,
diversification, input costs and the product cycle. In
reviewing the theoretical literature previous surveys by
Kennedy and Thirwall (1972) and Kamien and Schwartz (1975)
were of benefit. A more recent book by Kamien and Schwartz
(1982) on innovation and market structure was also helpful.
The chapter, with few exceptions explains the
theoretical hypotheses in an informal manner. The
discussion is useful however in leading to a more rigorous
approach to inventive decision-making by the firm in
chapter 6. The chapter also has a relationship to chapter
5, where the empirical results associated with the various
hypotheses are presented. The review of empirical studies
in chapter 5 follows the same order as we use here for
the theoretical review.
The amount of space devoted here to each of the
theoretical hypotheses varies considerably depending on
the extent to which they have been developed and on their
current importance as far as the theoretical literature is
concerned. This explains the more extensive coverage of
rivalry in R & D and the effect of market structure on
invention. The topic of economies of scale in R & D is
also covered in some depth because this is important to




4.1 The 'Demand-Pull' Hypothesis
Endogenous theories of technological change owe
much to Schmookler (1966, 1972), whose general contention
was that economic forces, particularly 'the extent of the
market', played the leading role in determining the
magnitude and direction of inventive activity. Schmookler
is thus credited with the 'demand-pull' theory of
technological change. It is important to this thesis
to review the Schmookler hypothesis in somewhat more detail,
especially since it has been subject to some misinterpretation.
Schmookler (1966, p.88), in his major work, explained
that every industry had two technologies; its 'product
technology' or the technology used in creating and improving
products, and its 'production technology' or the technical
knowledge used in producing products, which is referred to
in this thesis as its 'process technology'. It was process
technology with which Schmookler was primarily concerned
and which his original demand led theory addressed.
Schmookler questioned whether the decline in invention
associated with the process technology of an industry was
due to diminishing returns in the production of knowledge
(an increase in the cost necessary to obtain a given
percentage increase in productivity) or diminishing demand
for the final product (a decrease in the value of an
increase in productivity). Salter (1960) hypothesised
the former; that is over time the inventive potential
of /
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of a production technology declines. However it was
Schmookler's view that the exhaustion of a field's
technical possibilities is never approached and that the
pattern of changes in industry process technologies is
explained by the end result or economic payoff.
Technological change therefore slows down in an industry
because it becomes less valuable, not because it becomes
more costly.
Consistent with his emphasis on process technologies,
Schmookler emphasised the capital goods industry in his
work. Like Salter (1960) his view was that most improve¬
ments in an industry's productivity came about through
improvements in the capital goods which it purchased.
His testable hypothesis concerned the relationship between
the growth in an industry's demand and the level of capital
goods inventions associated with the industry's process
technology"1'.
Schmookler's view that 'the extent of the market' is
an important factor influencing invention, is in reference
to the market of the industry using the invention. This
is revealed in a passage from an earlier Schmookler
article (1954, p.187) as follows
The extent of this market, it is urged
here, varied more or less directly
with the volume of resources employed,
for the greater the volume of employment,
the greater the amount of resources that
could be saved with a given invention.
1. Schmookler's empirical work is reviewed in chapter 6.
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From the passage above, the connection between inventive
activity and market size, which has been so often tested,
is clear. It should be emphasised again however, that
Schmookler here is referring to the market of the user
rather than the producer of inventions.
While Schmookler's emphasis in explaining inventive
activity was on demand, he did not neglect supply or the
cost of inventing altogether. In this respect he may
have been criticised wrongly or at least too strongly.
Rosenberg (1974) charges Schmookler with overstating
his case for demand-led technological change, interpreting
Schmookler to assume a perfectly elastic supply curve of
inventions. Rosenberg's (1974, p.100) own view is that
while economic forces play a large role in shaping the
direction of scientific progress, they are limited by
the'constraints of a body of knowledge growing at uneven rates
among its component sub-disciplines'. This suggests that
at least part of the explanation for the pattern of
technological change rests on the supply side.
Schmookler however, did not completely ignore cost
differences in explaining inventive activity. In fact
he associated their importance with those capital goods
industries producing new technical knowledge to be embodied
in their products. Schmookler (1966, pp.102-3) states:
... it seems reasonable to suppose that
while cost differentials evidently
have little effect on the number of
inventions made to improve a production
technology, they may substantially
determine which product technologies
are tapped to accomplish it.
... /
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...the hypothesis that each industry's
product technology - its array of
products - is as improvable as any
other's seems untenable.
...between two rival product
technologies, the inventive potential
of one may be superior to that of
another.
Schmookler therefore did not ignore 'technological
opportunity' altogether; it was important to the
producer of inventions. We turn to a more detailed
discussion of the 'technological push' hypothesis in the
next section.
4.2 The 'Technological-Push' Hypothesis
Advance in the underlying basic scientific knowledge
associated with an industry is hypothesised to have a
major influence on the inventive activity of firms within
the industry. This has become well known as the
'technological-push' theory and it is associated with the
supply of inventions or the costs of inventive activity.
The theory can be traced to Nelson (1959, p.300) who
emphasised that demand was not the only factor influencing
the decision to invent by an organisation or individual:
But often, though the inventor believes
that there is a great demand for a
particular invention, it is not
rational for him to attempt the
invention, given the state of scientific
knowledge.
It has been argued further by Phillips (1966),
Rosenberg /
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Rosenberg (1974) and others that technological oppor-
1
tunities differ significantly among industries due to
differing rates of growth of scientific knowledge in
different fields. The most general distinction is
between the 'science based' industries, such as chemicals,
electronics, aircraft and scientific instruments; and the
traditional industries of primary food, textiles, wood,
paper and metal working. In the 'science based' industries
the ease of invention is greater and therefore the cost
of inventive activity lower.
It is generally acknowledged that the advance of basic
science is with few exceptions outside the firm's control.
The firm however is able to draw freely, since basic
knowledge is by definition unpatentable, on discoveries
originating in universities, government and basic research
institutes. Technological opportunity is therefore an
exogenous variable in the determination of inventive
activity by the firm.
While the concept of technological opportunity is
reasonable it is also difficult to define with precision
and even more difficult to measure. Evenson and Kislev
(1976) go some way towards clarifying the concept in
their discussion of the role of applied R&D. They view
applied research as filling a gap between basic knowledge
and the current level of technology in practice. The
larger the gap, the greater the technological opportunities
available or the greater the ease of improving a technology.
In /
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In the Evanson and Kislev model, applied research is a
t
search within a distribution of a random variable. At some
point the distribution becomes 'technologically exhausted'
unless new basic knowledge can shift the mean or provide
new distributions to search. Bailty (1972) also suggested
this in his study of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
when he hypothesised that a rapid period of innovation
had the effect of depleting technological opportunities
for a number of subsequent periods.
It is important to this thesis to emphasise that most
supporters of the technological-push hypothesis relate
technological opportunity to the product technologies of
industries. Phillips (1966) who was one of the early
proponents of the theory, Wilson (1977) and Link and Long
(1981) all view technological opportunity as the richness
of opportunity for new product breakthroughs. Parker
(1974, p.76) who also takes this line summarises the
situation as follows:
Industries that are new with a product
base which is not yet standardised are
able to dip into the veins of unexplored
technology to improve their products.
They may be science-based in the sense
that they may be closely connected to
scientific discoveries and thus enjoy
a wider range of research options than
other industries which do not have such
contacts.
The 'technological-push' hypothesis is generally down¬
graded by those who view demand as the most important
impetus to inventive activity. However, a further doubt
is /
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is raised by those who question the extent to which
technological change actually depends on basic scientific
knowledge. Norris and Vaizey (1973, p.14) for example
challenge the idea that basic scientific knowledge available
in the scientific journals leaks into technology, suggesting
instead that technology may be subject to'laws of its own'.
Nelson and Winter (1982, p.119) take a slightly more
complex view, distinguishing between a 'cumulative technology'
and a 'science-based' technology. They, like Evenson
and Kislow, look upon applied R & D as a draw on a general
fund of knowledge. In the case of a 'cumulative technology',
the firm innovates by making incremental improvements in
its own current technique, not by drawing on new knowledge
created outside the industry. In the 'science-based' case,
the firm's distribution of general knowledge improves over
time as a result of events outside the industry, for
example advances in fundamental science occurring in
universities. It should be noted that the Nelson and Winter
study is one of the few who view technological opportunities
as applying'to a firm's process knowledge.
While remaining somewhat vague, the notion of technological
opportunity is an important one. Theoretically it implies
that there is an external constraining force on the firm's
ability to produce new technical knowledge. It also has
important implications for diminishing returns in R & D
activity and economies of scale in R & D. We take up some
of these implications in the next section on firm size and
inventive activity.
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4.3 Inventive Activity and Firm Size
As noted in the discussion in section 4.1, the demand-
pull theory leads to a hypothesised relationship between
inventive activity and firm size. However there are other
important influences on inventive activity which make
large size an attribute for an inventing firm, particularly
on the supply side.
The Galbraith Assertion One influence on the ability
of firms to invent is the nature of technology itself,
which a number of economists view as changing. Galbraith
(1952, pp.91-92) emphasised this point in his much quoted
explanation of the decline of cheap technology:
There is no more pleasant fiction than that
technical change is the product of the
matchless ingenuity of the small man forced
by competition to employ his wits to better
his neighbour. Unhappily, it is a fiction.
Technical development has long since become
the preserve of the scientist and the
engineer. Most of the cheap and simple
inventions have, to put it bluntly, been
made. Not only is development now
sophisticated and costly but it must be on
a sufficient scale so that successes and
failures will in some measure average out...
Because development is costly,, it follows
that it can be carried on only by a firm that
has the resources associated with considerable
size.
Freeman (1974, p.30), twenty years hence, can be viewed
as taking up the Galbraith theme in his discussion of the
'professionalization of R & D'. He explains that the
increasingly scientific content of technology is
responsible for the removal of experiments from the
production /
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production line to a separate workshop or pilot plant.
The statements by Galbraith and Freeman imply that
there is a 'threshold' level of R & D expenditure which
is necessary prior to R & D having any effect. This
might be seen in the context of Freeman's work on the
electronic capital goods industry. Freeman (1974)
explains that in this industry, where competition takes
the form of technical innovation and technical service
to customers, entry is restricted by R & D capacity. This
threshold level of absolute R & D expenditure (not a ratio
of sales), is the minimum level needed to defend one's
market position. Here defensive R&D entails keeping
up to date with the latest discoveries in the field and
introducing a continuous flow of product improvements and
perhaps a completely new model when necessitated by the
competition.
Threshold levels of R & D spending will of course be
much greater barriers for industries based on science
than in those where the technology is more traditional.
As emphasised previously however, the once traditional
industries are being invaded by the more scientifically
oriented electronic technology. Even in electronics
though, as Freeman points out, the 'threshold' is low
for some types of electronic instruments, allowing small
firms to prosper in this part of the industry.
On the influence of firm size on R & D spending,
Scherer (1980) has critised Galbraith as 'guilty of
outfictionalizing /
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outfictionalizing the fiction writers.' While
acknowledging that some R&D projects are beyond
the capacity of all but the largest corporations, Scherer
describes these as representing the long thin tail of a
highly skewed distribution of development projects
arranged by cost. He argues that the more numerous
smaller projects are well within the means of firms
classified as small by current standards. As noted in
the last chapter, even the largest firms tend to choose
R&D projects which are small, at least as measured by
their duration. The point remains however, that in some
fields, even small improvements may require a general
level of knowledge beyond the acquisition of many smaller
firms.
It should also be mentioned that large sums of R & D
expenditure may be required to a greater extent at the
innovative phase of a project than at the inventive stage.
Mansfield et al. (1971) provide figures showing that
R&D costs generally weigh most heavily during the post-
invention stages, although this varies by industry. This
is one reason why the inventions of individuals and in
some cases small companies are finally brought to the
market by large corporations. As Scherer(1980) notes,
the inventions produced by small firms prove attractive
assets in merger negotiations. For the small firm
however, which seeks to develop its own inventions, the




A further point made in the previously cited Galbraith
quotation is that large firms have an advantage with
respect to the riskiness of inventive activity. As was
explained in chapter 3, large firms who are able to
undertake a number of independent R&D projects sim¬
ultaneously can lower their overall risk, as high risk
projects are averaged with those of a mundane and low
risk nature.
The risk factor has added implications for the
financing of inventive activity. If due to the riskiness
of R & D compared to other investment opportunities,
outside capital is limited, then inventive activity is
more likely to occur in firms with sufficient internal
funds. The generation of sufficient internal funds to
meet R&D thresholds depends on the level of profits
the firm is able to realise. While size may be a factor
here, so is the degree of concentration existing in the
firm's industry. We shall return to a discussion of the
influence of concentration on inventive activity later
in the chapter.
Returns to Scale in R & D There is some difference
of opinion as to whether Schumpeter was more concerned
with the relationship between market structure and
innovation or size and innovation. Kamien and Schwartz
(1982) argue that a careful reading of Schumpeter shows
that his main concern was with market structure and that
economies /
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economies of scale in R & D is more of a Galbraithian theme.
Nelson and Winter (1982) argue the opposite stressing
that much of Schumpeter's discussion concerned the
advantages of large size to innovation."'" Despite the
disagreement there are logical reasons for assuming that
increasing returns to scale exist in the production of
knowledge. Correctly or incorrectly the argument is
generally attributed to Schumpeter.
There are two different 'scales' which may be referred
to in discussing the returns to R & D activity. One
concerns the effect of the size of the R&D facility
itself within a firm of a given size. Another concerns
the effect of the overall size of the firm on returns to
scale in R & D with an R & D facility of a given size.
Kamien and Schwartz (1975) note that the separation of
the two effects is important for policy implications.
If increasing returns to R & D are related to the size
of firms then concentration of sales may be beneficial
for technological advance. If however, the economies
are related to the R&D facility itself, then this
would support the case for cooperative effort in R & D.
One argument in support of scale economies in R & D
expenditure is that a large R&D staff operates more
efficiently /
1. Nelson and Winter refer in particular to
Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy, 1952.
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efficiently than a small R&D staff. As with technical
economies in the production of goods, large R&D
operations may be in a position to take advantage of
specialised equipment in the research laboratory. Also
specialisation of research personnel, which may only be
feasible in larger facilities may mean significant
efficiency gains. A further source of economies is the
increased productivity of researchers when they are able
to interact with a larger group of colleagues.
It has also been argued by Fisher and Temin (1973) that
an R & D staff of a given size operates more efficiently
in a larger firm. This is because R&D projects may
benefit from economies of scale associated with other
segments of a large firm's operations. There may be
pecuniary economies of scale in that larger firms have
greater access to capital at lower costs than do small
firms. This may be associated with the lower average
risks taken by large firms, when conducting a variety of
independent R&D projects. Also the per unit costs of
distributing and promoting a new or improved product may
be lower for large firms. While promotion activities
are several stages away from the inventive stage, they
can affect R&D decisions since they may determine the
profitability of a new product invention.
As with large scale production of goods, a point may
be reached where diseconomies of scale in the production
of knowledge appear. According to Scherer (1980) this
is due to the growing bureaucratisation of the R&D
process /
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process. This could conceivably be within the research
team itself or as part of the overall decision-making
process within large firms. R&D projects in large firms
I
may have to be channeled through a chain of decision¬
making bodies for approval. This both delays R&D
projects and adds costs to the R&D operations. Also
the inability to get R&D projects approved by manage¬
ment may drive the most original and productive researchers
off to start their own ventures.
While the arguments surrounding economies of scale in
R&D are logical, they are usually discussed quite
informally as above. Fisher and Temin (1973) have
generated considerable debate with their claim that
incorrect conclusions from empirical tests of the
'Schumperterian hypothesis' have been obscured by the lack
of a precise theoretical base for the hypothesis. In
particular Fisher and Temin, joined by Kohn and Scott
(1982) and Lunn (1982), show that the standard test of
proportionality between R&D inputs (expenditure on staff)
and firm size is not a test of the Schumpeterian hypothesis
which is that the average productivity of R & D inputs
increases with both the number of R & D inputs and with
the number of non-R & D inputs.
More precisely, Fisher and Temin (1973, p.60) state
the Schumpeterian hypothesis as follows:
[4.1] FR > 0
[4.2] FN > 0
where /
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where subscripts denote partial derivitives and where:
F = F(R,N)
F = the dollar value of the per worker output
of the R&D staff or the average productivity
of the R&D staff
R = the number of R & D staff
N = the number of non-R & D staff
S = R + N, total firm workers
Continuing, Fisher and Temin argue that [4.1] and [4.2] do not
imply what has come to be the standard empirical test
of the Schumpeterian hypothesis or:
[4.3] S/R 3R/9S > 1
This is due to the effect of the increase in size of the
operating staff on the marginal product of the R&D
staff (or F^j + • As explained by Lunn (1982,
p.215), if the size of the firm increases, the value
of the expected innovation increases (due to F^j > 0) .
This should lead to an increase in R & D spending. But
R&D inputs will not increase proportionally because
of the shape of the R&D marginal benefit curve, which
eventually becomes downward sloping. This is simply
diminishing returns to R & D. The higher the level of
technology already attained by the firm, the lower the
probability that further R&D spending will improve the
technology. As Lunn (1982, p.213) notes,if P is the
probability of developing an innovation and P is a
function of R & D (R), then P = P(R) and P1 > 0 and PM < 0.
Although /
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Although the probability of innovating increases with
R & D, it does so at a decreasing rate.
The argument above may also be viewed from the point
of the production function for knowledge. Scherer (1973,
1980) analyses the situation by examining the two
following equations:
8
[4.4] R = cxS
[4.5] A = yR6
Using our previous notation, the first equation shows
the usual empirical test of the Schumpeterian returns to
scale hypothesis. The second shows the production
function for knowledge with A representing inventive
output. Scherer states that the hypothesis testing
dilemma of Fisher and Temin disappears if 6 = 1 or the
knowledge production function is linearly homogeneous. He
argues that much empirical evidence on the relationship
between R&D inputs and outputs shows this to be the case.
Lunn however, disputes this assertion proposing that a
stochastic model is a more appropriate version of 4.5 above.
A slightly different analysis of the same problem may
be obtained by specifying two inputs to the knowledge
production function, R&D (R) and basic scientific
knowledge (B) so that:
[4.6] A = g (B, R)
If basic knowledge is constant or if there are constant
technological /
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technological opportunities for the firm to draw on,
diminishing marginal returns to R & D must eventually set
in. However if both inputs are increased proportionately
(with exogenous advances in basic science), there may be
increasing returns to scale in the size of the R&D
operation. The problem here is an input, B, over which
the firm has no control and which depends on basic scientific
research in government or universities. This is the
approach taken in the development of our theoretical models
in chapter 6.
4.4 Market Structure and the Incentive to Invent
It has been previously emphasised that some degree
of monopoly power and therefore profits from the use of
new technical knowledge must be anticipated by the firm
if it is to have any incentive to invent. In this section
the reverse of the above causal relationship is explored;
that is the effect of market power with respect to the
firm's current production on its inventive activity. Although
the two relationships are separated analytically here, it
should be recognised that inventive activity and market power
are both endogenous variables.1 The direction of causation
is two-way.
An extensive amount of theoretical work has been done
on the effect of market structure on invention and innovation.
It /
1. Dasputa and Stiglitz (1980) provide a theoretical
model in which both market structure and the nature
of inventive activity are endogenous.
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It stems from Schumpeter's hypothesis1 that firms
1
in a monopolistic environment are better able to
introduce innovations than those in a competitive
environment. Therefore society's price for rapid
technological change ..is the static inefficiency
associated with a market structure involving large
firms with considerable market power.
There are a number of arguments which can be
reviewed in support of the Schumpeter hypothesis concerning
the effect of market power on technological change under¬
taken by firms. In some cases however it is difficult
to separate those which relate strictly to the market
power of firms and those to the size of firms. Although
the two characteristics are not strictly dependent and
therefore should be analysed separately, they do interact
and in practice often appear together.
One argument addressed directly by Schumpeter (1952)
concerns the necessity and ability of firms to finance
R&D projects from internal funds. Due to the very
risky nature of R & D, firms may be unable to attract
outside capital. They also may be unwilling to do so
due to the disclosures which they would be required to
make /
1.. It should be noted again that Schumpeter's
hypothesis concerned innovation. It is
extended to invention here because we assume
the firm to be both inventor and innovator.
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make concerning their projects. The argument follows
1
that firms earning supra-normal profits are more likely
to generate the required internal funds than those
earning only normal profits. The argument is inter¬
linked with the size argument since threshold levels
of R & D may require a large absolute volume of profits
as well as a high rate of return. Firms with high
liquidity are generally large monopolistic firms.
A second but related argument offered by Scherer (i980)
is that enterprises earning monopoly profits have
a good deal more financial and organisational slack
than their competitive counterparts. Therefore dis¬
cretionary spending on research and development may be
more readily forthcoming. A counter argument to this
is the X-inefficiency argument by Leibenstein (1966),
where those earning supra-normal profits become less
motivated to seek additional profits, through R&D for
example. Competition may prod the firm to improve its
technology in order to survive while the lack of it
removes the threat and therefore the inventive incentive.
A third argument associated with market power and
the incentive to invent is the appropriability argument.
While rivals may have stimulating effects on technical
progress in one respect, they may act as a disincentive
to invention if they are able to reap the rewards the
inventor deems as rightfully his through imitation. It
is argued by Kamien and Schwartz (1972) that a strong
market /
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market position and the absence of significant
competitors enhance the firm's ability to internalise
the benefits of its own inventions. Appropriability
may also be increased if the firm is able to extend
the monopoly power from its existing products to new
products due to command over distribution channels or
by way of an established name in a particular industry.
The contradiction above points to the importance
of recognising the multidimensional nature of a market
environment in assessing its effects on the inventing
firm. Not only is the number and relative size of
competitors in a market important, but also their
conduct in terms of rivalrous R&D behaviour. Kamien
and Schwartz (1970) reconcile the contradiction by
suggesting that competition encourages the diffusion of
technical advances through imitation, while the lack of
it is encouraging to major innovations. The effect of
rivalrous behaviour on the incentive to invent is
considered in more detail shortly, expecially with
reference to product invention.
A fourth advantage of monopoly power as it relates
to R & D activity may be the ability to hire the most
talented researchers. Assuming that an imperfect market
for R&D personnel exists, the firm with supra-normal
profits will be able to outbid its less powerful and
likely smaller counterparts. However as previously
noted, talented researchers desiring a degree of work
independence /
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independence may find R&D activity in the large power-
1
ful corporation too bureaucratised, preferring either
their own ventures or smaller enterprises.
While a number of the possible negative effects of
market power on inventive activity have been mentioned,
it is worth discussing a few additional drawbacks.
Baldwin and Childs (1969) develop a model which shows
market power diminishing the amount of original R&D
undertaken in the firm in favour of imitative effort
instead. While the smaller less powerful firm must
innovate to improve its unfavourable market position,
the firm with considerable market power finds itself in
:
a position to gain from quick imitation. This strategy
is termed'the fast second.' Here firms with established
reputations, access to better raw materials and components,
established distributional channels and perhaps possessing
scale economies, are able to outdo the innovator by
imitation.
Schumpeter (1939) himself recognised the negative
effect of.too much market power prevailing throughout
the economy, especially if it was in the hands of the
older and more conservative firms. Schumpeter saw
innovation arising from the newer evolving giants. A
further point with reference to newcomers is made by
Kamien and Schwartz (1980) who explain that the incentive
to invent is always greater for the newcomer than the
existing monopolist, all other things equal. This is
because /
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because the monopolist currently earning supra-normal
profits must calculate the difference between profits
after an invention and his current profits to arrive
at his net gain from an invention. The newcomer
however includes total profits from an invention in
his calculation of net gain.
Kamien and Schwartz base the point above on the
work of Arrow (1971) who was interested in discovering
whether the incentive to invent was greater under
perfect competition or monopoly. Arrow's analysis is
interesting because on first glance it appears to
contradict the Schumpeterian hypothesis; however a
closer look shows that this is not the case. Arrow
proved that the incentive to invent a cost-reducing
invention is greater under perfect competition than
monopoly. The reference however is to the industry
using the cost-reducing invention rather than the
industry producing it, with which the Schumpeterian
hypothesis is concerned. The analysis by Arrow and the
discussion- that followed highlights some of the
properties of process invention and their relationship
to market structure. We therefore take up the
analysis in more detail.
Cost-Reducing Inventions and Market Structure An
article by Arrow (1971) , a| ready considered in chapter three,
initiated considerable discussion concerning the market
structure /
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structure providing the most incentive for cost-
reducing invention. The results of Arrow's analysis
may be seen graphically in Figure 4.1 below.
Figure 4.1
Arrow's Model of Cost-Reducing Invention
Assuming constant marginal and unit costs of production
(c), the effect of a cost-reducing invention is to
reduce marginal costs of production from oc to oc'.
This level of cost-reduction was labeled 'drastic' by
Arrow because it results in a post-invention monopoly
price, p, below the pre-invention competitive price, c.^"
Arrow /
1. Arrow also considered minor cost reductions where
the post-invention monopoly price is above the
pre-invention competitive price. Although the
analysis is slightly more complex, the results
are the same.
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Arrow first considers an inventing firm within
a competitive industry, which patents a cost-reducing
invention and then licenses it for all other firms
in the industry. Here the optimum policy for the
inventor is to charge a per unit royalty on the use of
the invention of (p - c'), so that the resulting output
level is that which would be chosen by a monopoly.
Profits to ivthe inventor are clearly B. A monopoly,
facing the same demand and cost curves, produces an
invention and uses it itself. The net revenue gain
to the monopolist is B - A. The monopolists gain
is less than in the perfectly competitive case because
of pre-invention monopoly profits. Arrow's conclusion
is that the incentive to invent is greater under com¬
petitive conditions than monopolistic conditions. It
should again be stressed that the market structure
reference is to the industry using the invention.
The Arrow model led to a number of criticisms and
counter-criticisms from other economists. Demsetz (1969)
criticised the analysis on the basis that the monopoly
and competitive industry faced the same demand curve.
This led to a lower pre-invention monopoly output than
in the competitive case. When he worked through the
analysis assuming that the two industries had the same
1
pre-inventive output , Demsetz reached conclusions
opposite/
1 Demsetz's proof awsumes that the monopoly's marginal
revenue curve is the competitive industry's demand
curve, making pre-invention competitive and monopolistic
output the same.
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opposite to those of Arrow or that the incentive to invent
whs greater with monopoly. In Demsetz's analysis the
monopoly has the greater post-inventive output.
Demsetz's analysis, however, has been subject to a
number of counter-criticisms. As Kamien and Schwartz(1982)
note, a competitively organised industry does produce more
output than a monopolistically organised one, under the
same demand conditions. They argue that to ignore this
fact is to ignore the objections to monopoly itself.
In a further discussion of Arrow's work, Yamey (1970)
considers that a monopoly inventor and a monopoly user
of an invention may not be one and the same. In this
case, it is likely that the rewards from invention would
be shared, thus diminishing the incentive to invent.
This points to the problem of appropriability of an
invention, which has been discussed in chapter 3.
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) view Arrow's analysis as
a proof of the 'demand-pull' theory of Schmookler. This
is because it points directly to the positive effect of
market size on the incentive to invent. From the above
discussion, it is clear that the total reward from a cost-
reducing invention increases with the size of
the market. The explanation lies in the indivisible
nature of a cost-reducing invention once produced. The
increase/
- 120 -
increase in productivity can be spread over additional
units of output at no extra cost. Jnsofar as competitive
1
output is greater than monopoly output, the inventor's
total reward also increases with the competitiveness of
the industry to which he is licensing it.
A further extension of the Arrow analysis by Kamien
and Schwartz (1970, 1982) shows that the total reward
for an invention, which reduces costs substantially,
increases with the elasticity of the industry's demand
curve regardless of its market structure. This follows
directly from the previous discussion. The industry
with the greater elasticity of demand experiences a
greater increase in output given the cost reduction and
output has a positive effect on inventive activity.
While the analysis by Arrow and his followers leads to
important insightss it is simplistic in the sense that it
assumes no rival R&D efforts. The 'no rivalry' assumption
may not be too unrealistic for process inventions since
they are internal to the firm if the firm is both the
inventor and user of the invention. But, rivalry in
R&D becomes very important in analysing the firm's
incentive to produce product inventions. It is interest¬
ing to note, however, that Barzel's (1968) paper on
competition between potential inventors of process
innovations stimulated considerable work (particulary by
Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) on rivalry. Barzel recognised
that intense rivalry could result in a premature intro¬
duction of innovations compared to the 'social optimum'.
His model, however, did not specify how firms took the
presence/
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presence of rivals into account. We take this subject
up in the next section.
4.5 Rivalry and the Incentive to Produce New Product
Technology
It is widely recognised that firms, especially in
oligopolistic situations, often compete on the basis of
product quality rather than price. As noted previously,
the large majority of private industrial R&D expenditure
is devoted to new product development and improvements
rather than cost-reductions. Unlike inventions which
reduce cost and whose benefits might be viewed as
largely internal, the benefits of an improved product
technology come from the market. Profit maximising
firms therefore weigh the benefits of product technology
changes in terms of market response against the costs
of product invention and innovation. The market response
might be a whole new demand function for a new product
or a larger market share of a given demand for a product
quality improvement. The costs of new product inventions
may be significantly affected by the technological
opportunities available in the industry. All other
things equal, we would expect greater product invention
by firms in 'high opportunity' industries.
Scherer's Model of Technological Product Rivalry
Scherer (1 967) , who recognised that new products and
product improvements were susceptible to imitation, was
was/
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was one of the first to develop a model of technological
1
product rivalry . He proposed that the increase in net
revenues from the successful completion of an R&D project
would depend on the date of completion, the quality of
the end product (its ability to satisfy existing or
latent demands) and the reactions of rival firms. A
typical rival reaction to a product innovation might be
increased R&D expenditure in order to bring the intro¬
duction of an imitation further forward in time. The
costs of the R&D project in Scherer1s model depend upon
the state of technology, the quality of the end product
(costs varying directly with the quality of an invention)
and the speed of development. Scherer was particularly
interested in the time pattern of R&D expenditure and its
effect on the total cost of the R&D project. His signi¬
ficant contribution was the specification of a time-cost
trade off function, whereby the compression of R&D project
time by higher per period expenditures increases the
2
total R&D project cost . Therefore while there might be
significant benefits from the early introduction of a
new product, particularly if the payoffs for being first
are high, there are also increased costs.
Scherer/
An earlier model by Horowitz (1963) analysed 'The
Research Inclinations of a Cournot Oligopolist1 in the
context of game theory. His results are essentially
the same as Scherer's but his model is not as extensive.
^ Scherer's rationale for the cost increases are due to (1)
mistakes from overlapping sequential research steps; (2)
running alternative technical approaches concurrently to
increase the probability of an earlier completion; and
(3) conventional diminishing returns from allocating more
technical personnel to a particular task. Mansfield et
al., (1971) provide evidence supporting Scherer's time-
cost trade-off function.
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Scherer further specified a number of conditions of
oligopolistic rivalry which lead directly to his results.
One was that imitators engaged in product quality-matching
as a reaction to innovators rather than quality leap¬
frogging. Another important specification was that of
the benefits to an early completion. The benefits for
being an innovative leader in a market-sharing game
were due to: (1) the temporary slice of rivals'markets
which could be gained before they were able to quality
match and win markets back; and (2) the gain due to the
permanent erosion of rivals' markets due to their being
laggards. The latter factor or permanent erosion factor
means a particularly big payoff for being first and invites
strong aggressive reactions to accelerated R&D spending
by rivals.
Scherer notes that, as in all cases of oligopolistic
rivalry, no unambiguous profit maximising solution to R&D
spending exists. However, he examines the Cournot
solution, first for the duopolist and then extending the
model to 'n' firms to reach important conclusions^. One
significant result was that firms with smaller market
shares are more likely to initiate a rapid pace of
innovation than dominant firms, though the latter were
likely to retaliate quickly as imitators. Although
rigorous results were provided, Scherer also offers an
intuitive interpretation (Scherer, 1967, p. 383):
In/
i
The Cournot assumption in Scherer's model is that each
firm takes its rivals R&D project time as a parameter.
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In a market-sharing game, the relatively small
' firm has much to gain by cutting into its bigger
rival's market position through innovation, but
less to lose when it trails its rival. A
dominant firm has little to gain by innovating,
but much to lose when its position is attacked
by a smaller innovator.
While the citation above applies to a given market,
Scherer's conclusions are the same for an innovation leading
to a new market. The larger the target market share
of its imitating rival, the more rapidly a smaller firm
would conduct its product development.
Scherer's results contain a number of qualifications,
two worth mentioning here. One was that the ability of
the smaller innovator to penetrate a market might be
limited by internal growth constraints, thus decreasing
the potential benefits and incentives to conduct R&D.
Another important qualification is related to the number
of firms in the market. While stimulating rivalry, an
increase in the number of firms beyond some point might
lead to market overcrowding and reduced profits for all.
Scherer (1980 , p. 429) later elaborated on this point
when he described the 'clash of structural propensities'
as follows:
In terms of the marginal conditions for profit
maximisation, an increase in the number of
sellers is conducive to more rapid innovation.
This influence can be called the stimulus
factor. But in terms of the requirement
that expected profits from innovation be non-
negative, an increase in the number of firms
can, beyond some point, discourage rapid
innovation. This influence might approp¬
riately be called the market room factor.
The/
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The clash of structural characteristics described
above makes it difficult to predict the effect of market
structure on the incentive to invent. Whether rivalry
or appropriability of benefits dominates must be left
to empirical analysis.
Before leaving the early Scherer model, a few of the
welfare implications might be noted. First, from the
firm's point of view, rivalry provides a stimulus to
over-invest in inventive activity. In the Scherer case
firms end up in the classic prisoner's dilemma situation
where the dominant strategy results in bringing forward
R&D results in time^. Through mutual trust firms could
delay product introductions to extend R&D projects,
lowering costs. Scherer, however, provides some
rationale for un-cooperative behaviour with respect to
R&D decisions. One factor leading to mutual distrust
is that information concerning rival R&D strategies is
even more imperfect than that concerning price
strategies. Also, quite different from price decisions,
R&D project decisions are in a sense 'one of a kind'
in that all projects differ somewhat. Furthermore,
firms tend to overestimate their own ability and
underestimate their rival's ability to succeed in the
game of knowledge production.
As far as the welfare implications for society
when a completely new product is introduced, Scherer
refers to Usher's (1964) proof showing that any
commercially/
"1
In the pure market-sharing model firms would maximise
their joint profits from restraining from R&D altogether.
This is because the gains of leaders and losses of followers
cancel each other out while the costs of R&D persist.
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commercially profitable product invention confers a
f
net benefit on the community as a whole. Usher however
warns that when the profits from inventing first are
high, there may be wasteful duplication of research
efforts among competing inventors.
For Scherer's market-sharing rivalry situation,
Usher's work demonstrates that innovations which are
privately unprofitable may confer social net benefits,
depending on the shape of the community indifference curve
between the product of the invention and the products
previously available. Barzel (1968) reached a similar
conclusion for process inventions.
Scherer's modelwhichis a 'game theory' approach to
technological rivalry has been extended by a number of
economists including Loury (1979) and Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980). The difference between Scherer's
model and the later models rests on the specification of
the development cost function. In the Scherer model
it was deterministic, while in the later models it is
stochastic-. Here the probability of completing an
R&D project increases with both time and the level
of R & D expenditure. Kamien and Schwartz have taken
a different approach to the rivalry problem, viewing it
from the angle of individual firm behaviour. Since
this is the approach that we take in this thesis, we now
turn to their work.
The Contributions of Kamien and Schwartz Kamien
and Schwartz have made a significant contribution to the
theoretical /
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theoretical literature concerning the effects of rivalry
and market structure on innovative activity. Much of their
work, summarised in a recent book (Kamien and Schwartz,
1982) was inspired by the dilemma, noted by Scherer; that
is the dual effect of structural characteristics on the
incentive to invent. Kamien and Schwartz (1982, p.118)
explain the dilemma by way of the 'carrot and stick'
parallel. The carrot of innovational profits stimulates
invention for offensive reasons. The ability of the
firm to appropriate the rewards through a strong market
position, with few rivals, is beneficial. However,
rivals also stimulate invention for defensive reasons with
the threat of loss from rival innovation acting as a
'stick ' .
In their 1982 model of product innovation, Kamien
and Schwartz consider the individual firm both as a
potential innovator and potential imitator, depending
on whether T, the firms date of product introduction is
earlier or later than v, the date of its rival's product
introduction. The net receipts received by the firm
from the beginning of the new product's development
period are summarised by Kamien and Schwartz (1982, p.113)
as follows:
r P. P1o o
flow T flow V stock t
if the firm is an innovator and
r
o
flow v flow T stock t
if /
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if the firm imitates, with all receipts calculated to
their present value and where:
r is the firm's receipts on its current good
r^ is the imitator's receipts on its current
good after an innovation which is a
substitute, where r^ < rQ
p is the innovator's receipts before imitation
P° is the innovator's entire profit stream after
imitation
is the imitator's entire profits stream after
it has imitated
The profit maximisation problem for the firm, in the
situation above, becomes one of choosing the optimal T
or R & D project development time which maximises the
difference between expected receipts and costs. Kamien
and Schwartz assume here that total development costs
are subject to the time-cost tradeoff function developed
by Scherer, with higher costs being the result of
compression of development time. Their expected benefit
function is somewhat different however, in that they
realistically assume that a firm's decision as to its
rate of innovation depends not on its rival's actions,
but on its own assessment of its rival's intentions. The
uncertainty surrounding rival product introduction dates
is specified by a subjective probability function.
Expected profit streams from innovation therefore become
dependent not only on net profit flows, but also on the
probability that they will occur, or the probability of a
rival's preemption.
A significant theoretical contribution of Kamien and
Schwartz, is their attempt to specify more accurately
in their profit-maximising model 'rival intensity'. They
(Kamien /
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(Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, p.114) do this by defining
'hazard rate' which is the probability that a rival will
introduce its product innovation in the next moment,
given that the rival has not done so already.^ An increase
in rivalry is realised in an increase in the hazard rate
which depends on a hazard parameter and a non-decreasing
function of time. Of particular interest to Kamien
and Schwartz is the change in the optimal time of
innovation with a change in the hazard rate or the
intensity of rivalry.
An important result of the maximisation problem
described above is that the speed of introduction of
innovations with a large payoff will increase with an
increase in the intensity of rivalry up to a point and
then will slow down as rivalry increases further. An
intuitive explanation put forth by Kamien and Schwartz
(1982, p.142) is as follows:
Initially, the fear of losing the race
spurs additional expenditure on
development but as the intensity of
competition continues to grow, the
firm begins to fear that it will not
get the reward from being the first
and will also lose the development
costs. It then reduces investment
in development and thereby postpones
the planned introduction date.
A second result relates to innovations with a more modest
payoff. Here as the degree of rivalry increases
development of the innovation is delayed. In this
situation, no rivalry yields the maximum rate of inventive
activity /
1. The composite rival referrei to in the analysis may appear
from a number of sources: Irom current rivals, firms in
other markets or entirely new entrants.
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inventive activity.
Another finding of Kamien and Schwartz, which was
noted earlier by Arrow (1971), is that the presence
of extraordinary profits on current products reduces the
firm's inventive activity. This is because the firm
realises only the difference between current profits and
profits from innovation as its reward. Thus newcomers
should have faster rates of invention than established
firms all other things equal. Also, this explains
why established firms often have a greater incentive
to innovate in industries and sectors other than their
own.
Kamien and Schwartz complicate their model of
innovation under rivalry by considering a number of
extensions which make it more realistic. For example
they consider the effects of imposing the self-financing
of R & D on firms undertaking innovation. They find
that self-financing is not a limiting factor to a firm,
except where expected profits from the innovation are
many times larger than current profits. In the case
of large expected payoffs, the firm would like to step
up its development pace, but is constrained by the current
level of profits or its liquidity.
While models of rivalry following the Scherer and
Kamien and Schwartz lines are currently most prevalent,
they /
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they leave out a number of factors which have been
I
hypothesised to influence inventive activity. While not
as extensively developed as the rivalry hypothesis, they
deserve some mention here.
• « . i 11 . : . 3 fc •
4.6 The Diversification Hypothesis
The firm's degree of diversification has also been
identified as a variable having some influence on its
incentive to invent. The argument is that the firm
with a diverse product line will be better able to use
the sometimes unanticipated results of its research efforts.
The expected profitability of R & D is thus higher for
diversified firms and they tend to undertake more of it.
Diversified firms may also have lower R&D risks than
their narrower-ranged counterparts due to the variety
of independent R&D projects going on simultaneously.
It is important to emphasise that Nelson's (1959)
original diversification hypothesis referred to the
conduct of basic scientific research by the firm.
Nelson (1959, p.303) stated:
Strangely enough, economists have tended
to see little economic justification for
giant firms not built on economies of
scale. Yet it is the many-product
giants, not the single-product giants
which have been most technologically
dynamic, and to the extent that we wish
the private sector of the economy to
support basic research, we must look to
these firms.
Nelson further explained that applied research was
likely to be profitable in firm s with a narrow
technological /
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technological base, because it could be directed toward
the solution of the firm's specific problems and could
be easily translated into patentable products and processes.
On the other hand, due to the greater uncertainty
involved, product diversification with a wide technological
base was a prerequisite for basic research. Diversified
firms would be better able to profit from whatever dis¬
coveries might result.
While the diversification hypothesis applies more
directly to basic research, it has been extended by a
number of economists, including Comanor (1965) and
Grabowski (1968) to relate to the conduct of all R&D
by private firms.
4.7 An Alternative Approach to Process Invention
Concerning the subject of process inventions, it is
worth mentioning another approach which is much different
from the Schumpeterian line of analysis. Most studies
of inventive activity emphasise the size or market power
of the inventing firm, however here the emphasis is on
the optimal'mix of the firm's factor inputs, R&D being
one factor input.
The approach stems from the work of Hicks (1932)
which was concerned with the bias of invention. Hicks
hypothesised that a change in relative factor prices would
stimulate the search for new methods of production which
would use more of the now relatively cheaper factor and
less of the expensive one, which was expected to be labour.
While Hicks' hypothesis created a considerable amount
of /
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of discussion concerning the labour vs. capital-saving
bias of inventive activity, we will not be concerned
with that here. What is of some interest is an
extention of the theory which relates to the rate at
which private firms are producing technological changes.
Schott (1976) suggests that R&D expenditures
are influenced by changes in relative costs and prices.
Her argument is that the more relative factor prices
change the wider the choice of techniques industry would
like. As an example she proposes that recent increases
in oil prices ought to have induced more research in an
attempt to widen the choice of energy alternatives. In
a more rigorous model of induced factor-augmenting
technological change, Kamien and Schwartz (1969) show that
the rate of advance varies directly with factor costs.
In a further more extensive investigation of the
demand for R & D as a factor input, Schott (1978)
hypothesizes that changes in R & D spending are intimately
connected with other factor decisions. Her investigation
considers the complementarity and substitutability of
R&D with other factors of production both in the short-
run and long-run.
4.8 The Product Cycle Approach to Technological Change
Another view of technological change in an industry
is closely associated with the theory of the product cycle
which has been important to international trade studies
(for example, see Vernon, 1966). The theory is reviewed
here /
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here because it emphasises the differences between process
i
and product changes. The general prediction is that the
stage of development an industry has reached determines
its propensity to gain from particular types of technological
changes.
The evolution of a product from birth to maturity is
often described in three stages. In the first stage of a
product's development, most technological applications are
to the product's characteristics. A new product may at
first have no close substitutes and be relativelyprice
inelastic. The product in this stage is unstandardised
and frequent changes are necessary to iron out product
difficulties and to redefine characteristics. If
technological possibilities are significant competitors
may respond with imitations and technological rivalry
may develop. Production processes tend to be labour
intensive in the first stage and any capital equipment
tends to be general purpose.
In the second stage of development price competition
becomes more important. The product technology becomes
stabilised and the production system designed for
increased efficiency becomes more capital intensive. In
this stage the production process as a whole remains
relatively segmented and improvements are made to various
subprocesses. Although product competition may persist,
it will tend toward differentiation which does not impair
volume production. Parker (1974) adds that for some
products with significant potential this stage may be
delayed /
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delayed, but eventually a point is reached where minor
improvements become the basis of any product competition.
In the final development stage the product is fully
mature and there are few improvements either process or
product coming forward. The production process becomes
so well integrated that changes become very costly.
Price competition becomes paramount and capital intensive
mass production methods are necessary for survival.
Abernathy and Townsend (1975) explain that process
redesign may be initiated at this stage by the development
of an entirely new technology or shifts in the market
environment. If the mature industry resists these
pressures then technological change becomes revolutionary
rather than evolutionary.
Abernathy (1978) in a later paper on the product
cycle in the U.S. automobile industry, addresses the
dilemma which becomes apparent in the evolutionary process.
While movement toward the final stages offers the benefits
of high productivity, this is only at the cost of inflex¬
ibility and.decline of innovative potential. The mature
industry therefore can find itself vulnerable to stag¬
nation. A possible option for a firm or industry is to
remain in the particular stage offering the best tradeoff
of conflicting objectives. This may mean reversing or
halting the evolutionary process. Abernathy found that
the development of the highly automated engine plant
lessened its ability to adapt to needed changes in air-
pollution control and fuel economy. On the other hand
the /
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the auto-assembly plant remained more adaptable with
1
resulting lower efficiency in production.
The analysis above is also the general theme
of Utterback (1979) who argues that the conditions for
rapid innovation in an industry are much different from
those required for high levels of output and efficiency
in production. His prediction is that a strong
commitment to R & D is characteristic of the middle
stages of the product cycle, with emphasis on both process
innovation and product differentiation through functional
improvements.
A related hypothesis is put forth by Wilson (1977)
who views product innovation as a trade-off against
process innovation. He argues that the more the physical
characteristics of a product are expected to change, the
lower the effort devoted to process changes. This is
both because rapid product obsolescence constrains any
potential for cost reduction and because of limited
resources for R&D. Wilson sees the technological
environment and degree of product rivalry as having
substantial influence on the firm's choices. These
characteristics however may be more predominant at a
certain phase of the firm's product cycle. The trade-off
hypothesis may be criticised for being a bit too 'black
and white'. New products and even product improvements
may necessitate changes in the production process, while




A review of the theoretical literature shows that
a good deal of effort has been devoted by economists in
the past two decades to technological change at the
microeconomic level. Much of the recent theoretical
work is highly rigorous, especially that concerning market
structure and rivalry. However, while models of
technological rivalry have been developed extensively
in theory, the problem of identifying a variable to
represent the 'intensity of rivalry' empirically remains.
The problem of measurement also becomes important in
testing the 'technological push' hypothesis. Chapter
five, which follows, discusses efforts to test the




A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK
Since the mid-1960's, there has been a substantial
amount of empirical work related to testing theories of
inventive and innovative activity. This chapter reviews
and summarises such work, using the same system of
subheadings as that used for describing theoretical studies
in Chapter four. Because the scheme focuses on particular
variables, such as 'technological opportunity', rather than
individual studies or authors, and because most studies
use a multivariate approach, some overlap in the discussion
is unavoidable.
The majority of empirical studies completed in the
field of invention and innovation have used U.S. industrial
and firm level data. There have been however, a number
of U.K. studies which will be of special interest here.
Rather than a thorough description of each paper, the
Chapter seeks to focus on those of greatest interest to
this thesis, which are: those using patent data to
measure technological change; those using U.K. data and;
more recent studies shedding new light on the behaviour
of variables. In addition to summarising both the
approach and results of the various papers with respect
to variables tested, some attention is also given to the
problems inherent in empirically testing theories of
this nature.
A number of surveys of the empirical literature have
been /
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been of help in compiling this review, particularly
i
the recent survey by Kamien and Schwartz (1982). Two
other surveys should also be mentioned in this respect:
an earlier review by Kamien and Schwartz (1975); and that
of Kennedy and Thirwall (1972).
5.1 The Demand-Pull Hypothesis
Original Work by Schmookler Jacob Schmookler (1966),
who is generally credited with the 'demand-pull' theory
of inventive activity, also tested his theory, making
extensive use of U.S. patent data. While others, both
in the U.S. and the U.K. have both supplemented and
challenged his work, Schmookler's original test remains
distinctly important.
Schmookler's empirical model, like its theoretical
counterpart, emphasises capital goods inventions. As
explained in Chapter four, in Schmookler's view, demand
or the extent of the invention using industry's market,
was an important factor in stimulating capital goods
inventions associated with the industry. Schmookler
carried this approach through in his empirical model,
hypothesising that capital goods inventions would be
distributed among industries of use in relation to the
amount of investment in the user industries.
In cross-sectional tests of his hypothesis on
twenty-three U.S. industries, Schmookler examined the
relationship between patent applications on capital goods
inventions to be used in industry and industrial investment,
both /
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both variables in logarithmic form."*" Patent applications
were counted over three years, beginning one year after
that in which industrial investment was measured.
Schmookler's results show a proportionate relationship
between the distribution of capital goods inventions
among industries and the distribution of industrial
2
investment. Furthermore the lagged structure of the
regression equation implied that 'a 1 per cent increase
in investment tends to induce a 1 per cent increase in
capital goods invention' (Schmookler, 1966, p.144).
The regressions, in addition, provided a very good fit,
with the variation in investment explaining about ninety
per cent of the variation in patenting. When Schmookler
tested the argument that industrial size, as measured
by number of workers, was responsible for the movement
in both variables, he found an insignificant role for
size.
Schmookler's work involved considerable effort in
terms of classification of patented capital goods
inventions /
1. Schmookler's time-series analysis of the U.S.
railroad, building and petroleum refining
industries provide him with essentially the
same results as his cross-sectional tests.
2. For example, Schmookler's (1966, p.144) regression
equation for 1948-1950 patenting, where P represents
industry patents and I represents industrial invest¬
ment is as follows:
log 948-50 = °*598 + °'940 lo<3 Ii947 ^ = °-909-
(0.116) (0.070)
The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of
the coefficients.
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inventions to their industries of use. Like Boehm (1967)
in his industrial classification of U.K. patent data,
Schmookler attempted to link patent office subclasses
to industries as defined in the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) manual. Both faced the problem of
a patent system classified by technological function,
which was not easily converted to a classification system
based on industrial principles. Schmookler used a
criterion such that subclasses of the patent scheme, and
therefore all patents under these subclasses, were assigned
to an SIC industry, if at least two-thirds of the patents,
based on sampling the subclass, pertained to a particular
industry. This meant however, that some subclasses
would be eliminated for use in his data base. Another
problem leading to the exclusion of some capital goods
inventions is that a number, for example those involving
diesel engines, could not be assigned to a single
using industry. Schmookler estimated that even if his
database was incomplete, ninety-five per cent of the
inventions'used belong to the industries to which they
are assigned.
While Schmookler's own work involved classification
of inventions by industry of use, others in the field
classified inventions by the industry supplying them.
In order to determine whether this difference affected
his conclusions, Schmookler ran further tests. Using
Scherer's sample of patents of 448 large U.S. corporations,
classified /
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classified by industry of origin, he ran three regressions,
J
taking alternatively values for industry sales, assets and
employment in 1955 as the independent variable and patents
granted in 1959 as the dependent variable. From the point
of view of the supplying industry, sales, assets and
employment were indicative of the extent of the market
served by the industry. He found that the relationship
between originating industry size and patenting was again
log linear, however these regressions provided much lower
2
r values. Schmookler attributed the appreciably smaller
proportion of variance explained when inventions were
classified by the producing industry/to differences in
technological opportunity among industries. While in
Schmookler's view the richness of an industry's knowledge
base had little effect on the inventions made to improve
its production process, the differences in inventive
potential of rival product technologies was important.
Technological opportunity would therefore be a factor in
determining which capital goods industries were tapped
to improve a production process.
The Contribution of Scherer Scherer (1982) reconsiders
Schmookler's approach to testing the demand-pull theory
using a new data base."'" Scherer's patent data, classified
by a research team into both an industry of use and an
industry of origin, are from a sample of 443 large U.S.
corporations /
1. Scherer (1982, p.227) notes two limitations of
Schmookler's tests: (1) the sample of industries
chosen for his investment-capital goods patent
analysis was small and over-represented by 'older
industries' such as papermaking and apparel; and
(2) the sample of patents classified by industry of
origin was different from the use-oriented sample.
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corporations over a 10 month period of time in 1976-77.
Scherer includes material goods inventions in his data
base along with capital goods inventions, introducing
material input purchases as the demand-pull variable
for the former.
The results of Scherer's test of the logarithmic
relationship between user industry investment and capital
goods patents classified to user industries is much
stronger than his test of the comparable relationship
for material input inventions. He concludes that
Schmookler chose the best suited class of inventions
for his analysis of the demand-pull theory. His tests
2
however, result in r values much lower than Schmookler's.
Scherer also found the elasticities of invention with
respect to investment and material input purchases
respectively, to be significantly less than one -.69 for
capital /
2. Scherer's team was comprised of four students
with'specialties in the chemical and
electrical engineering fields. The team
found 34 per cent of firm patents too broad
in terms of use to associate with any subset
of using industries.
- 144 -
capital goods and .44 for material inputs.^ Scherer
(1982, p.232) comments that 'appreciable diminishing
marginal returns appear to prevail'.
Scherer also regressed patents classified by industry
of origin on originating industry sales in logarithmic
form, finding a regression coefficient very much closer
to unity (.904). He remarks (Scherer, 1982, p.232)
that this implies 'equivocal' support for Schmookler, given
that the flow of inventions appears in his own tests more
closely correlated with originating industry sales than
using industry investment.
Scherer also acknowledges the role of technological
opportunity ,adding dummy variables for technology class
into his 'originating industry' regression equations.
This significantly raises the explanatory power of his
results. Scherer's work with the technological
opportunity variable is described more fully in section
5.2.
Overall, Scherer (1982, p.236) concludes that while
his results do 'some damage to Professor Schmookler's
findings on the role of 'demand-pull', the theory survives
at least for capital goods inventions. He adds that
both /
1. Scherer also ran tests on-two subdivisions
of capital goods, those processes for internal
use by the originating firm and capital goods
product inventions for sales across industry
lines. His general conclusion was that
external markets were at least as responsive
in transmitting demand-pull stimuli as internal
markets.
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both demand and technological opportunity differences
however, need to be accounted for in explaining
technological change.
It is important to note that in both Scherer's
user industry and industry of origin tests, patents
lagged the demand-pull variables by two years in the
best-performing results. With an average 9 month lag
in invention to application and an average 19 month lag
in application to issuance, this leaves no room for a
lag between the emergence of demand influences and
invention. Scherer attributes his results to chance or
a tendency for corporate inventors to anticipate favour¬
able demand conditions even before they fully materialise.
Going beyond Schmookler's model, Scherer also tests
the strength of the invention-using industry's output
growth as a demand-pull variable. By adding this
variable, which turns out to be positive and significant,
to his regression equations for user industry capital
goods inventions and material input inventions, he is
able to add significantly to their explanatory power.
Scherer concludes (1982, p.235) that 'past increases
in using industry output provide modest additional
stimulus to invention above and beyond current levels
of demand.'
Other Tests of the Output Growth Variable A number
of other economists have tested the influence of sales or
output growth as a demand-pull variable, but unlike the
Scherer test above, these tests have been at the firm
level /
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level of analysis. Mueller (1967), for example, found
a positi/e influence for the firm's ten year growth in
sales on its R&D expenditure for 67 U.S. firms."*"
He attributed the positive influence to both a reduction
in uncertainty due to higher growth and the pull of
demand. He added that the sales growth could be the
t
result of the firms past R&D expenditures and if this
were true the variable would serve as a measure of the
firm's expectations.
Elliott (1971) however in a slightly different
type of cross-sectional test, obtained contrary results.
Using data from 53 U.S. firms in 16 industries, he
found that the five year average growth rate for all
firms in the industry of the sample firm was not a
significant influence on firm R&D expenditure. He
concluded that there was a considerable degree of
independence of firm R&D decisions from longer range
industry growth patterns.
Rosenberg (1977) on the other hand, found a positive
and significant effect for five year firm sales growth
on the percentage of total employment allocated to
profession R&D personnel in 100 U.S. firms.
Stoneman's U.K. Tests In the United Kingdom,
Stoneman's (1979) work comes closest to that of Schmookler
and /
1. While Mueller (1967, p.65) obtained his predicted
positive coefficients for sales growth, his t
values were not very high.
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and Scherer in the U.S. Stoneman tests Schmookler's
demand-pull theory of invention using an inter-industry
distribution of U.K. patents, 1931-1960, compiled by
Boehm (1967). He adds however, to the Schmookler model,
a variable representing technological opportunity
differences between industries. This is represented
in his empirical work by industry R&D expenditure per
patent.
Stoneman (1979) developes a theoretical model of
firm decision-making with respect to inventive output,
which recognises both expected revenues and expected
costs of the activity. Expected revenues from an
invention are influenced in his model by: (1) the
size of the potential market for an invention, represented
by the output of the user industry; (2) the speed of
diffusion of the invention, represented by the investment
to output ratio of the user industry; and (3) the number
of inventions being produced in a given industry - the
greater the flow, the lower the expected return to any
one invention.
When aggregating his model to the industry level to
conduct his empirical tests however, Stoneman (1979)
assumes that the industry producing and using the
invention is one and the same. This is necessary due to
the limitations of Boehm's database. Boehm (1967)
classified inventions to the industry of application;
product inventions are attributed to those making the
products /
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products and process inventions are attributed to
industries using such products.1 Therefore, while
necessary, Stoneman's assumption renders the inter¬
pretation of the demand-led variables somewhat different
to those of Schmookler. Stoneman notes that given the
broad definition of industries used, the probability of
using hnd invention-producing industry being the same
is high.
Stoneman tests his model in logarithmic form on
time-series data for thirteen U.K. industries and cross-
sectional data for fourteen industries, making cross-
sectional tests for a number of years, 1949-60. In
cross-sectional tests, both diffusion speed (investment/
output) and market size (output) are significant at the
10 per cent level in at least half of the years tested.
This leads Stoneman (1979, p.400) to conclude that 'a
preferred measure of the demand effect ought to consider
both market size and diffusion speed'. The coefficients
for market size however, are substantially below one
(the highest being .731 in 1960) which implies a less
than proportional relationship between this variable
and inventive activity. Results here however are not
strictly comparable with Schmookler's due to the
forementioned differences in assumptions. Also Stoneman's
tests /
_
Boehm (1967) experienced the same difficulties
as Schmookler in converting a technology based
patent classification scheme to an industry
based classification.
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tests are made on all patents, not just those pertaining
1
to capital goods inventions.
Stoneman's general conclusion is that not only
demand, but also the costs of inventing play a role in
influencing industrial inventive activity. With
variables which represent both demand and technological
opportunities he is able to explain a good deal of the
2
variation (with r 's from .661 to .848) in cross-sectional
tests of industrial patenting. Technological opportunity
is discussed in the next section to which we now turn.
5.2 The Technological-Push Hypothesis
A major difficulty to be faced in empirically
testing the technological-push theory of inventive
activity is the measurement of the independent variable.
Because technological opportunity cannot be measured
directly, economists have resorted to a number of
alternative approaches. In some cases unexplained
variation in inter-industry inventive or innovative
activity is attributed to a missing variable, the differ¬
ences in the science-base of the industries concerned.
Another approach is the use of dummy variables to cate¬
gorise firms or industries as being characterised by
high or low technological opportunities. More recently
other /
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other quantifiable variables have been used as proxies
for the somewhat abstract concept. Although none of the
approaches are completely satisfactory, results of the
empirical tests have shown that more work on testing the
technological push theory is justifiable.
U.S. Studies Stressing Product Differentiation
Phillips (1966) in contrast to Schmookler (1966) who had
emphasised the role of demand, was an early proponent of
the 'technological-push' theory of innovative activity.
Phillips undertook what he described as a 'crude' empirical
test of the hypothesis that the strength of the association
between the organised sciences and the technologies of
specific industries explained interindustry differences in
technological advance. In a two-step regression analysis
to explain differences in R & D performance between
estimated industry performance in eleven U.S. industries
and the three size groups of firms within each industry T
Phillips found the interaction between high concentration
and low product changeability as firm size increased to
swamp the simple size effects of firms."'" In other words
a high correlation between research activity in the
industry /
1. Using National Science Foundation data on company
financed R&D funds per hundred dollars of value
added, 1958, for 3 size classes of firm in each of
11 industries, Phillips first tried to explain R&D
differences between industries. He then attempted
to explain differences in R & D performance between
the estimated industry performance and the three
size groups of firms within each industry.
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industry as a whole and research activity for each firm
size in the industry existed.
The important independent variable in Phillips'
regression analysis was the industry's index of product
changeability or differentiability. Each industry's
index was obtained by studying the descriptions of the
primary products of each four digit SIC industry within
the eleven two digit SIC industries tested. Each product
was assigned a code depending on a subjective evaluation
of the extent to which current science permits functional
product differentiation. The figure for each industry
was an average number for the products of the group.
Comanor (1967) followed Phillips in emphasising the
ease of product differentiation as important in R & D
decisions. Using data from a large number of U.S. firms
classified into thirty-three industries, he conducted an
inter-industry analysis of the influence of a number of
factors on the level of industrial R&D personnel. His
analysis showed R&D levels, adjusted for firm size to
be far gregter in industries producing consumer durable
and investment goods than in those producing consumer
non-durables and material inputs."'" He concluded that
in industries where the development of new products was a
major /
1. Comanor (1967) determined this by testing for
differences in intercepts when variables
representing industry concentration were
regressed on research personnel for each of
the two groups. The intercept for consumer
durables and investment goods was significantly
higher than that for consumer non-durables and
material inputs.
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major source of rivalry, such as in consumer durables
1
and investment goods, competitiveness in research would
be an important element in market behaviour. While
stressing product differentiation through R&D, there
is some question as to whether Comanor linked technological
opportunity directly to the ease of product differentiation
as reported by Kamien and Schwartz (1982). Comanor (1967)
in his own article states that his analysis of inter¬
industry R&D levels does not consider technological
opportunity.
Wilson (1977) followed the Phillips and Comanor
approach with regard to product differentiability in his
study of the R&D effort and the licensing of inventions
among 350 U.S. firms. He identified however, two
dimensions to each firm's technological environment: (1)
the richness of opportunity for product change arising
from exogenous advances in science and technology and;
(2) the ease with which the physical characteristics of
products can be changed. Both, he argued, would have a
positive influence on the firm's decision to undertake
research.
Assuming that a firm's technological environment can
be represented by the industry in which the firm operates,
Wilson (1977) used data on industry basic research
expenditures to classify firms into high, medium and low
opportunity industries. The share of a durable goods
industry's output sold to the consumer, investment and
government sectors combined (calculated from input-output
tables) /
- 153 -
tables) measured the ease of product differentiation.
s
Wilson's regression results show both technical dimensions
to significantly influence firm research intensity
(R&D expenditure/sales).
In another U.S. study, Shrieves (1978) accounts for
both product market and technological characteristics
in testing the relationship between innovative activity
and market concentration on 411 U.S. firms. Shrieves
took his sample of firms from those which were included in
the publication Industrial Research Laboratories of the
United States. This enabled him to use data on
employment of scientists by various disciplines to
classify firms according to their technological character¬
istics on an objective basis. A firm's product market
characteristics are determined by the three digit SIC
industrial code to which it is assigned and in turn by
that industry's sales of consumption goods, investment
goods and materials as determined by input-output tables.
The Shrieves' study makes use of factor analysis to
reduce the dimensionality of the product-market character¬
istics to two and technological characteristics to five.
Four of the five technology factors describe the relative
involvement in firms, through employment of scientists in
four broad areas; (1) life sciences,(2) electronics and
aerospace, (3) mechanical and electromechanical and
(4) chemicals. The final technology factor is dominated
by a capital intensity variable which suggests this to be
an index of the degree of process orientation or the 'flow
characteristic' /
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characeristic' of a production technology employed by
t
an industry. The two product market factors are (1)
the relative involvement in production of material inputs
and (2) the relative involvement in production of durable
equipment.
Shrieves found, in his multiple regression analysis,
the degree of involvement in the life sciences to be a
significant determinant of innovative effort. The factor
representing mechanical and electromechanical technology
was significantly inversely related to research effort,
while the other technological factors exhibited weak
inverse relationships. Shrieves concludes from these
results that areas relating to the life sciences are
relatively 'fertile' in terms of technological opportunities.
The results however do not show as one might expect a
significant positive relationship between the electronics
and chemicals factors and innovative activity.
Both product market characteristics (involvement in
material inputs production and involvement in durable
goods production) had positive and significant regression
coefficients in Schrieves' results. From this he
concludes that industries scoring low in both factors,
or those primarily engaged in consumer goods can be
expected to allocate little of their resources to R & D
rivalry. Again Schrieves' findings are somewhat
surprising for the factor representing material inputs,




Other U.S. Studies A number of other U.S. studies
i
have used various methods to account for the technological
opportunity variable in empirical tests of inventive
activity. Although these methods differ, almost all
of the studies have found the variable to have a
significant and positive influence.
Mueller (1967), for example, tests a simultaneous firm
decision-making model which includes four dependent
variables: capital investment, R&D expenditure,
advertising expenditure and dividend payments. Using data
from 67 U.S. firms for four years, 1957-60, his results
showed the independent variable to have the most explanatory
power, as far as firm R&D expenditure was concerned, to
be an industry index of R & D expenditure. Mueller con¬
cluded that the industry R&D index represented inter¬
industry technology differences.
Bailey (1972), in his analysis of U.S. pharmaceuticals,
reached a different conclusion from that of Schmookler as
far as the exhaustion of technical opportunities is
concerned."'' He found new drug introductions per dollar
of R & D spending to be negatively related to the depletion
of research opportunities. As an index of depletion he
used a seven-year moving average of past total new drug
introductions. /
1. The conclusions of Bailey (1972) and Schmookler (1966)
are not strictly comparable since the former was
considering the depletion of product technology
opportunities while the latter was concerned with
production technology. According to Schmookler a
variety of product technologies in capital goods
industries might be able to meet the need of a
changing production technology.
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introductions. Grabowski, Vernon and Thomas (1978)
I
testing Bailey's regression equation using several years
of additional data, found the depletion coefficient to be
negative but insignificant. They don't as a result
of their test however, dismiss the possibility of
depletion of opportunities as an explanatory factor for
the decline in new product introduction in drugs since
the 1960's.
Scherer (1982), in his recent retest of Schmookler's
demand-pull hypothesis, also introduces technological
opportunity into the analysis. He classifies 245 U.S.
industries into seven categories according to 'the
perceived richness of their knowledge base'.^" Dummy
variables representing the technology classes are then
entered into equations regressing patents produced in an
industry on industry sales or the demand-pull variable.
Scherer finds that the addition of the technological
opportunity dummies raise the explanatory power of his
simple demand-pull regressions significantly. He
(Scherer, 1982, p.236) concludes that 'clearly differences
in opportunity play a large and easily systematized role.'
Scherer /
1. Scherer's seven categories are as follows: organic
chemicals, other chemicals, electronic systems
and devices, other electrical equipment, the
metallurgical trades, industries with 'traditional'
technologies, such as sugar refining, textile
weaving and cement making, and a base case
consisting most of industries with mechanical
technologies.
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Scherer (1965a)in an earlier study had used a
slightly different technique in identifying the inter¬
industry differences in technological opportunities.
Using data from 352 of the largest U.S. corporations,
he first conducted a simple regression of firm patenting
activity,1959 on firm sales, 1955. He then placed the
firms in one of 14 industries and again conducted the
regression for each industry. By letting each industry
assume its own slope and intercept, he was able to
explain all but 16 per cent of the total variance in
corporate patenting about a grand mean. This was a
gain of 42.5 percentage points over his first simple
regression. Scherer attributed 30 out of the 42.5
percentage point increase in explanatory power to
technological opportunity differences among industries.
The remainder he attributes to differences in the
propensity to patent among industries."'"
Studies Using U.K. Data
While most empirical studies which have included the
technological opportunity variable have resorted to dummy
variables to represent industry differences, Stoneman (1979)
in his U.K. test of Schmookler's demand-pull theory develops
another quantifiable measurement. He represents the
differences in industry opportunities by R & D expenditures
per /
1. Scherer calculated the 12 percentage point gain
due to differences in the propensity to patent
by first regressing patent output on R & D
employment for 352 firms and then introducing
individual industry slopes as dummy variable!
The r^ for the regression including the industry
slopes is 12 percentage points higher than the
simple regression.
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per patent produced in an industry. Interpreting the
variable as representing the supply side of the inventing
industry, Stoneman argues that an industry with extensive
technological opportunities would be reflected in lower
costs per patent than one with limited opportunities.
He hypothesises that the inventing output of an industry
will be influenced by both cost and demand parameters.
Stoneman's use of a quantifiable proxy for technological
opportunity is an important step forward from the assess¬
ment of technological opportunity through subjective
judgement. His use of the R&D per patent measure
however does lead to some questions. As noted in section
5.1, Stoneman tests both demand-pull and technological -push
variables as determinants of U.K. industrial patenting
activity in both time-series and cross-sectional tests.
This however, as Stoneman notes himself, leads to the
simultaneity problem of having the number of patents both
as the dependent variable and as the denominator of the
independent technological opportunity variable."*"
Stoneman however finds in both cross-sectional tests
for 14 U.K. industries and time series tests for 13 of
these industries that not only demand but costs have an
important role to play in determining inventive activity.
His cost term is significant at the 5 per cent level in
each /
"*" *
Stoneman (1979) defends his empirical equation
however by pointing out that while the dependent
variable takes values over a number of years, the
independent cost variable is calculated for only
one year and is used to represent technological
opportunity in all years. Therefore the two
values are the same only for one year.
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each year 1949-60 in his cross-sectional tests.
Another recent U.K. study using quantifiable
variables to represent technological opportunity is that
by Waterson and Lopez (1983) . Their study is particularly
relevant since they find technological opportunity to be
the main discernible influence on U.K. industrial research
intensity as measured by R & D expenditure as a percentage
of sales. In contrast average industry firm size and
the level of concentration have virtually no influence on
industry research intensity.
Waterson and Lopez include two variables as proxies
for technological opportunity, a variable representing
capital intensity and a variable representing the rate
of technical progress as measured by growth in output
per head over a seven year period. They argue that
research is likely to be more productive and can be
adapted more quickly in industries which invest
relatively heavily. The technical progress variable,
according to Waterson and Lopez, captures a rather
different aspect of technological opportunity as it is
not correlated with capital intensity.
Despite significant results for both technological
opportunity variables, the measures used must be questioned
on theoretical grounds. A basic criticism is that the
two measures are poor proxies for the theoretical
concept of the underlying scientific knowledge base
associated with an industry. The basis used by Griliches
(1980) /
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(1980b)however, in line with Waterson and Lopez, suggests
t
that capital intensive firms with large plants tend to
invest more in R & D.
The second variable used to approximate technological
opportunity, technical progress or growth in output per
head seems a result rather than a determinant of research
intensity. However again the product cycle theory
suggests that at very high levels of productivity the
opportunities for technological breakthroughs will have
been exhausted.
5.3 The Influence of Firm Size
A considerable amount of effort has been devoted to
testing the relationship between firm size and the incentive
to invent or innovate. This may be due to the implications
the Schumpeterian hypothesis has for government anti-trust
policy. If larger firms devote proportionately more of
their resources to R & D or more significantly if they
produce proportionately more inventions and innovations
than smaller firms, then anti-trust policies could be
damaging to dynamic efficiency in an economy.
This section of the chapter, which reports the
existing empirical evidence concerning the influence
of firm size on inventive activity, is divided into two
parts. In the first part those studies which concern
the relationship between R&D inputs and firm size are
described, while in the second part studies which concern
the relationship between inventive outputs and firm size
are reviewed. From the point of view of this thesis,
in /
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in which patent data is used as an index^inventive output,
the second group is more important. However, because
R&D inputs have been shown to be positively related to
R&D outputs (see section 1.4), the results of the two
types of studies are as expected, very similar. While
most of the empirical tests completed have been on U.S.
data, a number of U.K. studies are highlighted in the
discussion. In the second part of the section, work by
Mansfield and others (1977a)is discussed at some length
due to the separation of process from product innovations,
which again is of interest to this thesis.
Firm Size and R&D Inputs Early U.S. tests of the
relationship between firm size and R&D effort, by
Worley (1961) , Horowitz (1962) and Hamburg (1964) , provide
no evidence that effort devoted to R & D increases morej
than in proportion to firm size. Hamburg (1964) , whose
early work is often referred to, gathered data on 340
large U.S. firms in 19 two digit manufacturing industries
to test the relationship between industrial R&D activity,
in both the absolute and relative sense, and firm size.
Using rank correlation analysis for each of the 19 industries,
he found that the absolute level of R & D employment tended
to increase with firm size in all but one industry. But
when logarithmic regression analysis was used, Hamburg
found that R&D intensity increased with firm size in
but two industries, petroleum and stone, clay and glass.
In one industry, primary metals, the coefficient for
size /
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size was significantly less than one.
Results reported by Mansfield (1964) generally confirm
Hamburg's conclusions concerning R&D intensity and
firm size. Mansfield estimated the elasticity of R & D
expenditure with respect to firm size on major U.S.
firms in the chemical, petroleum, drug, steel and glass
industries. His least-squares estimates show that
except for chemicals, the largest firms in these industries
seemed to spend no more on R & D relative to sales than
smaller firms.
Mansfield (1964) also provided a test of the economies
of scale in R & D activity in the U.S. chemical, petroleum
and steel industries. Tapping various data bases, he
measured the effect of R & D expenditure on the number of
inventions or innovations made by firms weighted by their
importance in each of the three industries. Holding
R&D expenditure constant in a regression analysis,
Mansfield found the effects of firm size on the average
productivity of such expenditure to be negative in each
industry and statistically significant in two of the
three. Mansfield attributes this to looser controls
and the greater problems of supervision and co-ordination
in /
1. Scherer (1965b) suggests that Hamburg dismisses
coefficients too quickly when they do not meet
the .05 significance test. He points out that
eight of eleven major two digit industries in
Hamburg's tests have size coefficients greater
than one, when employment is the size variable,
even though they only pass significance tests
at the .10, .20 or .30 levels.
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in a very large organisation. Holding firm size
I
constant, the evidence suggests that increases in R & D
expenditures result in more than proportional increases
in inventive output in the chemical industry. This is not
true of the other two industries. Summarising his findings,
Mansfield (1964) states that the results imply no marked
advantages of the largest-scale R&D activities over
large and medium-sized ones.
Scherer (1965a), in evaluating empirical work concerning
firm size and R&D intensity, notes that the logarithmic
equations used by Hamburg (1964) are unable to detect such
structural features as inflection points. Scherer,
therefore, using R&D employment data from 352 of the
largest 500 U.S. firms in terms of 1955 sales, regresses
R&D employment on linear, squared and cubed sales
variables. In addition, to suppress the influence of
giant corporations, he regresses R&D employment on the
logarithmic transformation of all three sales variables.
Scherer's results show R&D employment intensity
increasing with size among firms with sales of less than
$500m,but declining among firms with sales over this
amount.
Classifying firms into six, two digit SIC industries,
Scherer (1965a) conducts separate regressions for each one.
In nearly every case the equations with logscales show
increasing intensity among the smallest and medium size
firms. Both untransformed and log equations show research
intensity /
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intensity declining with size among larger firms in the
1
non-chemical group. The chemicals industry, however,
displayed research intensity continuing to increase
with firm size or sales. Scherer cautions that his
industry results can only be viewed as 'best' estimates
due to the three sales variables being highly collinear.
He notes however that the results are similar to those
of Mansfield (1964) and his own corporate patenting
analysis, which are described in the section dealing with
size and research outputs. More recently Scherer
(1980, p.420) has reported that the difference once
apparent in the chemical industry appears to have dis¬
appeared over time. In data for U.S. firms in 1975, there
was no evidence of a positive correlation between R&D/
sales ratios and firm size among 54 industrial and
specialty chemicals producers.
Scherer (1965a), also in his early article, pointed
to a number of the problems involved in estimating the
relationship between firm size and inventive activity.
One such problem is that of zero values for either firm
R&D input or output data. He suggests that when zero
values exist in the relevant population the logarithmic
test of the size variable on R & D inputs, both dependent
and independent variables transformed, is not valid.
If the tendency is for the smaller firms in any dis¬
tribution to undertake no R & D, leaving these firms out
of the regression, which is necessary under the logarithmic





Scherer (1965a) further discusses the effects of using
different measures of firm size on regression results.
He concludes that the sales measure is preferable to
either employment or assets because it is neutral in
terms of factor proportions. He suggests that the
most suitable measure would be value added, but notes that
data is seldom available for individual firms.
Additional U.S. results provided by Comanor (1967),
Mueller (1967) and Grabowski confirmed the earlier
findings. Grabowski (1968), for example, compared the
influence of firm size in the U.S. chemical and drug
industries on R & D expenditure by large firms (on the
1960 Fortune's 500 listing). He uses a quadratic
regression equation, estimating parameters for both
linear and squared values of sales, to determine the
effect of size on research intensity in the two industries.
The results from 1959-62 data show quite different
behaviour in the two industries. For chemicals, the
statistically significant sales parameters indicate that
research intensity increases continuously with firm size.
For drugs the coefficient of the squared variable is
significantly negative. A plot of the estimated
relationship, indicates that after a brief initial increase
in research intensity with size, research intensity
decreases with size throughout most of the range.
Grabowski (1968), in the same study, examines the
relationship between firm research productivity and
firm /
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firm size, stressing the importance of the relationship
to any argument for corporate bigness. Research
productivity is measured here by the number of patents
received per scientist and engineer employed over a four
year period. He finds weak, and in the case of the
chemical industry negative and insignificant correlations
between the variables, lending no support to the afore¬
mentioned argument.
More recent studies of R & D effort and firm size
provide mixed results. Rosenberg (1976) tested the
size hypothesis using 1963 market share as a measure
of size in 100 large U.S. firms. He reported that the
percentage of a firm's 1964 total employment allocated
to professional R&D personnel declined as market
share increased.
Shrieves (1978) also using mid-1960's data, tested
the influence of the logarithmic transformation of sales
on the logarithmic transformation of privately financed
R&D employees for 411 U.S. firms included in the
publication, Industrial Research Laboratories of the
United States. A number of other variables were also
included in the regression equation. Shrieves finds
the sales parameter to be significantly (.01 level) less
than unity (.604) implying that smaller firms that
perform R&D allocate proportionately more resources to
R&D than larger firms.
Griliches /
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Griliches (1980fc>)using a sample of 883 large (having
over 1000 employees in 1964) and R&D performing U.S.
firms found no evidence of anything more than a proportional
relationship between R&D (total accumulated R&D
expenditure, 1957-65) and size (average of 1957 and 1963
valued added).
In contrast to most of the empirical work, Soete (1979),
using 1975 and 1976 company financed R&D expenditure data
for over 500 U.S. firms,"1" found that innovational effort
increased more than proportionally with firm size. This
result was consistent regardless of the method of analysis -
concentration ratios, logarithmic or cubic regression.
Soete could draw no general conclusions however when
analysing the data by industrial group.
Perhaps as important as Soete's results is his critical
analysis of previous empirical studies testing the
relationship between firms'size and R&D effort. He
argues that much of the data used in previous studies is
from the mid-1960's and before and therefore obsolete.
Soete comments that important changes in firms' size have
occurred over the last 10-20 years. He adds that R&D
employment data and patent data, which have been the
major /
1. Soete's R&D expenditure data is taken from the
Business Week Survey covering 95% of total
company financed R&D expenditure in the U.S.
Since 1976 Business Week has published this data
for individual firms.
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ma.jor indicators of inventive activity, overestimate
the contribution of the smaller firm.^" He suggests that
R&D expenditure is a more 'neutral' measure. Finally
he criticises previous studies for lacking any theoretical
justification for their findings. Soete asks why large
firms fully exploiting economies of scale in other areas,
such as marketing, would fail to do so with regard to
innovational activity.
Studies done using non-U.S. data show a less
than proportional relationship between R&D intensity
and sales, with a few variations. Adams (1970) for
example concluded that the effect of increased seller
concentration in the French economy, in the form of
large firms, is likely to have a perverse effect on the
volume of French industrial R&D activity.
Caves and Uekusa (1976) report on Uekusa's study on
the relationship between R&D expenditures and firm
size for a sample of nearly 300 large manufacturing and
construction firms in Japan. For the entire sample,
regression analysis for separate years (1965, 1967, 1969)
implies that R&D expenditure rose more or less proportion¬
ately with size to a certain point but then decreased
absolutely. These results change however, when the firms
are divided into industries. In highly innovative
industries /
*
Soete cites evidence showing that R&D costs per
scientist and engineer increase with firm size
and that large firms patent a smaller proportion
of what they invent.
- 169 -
industries, R&D expenditures are found to increase
more than proportionately to firm sales. In moderately
innovative industries the increase is more than
proportional only up to a point, then becomes less than
proportional and ultimately declines absolutely. In the
less innovative industries the increase in R & D becomes
less than proportional for those with more than a
modest volume of sales, and again an absolute decline
ultimately sets in.
A recent paper by Waterson and Lopez (1983) suggests
that firm size has virtually no influence on R & D
intensity in the U.K. among firms with R&D programmes.
They come to this conclusion by estimating the relation¬
ship between industry-level R&D intensity (R&D
expenditure as a percentage of sales in 1975) and average
industry firm size, in fifteen Minimum List Headings
industries. The regression equations also include
independent variables representing technological opportunity
and concentration. Waterson and Lopez find that average
firm size appears to have a negative influence on company
financed R & D as a percentage of sales and no significant
influence on total R&D intensity.
In further regressions, using pooled industry data
from 1972, 1975 and 1978, Waterson and Lopez adopt a
logarthmic equation to test the form of the relationship
between company-financed industry R&D expenditure and
average firm size. The coefficient for size is
significantly /
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significantly less than unity (.792) implying a less
than proportional relationship between the two variables.
However, due to the correlation between average industry
firm size and concentration the authors state that
conclusions are hazardous in this respect. When the
concentration ratio is adjusted to account for foreign
trade, the correlation between concentration and firm
size declines and the coefficient for average firm size
becomes slightly greater than one retaining its
significance. As an overall conclusion Waterson and
Lopez state that amongst relatively large firms, those
in industries which are more concentrated and having larger
firms are not on average heavier spenders than those in
unconcentrated industries with relatively small firms.
The Relationship of Firm Size to Inventive Outputs
An important early test of the effect of firm size on
the generation of inventive outputs was that by Scherer
(1965a). Scherer observed, from fully comparable data
on 352 U.S. firms, that sales volume among firms was
more concentrated than R&D employment, which itself was
slightly more concenrated than patenting. The
implication was that both inventive inputs and outputs
increase less than proportionately with sales and that
inventive outputs increase less than proportionately with
inputs. In the same study, Scherer (1965a) conducted
a more formal nonlinear regression analysis between firm
patentinginl959 and firm salesini955, using data from
448 large U.S. corporations. Regressing firm patenting
activity /
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activity on the first three powers of sales, Scherer
1
found: a significant and positive coefficient for
the first power; a significant and negative coefficient
for the second power; and a positive coefficient for the
cubic power, but with doubtful significance. More
precisely Scherer found diminishing returns dominating up
to a £5.5 billion sales level, after which increasing
returns set in. Only three firms however, had sales
over this amount. When Scherer (1965a, p.1108) repeated
his tests, breaking the same firms into both fourteen
industry groups and four consolidated groups, he came
to the same conclusion, 'again the indication is one
of diminishing returns except for a few giants leading
their two digit industries.'
Mansfield (1963, 1971, 1977) has used a standard format
to analyse the relationship between firm size and important
innovations introduced, in a number of studies for different
industries over various time periods. His database in all
of these studies is composed of important innovations in
the industry as listed by trade journals, trade associations,
university departments and the firms themselves, associated
with the particular industries. The sources were asked in
addition to rank each innovation by its importance, as
measured by either cost savings for process innovations
and volume of sales for product innovations. The
innovations were then traced to the originating firms.
Mansfield, and in some studies his fellow authors,
first /
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first examine the share of innovations accounted for
by the largest four firms in an industry as compared to
their market share. Then shifting to the full range
of firm sizes, regression analysis is used to determine
the optimum firm size in each industry with respect to
maximising the rate of innovation."*"
Early work by Mansfield (1963) in this area focused
on three industries, iron and steel, petroleum refining
and bituminous coal. Results showed that in two
industries, petroleum refining and coal, the four
largest firms introduced a larger share of innovations
than their share of the market. However in steel the
four largest firms introduced a disproportionately small
share of innovations. In a simple regression model to
determine why giant firms had a greater impact in some
industries and not in others, Mansfield found that the
investment required to use potential innovations relative
to firm size was a good predictor.
In /
1. Mansfield's (see for example Mansfield, et.al. 1977
p.51) regression equation is as follows:
2 3
N. - a + a. S. + a_S. + a_S. + z.
l o li 2 x 3 i i
where N. is the number of innovations weighted or
unweighted; Si is a variable representing firm
size; and zi i£ a random error term.
After the equation is estimated, Ni/S^ is solved
for and its maximum value determined.
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In his analysis over the entire range of firms,
Mansfield found that the sixth largest firm introduced
maximum innovations relative to its size in both the
petroleum and coal industries. In steel the optimal
size was found among very small firms. Mansfield
cautions however, that his regression equations fit the
data only moderately well.
A further test made by Mansfield (1963) in the same
study, and one of particular relevance to this thesis,
involved the separation of process and product innovations
in the steel and petroleum industries. After regressing
firm size individually against the number of product and
process innovations made by firms in each industry, he
compares the resulting residuals, finding them weakly
correlated. Mansfield's (1963, p.566) conclusion is
that 'holding firm size constant, a firm that did
considerable innovating with regard to process also did
considerable innovating with regard to products.' This
piece of evidence is not consistent with the hypothesis
that firms 'trade-off' process innovations against product
innovations (see, for example, Wilson, 1977).
In a later study of the U.S. ethical drug industry,
Mansfield et.al. (1971) follow the same format as that
described above. They concluded that, if innovations
were not weighted by their importance, the four largest
firms were responsible for a relatively smaller share
of innovations than their market share. However, when
innovations /
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innovations were weighted by their importance, the share
of innovations carried out by the largest four firms was
equal to their share of the market. The twelfth largest
firm in the pharmaceutical industry was found to intro¬
duce the greatest number of innovations relative to its
size.
In their following study of the U.S. chemical industry,
Mansfield et.al. (1977b)include not only those firms
first using major innovations in their database, but also those
firms responsible for the development (or in the terms
of this thesis - production) of the innovations. The
first commercial user and the developer may or may not
be the same firm. They also separate major innovations
into process innovations and product innovations, which
although in only one industry, provides a useful basis of
comparison for this thesis.
In their analysis of the largest four firms in the
chemical industry, Mansfield et.al. (1977b)found that with
respect to process innovations, either unweighted or
weighted by importance, that the asset share of the
largest four firms exceeded their share of innovations.
The largest four firms however accounted for the same
share of process developments as they did of the industry's
assets. Using regression analysis on the full range of
firm sizes, the authors found that the firm size generating
the maximum rate of innovation occurred among very small
firms for first users of innovations and at about the
seventh /
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seventh or eighth largest firm for developers of
1
innovations, whether the data was weighted or unweighted.
They concluded that there was no tendency for the very
largest firms to carry out a disproportionately large
share of process innovations or developments.
Results of the study were substantially different for
product innovations. Breaking the period over which
major innovations had been counted 1930 to 1966 into
two time periods 1930-1950 and 1951-1966, Mansfield et.al.
(1977b)found that the four largest chemical firms
carried out a larger share of product innovations and
developments than their share of the industry's assets in
the later period, but not in the earlier period.
Comparing these results with earlier studies, the authors
conclude that the largest four chemical firms made a
larger impact on product innovation than those in the
steel and ethical drug industries and about the same as
their counterparts in the petroleum industry. Using
the full range of chemical firms in regression analysis,
the maximum.value of both innovations and developments
relative to firm size occurred in the largest firm in
the industry, du Pont. This was true for both weighted
and /
1 . These results were obtained using data on major
chemical innovations between 1951 and 1971.
For an earlier time period, 1930 to 1950, all
relevant sizes of firms carried out the same
number of process innovations relative to
their size (see Mansfield et.al, 1977b,p.52)
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arid unweighted data and for both time periods used.
In concluding remarks concerning their study, the
authors point to the much greater role for the largest
chemical firms in product innovation as opposed to
process innovation. Their results for product
innovation are also consistent with evidence indicat¬
ing that the chemical industry is the one major
industry where the largest firms spend proportionately
more on R & D relative to their size than smaller firms.
The authors (Mansfield et. al. 1977b,p.64) add the
following with respect to the differences between
product and process innovation results:
To a considerable extent, this difference
undoubtedly reflects a conscious policy
decision at du Pont concerning the
areas and types of work that it regards
as most profitable. New products like
nylon or orlon can be enormously
profitable if a firm is able to overcome
the many technical and commercial hurdles
that lie along the road to success.
Discussing all of their evidence more fully, the authors
also note that innovations in the chemical industry
were not generally introduced and developed by the same
firm. However as firm size increased, the likelihood




Evidence concerning the relationship between firm
size and inventive output in the U.K. is supplied in a
study by Smyth, Samuels and Tzoannos (1972). More
specifically the study examines the relationship between
a firm's size, its profitability, its liquidity
and the number of patented inventions it produces, for
three industries - chemicals, electrical and electronic
engineering and machine tools. Drawing a sample of 86
U.K. firms from Kelly's Directory of Companies, the
authors regress number of firm patents, 1963-1966, on the
first two powers of firm size, as measured by assets, 1963.
Results which showed chemical patenting to increase more
than proportionately with firm size, were similar to those
in the U.Sl In electrical engineering and electronics the
authors report that patenting increased more than
proportionately with firm size, but that this did not
hold true for very large firms - GEC, Associated
Engineering. In machine tools the authors found that
smaller firms patent more than larger firms.
5.4 /
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5.4 The Influence of Market Structure
As indicated in the corresponding theoretical section,
market power has two offsetting influences on technical
knowledge production by the firm. The absence of competition
implies greater monopoly profits from the commerciali¬
sation of a firm's inventions; however, it may also
lead to complacency in innovation due to a lack of
pressure from rivals. Empirical tests are of interest
here in determining the relative strength of what
Scherer (1980, p.429) refers to as two clashing
'structural propensities'.
A frequent test of the influence of market structure
on inventive activity is one analysing the relationship
between inventive inputs or outputs in a firm or industry
and its industry concentration ratio. Results of such
tests are reported in the first part of this section.
In addition, the few studies concerning the relationship
between inventive activity and industrial entry barriers
are also described. An early study by Comanor (1967) which
indicated that there may be a complex relationship between
inventive activity and concentration is highlighted as
well as a later study by Shrieves (1978) which also follows
this line. In the second part of the section results
concerning the relationship between profitability and
liquidity, two other indicators of market power, and
inventive activity are reviewed. The great majority
of empirical studies in this area are from the U.S.;
very/
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very little work has been done using U.K. data.
( Studies Testing Industrial Concentration In two
earlier U.S. studies conducted along this line, Horowitz
(1962) and Hamburg (1966) both found positive correlations
between industry R&D intensity, as measured by R&D
expenditure to sales, and industry concentration ratios.
In both studies, however, the association found between
the two variables was weak. As Scherer (1965a) notes,
a deficiency of these earlier studies was the failure
to take interindustry differences in technological
opportunity into account.
Scherer (1965a), who has done considerable work in
this area, first found, in a study of the effect of
concentration on the patenting output of 448 U.S.
companies, that inventive output did not appear to be
systematically related to market power. However, in a
slightly later study (Scherer, 1967) using inventive
inputs rather than output as a measure of technological
change, he concluded that there was some support for
concentration as a positive influence on inventive
activity,.although the relationship was complex.
Scherer (1967), using data on 56 U.S. industries,
found a simple correlation of positive 0.46 between the
ratio of scientific and engineering workers to total
employment in an industry and the industry concentration
ratio. When differences in industry product technology
were taken into account, however, the partial correlation
coefficient between the technological employment index and
concentration/
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concentration fell to 0.20. The fall in the coefficient
1
was attributed by Scherer to the positive correlation
between technological opportunity and concentration,
and the strong correlation between technological opportunity
and industry inventive intensity.
A study of considerable importance, which highlighted
the 'complex' relationship between concentration and
innovative effort was that of Comanor (1967). Comanor,
who set out to investigate the various dimensions of
market structure on the level of research, considered
product differentiation as a strong incentive to
allocate funds for research. He found that there may be
an important interaction between concentration and product
differentiation in their influence on research spending.
His analysis was based on a sample of U.S. firms in 33
three digit SIC industries, which were classified into
two sectors: those producing investment goods and
consumer durables and those producing material inputs and
consumer non-durables. The first sector was characterised
by industries in which product differentiation played an
important role in market behaviour while in the second
sector product differentiation was relatively weak.
Comanor's results showed that while average research
levels in both sectors tended to be higher when con¬
centration was higher, the relationship was far stronger
in industries where prospects for product differentiation
were weak. From this Comanor concluded that where research
is more closely tied to competitive conditions, increased
concentration is less likely to lead to higher levels of
research. He warns that due to his exclusion of the
technological/
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technological opportunity variable, the influence of
concentration on research might be overstated in his
results. This, Comanor notes, is because technological
factors tend to be positvely correlated with concentration.
Comanor (1967), in the same study, regressed
industrial research levels against a number of entry
barriers, including one for product differentiation. He
used a dummy variable for product differentiation based
on the same two sectors previously mentioned. He
concluded from his results that industrial research
appears strongest in industries where some measure of
technical entry barrier exists, so that rapid imitation
is impeded - but also where entry has not been effectively
foreclosed.
Rosenberg (1976),following up on the Comanor test
of the influence of entry barriers on innovative activity,
analysed the effect of advertising intensity, capital
intensity and economies of scale on the percentage of
total employment allocated to professional R&D employment
in 100 U.S. firms. He found that entry barriers were
a positive' but not significant effect on research
intensity. Rosenberg concluded, however, that entry
barriers may be somewhat more important than previously
assumed. Rosenberg also found that market share and
industrial concentration have a significant impact on
R&D intensity, although the influence of a firm's market
share is negative. His study indicated that concentrated




Shrieves (1978, p. 330), following the work of Scherer
and Comanor, offers what he views as a 'more definite
view of the dichotomous nature of the relationship between
market structure and the intensity of innovative effort'.
Using a sample of 411 U.S. firms, he conducts multiple
regression analysis to estimate the relationship between
concentration levels across industries. He accounts for
product market characteristics, technological characteristics,
and government involvement in generating technology in his
analysis.
Shrieves first estimates the relationship between
innovative effort and the concentration aspect of market
structure across industry groups without regard to the
potential dichotomous nature of the relationship suggested by
earlier studies. His concentration ratio has a positive and
significant regression coefficient which offers support for
the thesis that firms in more concentrated industries
are more vigorous innovators than firms in less concentrated
industries.
Analysing his data further, Shrieves (1978) partitions
his sample of firms by product-market characteristics,
allowing a four-way classification of industries. His
classifications are not subjective, but result from
input-output data on sales of consumption goods, investment
goods and naterials for all 53 three digit industries into
which the 411 firms were classified. Regression results
by sector show that the role of concentration as a stimulus
to/
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to research appears to be ambiguous, very much depending
oh the product types sold and markets served by an industry.
While concentration levels were significantly and
positively associated with R&D effort for material inputs
and consumer goods producers, the relationship was
marginally significant and inverse for specialised durable
equipment. A positive but marginally significant
relationship was also found between concentration and
research effort for producers of non-specialised producer
goods.
Shrieves'results lend support to Comanor's theory of
a dichotomous role for concentration as an influence on
research effort. His results also suggest that concen¬
tration may have an adverse effect on innovative efforts
in certain industries, although findings are not strong
in this respect. He also concludes from his analysis
that product differentiation (as stressed by Comanor)
may not be the only or best explanation for the dichotomous
role of the concentration variable. His data show
certain technological characteristics to correspond with
product market characteristics in the durable goods as
opposed to the material inputs and consumer products
sectors. In the latter sector firms are larger and the
technology is more concerned with the life sciences and
chemistry and more process oriented. In the former
sector, however, firms are smaller and less process
oriented, while the technology is heavily oriented
towards/
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towards electronics, aerospace, mechanical and electro¬
mechanical fields. Shrieves emphasises the interaction
of these characteristics as an alternative explanation for
the dichotomous role played by concentration in
innovative effort.
There is remarkably little evidence on the relationship
between market structure and innovation in the U.K., although
Waterson and Lopez (1 983) do consider this in a recent
study. Their conclusion is that R&D intensity does not
appear to be positively associated with concentration within
15 of the most research-intensive industries in the U.K.,
once technological opportunities and statistical
difficulties have been taken into account.
A problem faced by Waterson and Lopez in their
industry-level study is the limited amount of data on
R&D expenditure and employment available in the U.K.
Data is compiled at approximately three-year intervals
for about 15 broad industry categories with minimum list
headings, which as the authors note, over-represents the
more research-intensive industries. While they alleviate
the problem somewhat by increasing the sample, combining
information for more than one year, they are still left
with broad industry categories for which themeaningful-
ness of concentration ratios must be questionable.
Using the combined data for company financed R&D
only, Waterson and Lopez find that concentration has a
mild impact on industrial R&D as a percentage of sales
when/
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when average firm size and technological opportunity
were accounted for. The authors, however, question the
results on the basis that concentration is simultaneously
determined along with R&D expenditures in the long run,
rather than causing a certain level of R&D. Using an
instrumental variable, an index based on minimum optimal
scale of production in an industry, to solve the simultane¬
ity problem and represent concentration, in a further test
they find that the concentration index becomes almost
insignificant. Also, when a measure of concentration
is used which is adjusted for foreign trade, the concen¬
tration variable loses its significance as a determinant
of R&D intensity.
Studies Concerning Profitability and Liquidity
In contrast to the use of concentration ratios as a measure
of market structure, several studies have included
measures of liquidity and/or profitability as determinants
of inventive or innovative activity. As Mueller (1967)
notes, profits serve a dual role in determining the
inventive effort made by firms. Current profits are
both a flow-of-funds and an indication of future returns
from similar investments. Both of these aspects support
the hypothesis that firms in more concentrated industries
are more likely to be innovators. An alternative view
is that profits may be inversely related to inventive
activity, as firms suffering a decline in profits may be
forced to innovate to survive.
Empirical/
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Empirical tests of the relationship between inventive
or innovative effort and either liquidity or profitability
have generally shown a weak relationship (for example,
see Scherer, 1965a and Hamburg, 1966). However, there
have been some positive results and other results of
interest.
Grabowski (1968) found liquidity to be a positive
and significant influence on firm R&D intensity in his
study of the U.S. chemical, drug and petroleum industries.
As a liquidity measure, Grabowski uses the sum of a firm's
after-tax profits plus depreciation and depletion charges.
In another study with Baxter (Grabowski and Baxter, 1973),
further support was found for the influence of internally
generated funds on R&D. Using data from eight U.S.
chemical firms over the period 1948-1967, the authors
estimate the annual changes in firm R&D expenditure.
In multiple regression analysis, they found cash flow to
i important
be the single most., explanatory variable in their equation.
Mueller (1967) tests a simultaneous firm-decision
making model concerning four variables, R&D expenditure,
capital investment, advertising and dividend payments
using observations from 67 U.S. firms over four years.
For the equation explaining R&D intensity (R&D expenditure
deflated by sales) he found the depreciation coefficient
to be positive for all years but significant for only one
recession year. He concluded that its increased
strength of influence in that year, coupled with its low
coefficient/
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coefficient in the investment equation for the same year
indicated a shifting of resources from investment to R&D
in years when the returns on the former activity are
low. His view therefore of R&D is one of less cyclical
influence than that of capital investment. Mueller also
finds an increased importance for profits as an explanatory
variable in years of high economic activity. He states
that in peak years when expectations are most buoyant,
high returns to the extent that they are attributed to
past R&D have their strongest impact on firm decision
making.
Elliott (1971) in a U.S. study using a cross-sectional
sample of 53 firms drawn from 16 industries, sets to
examine the rate of profits either as a demand variable
or a flow-of-funds variable in its relationship to firm
R&D spending. He proceeds by developing a stock-
adjustment model of R&D investment spending, where current
spending depends on the difference between a desired
'technology stock' and the firm's actual stock. Along
with variables representing the external industry
environment, Elliott includes three firm profit measures
and two measures of firm liquidity to represent internal
determinants of R&D. His findings show that there is
consistently stronger support for the profit role as an
expectational influence on R&D than for the funds-flow
effect. This is because those profit measures which are
most significant in his regression equation, are interpreted
as measures of expectations.
A/
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A more positive result was obtained by Branch (1 973) ,
who examined 111 U.S. manufacturing corporations in
industries where appreciable amounts of privately supported
R&D were performed. Estimating distributed lag functions
for pooled company time-series data by industry, he found
support for both causal flows from profitability to
patenting and from patenting to subsequently increased
profits. Of the two the chain from profitability to
patenting was less consistent and statistically weaker.
In the U.K. Smyth, Samuels, and Tzoannos (1973) have
tested the effect of profitability and liquidity on the
number of patents obtained by 86 firms in three industries,
chemicals, electrical engineering and electronics and
machine tools. The average five year profit rate had no
significant effect in any industry. Cash flow, measured by
undistributed profits plus depreciation had a positive
effect in each case but it was significant only for chemi¬
cals and machine tools.
A problem in using profits or liquidity as proxies
for concentration is that they are not direct measures of
market structure. They may be the results of a concentrated
market structure, but even this is not certain. Profits
may be high in a new industry which is rapidly growing
or may be the reward for exceptional management. It
is difficult, therefore, to arrive at conclusions con¬
cerning the effect of market power on invention from
studies using these proxies.
5.5/
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5.5 The Influence of Technological Rivalry
Although it is a characteristic of market structure,
technological rivalry is important enough to consider
individually as an influence on technological changes
made by firms. The hypothesis here is that competition
in the form of technological product differentiation acts
as a stimulus to firm inventive and innovative activity.
Scherer (1967, 1980) predicts that an increase in the
number of firms up to some point of overcrowding should be
a positive influence on invention and innovations. Grabowski
(1973, 1978) suggests that oligopoly is the market form
most conducive to rivalry.
While a good deal of theoretical work has been done
on the influence of technological rivalry (see Kamien and
Schwartz, 1982), little has been accomplished in terms of
empirical studies. Rivalry is used to explain particular
empirical results concerning the influence of market
structure in general on the research intensity of firms,
however it is only rarely directly measured. A number of
studies have, used dummy variables to represent the ease
of product differentiation in an industry, however these may
be as suggestive of opportunities available than actual
rivalrous conditions."'" Grabowski in the U.S. has made
the /
1. While Comanor's (1967) view of product differentiation
has been generally linked with technological opportunity,
Comanor himself stressed that new product development
may be a major source of rivalry in some industries.
See section 6.2 for a discussion of Comanor's work.
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the most significant contribution in terms of measuring
1
rivalry in a more direct manner.
Grabowski and Baxter (1973) in their investigation
of eight U.S. chemical firms over the period of 1948 and
1967 tested the hypothesis that one determinant of
changes in firm R&D expenditures is previous changes in
its rival's R&D expenditure. The chosen rival in their
study was determined by best statistical fit as either the
leading R&D spender or the immediate successor in terms
of R & D expenditure. While the single most important
determinant of firm R&D expenditure in the study turns
out to be the firm's cash flow, the previous changes in
rival firm R&D was significant in four out of eight
cases. Previous changes in the firm's own R&D
expenditure was a significant explanatory variable in
three cases.
In the same study, Grabowski and Baxter (1973) test
the relationship between competitive reaction in terms
of R & D and industrial concentration. They hypothesise
that the incentive to compete by differentiation and
improving product lines through R&D rather than by price
changes, should be stronger in more oligopolistic industries.
Grabowski and Baxter measure R&D competitive reaction
by the coefficient of variation in industry research intensity.
They predict that as the strength of reaction becomes
larger, a greater conformity in the level of R & D inputs
should be expected. Using a sample of twenty-nine U.S.
industries /
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industries and an eight firm concentration ratio, they
t
found a significant and negative relationship in the
rank correlation between concentration and the
coefficient of variation of research intensity. They
concluded that concentration does lead to greater
conformity in R & D spending, although as Kamien and
Schwartz note (1982) this has no implication for the
level of industrial R&D spending.
While a number of British economists, including
Freeman (1982) and Pavitt (1980) have stressed the
importance of technological competition or rivalry in
understanding patterns in R & D expenditure and
successful economic performance, there has been an
absence of empirical tests along the lines of Grabowski
and Baxter.
5.6 The Influence of Diversification
As explained in section 4.6, a firm's degree of
diversification might be expected to have a positive
influence on its incentive to invent. This is because
of the higher expected profitability from research for
firms with diverse product lines, able to make use in
some way of the unanticipated results of their research
efforts. Also, if R & D projects are conducted in a
number of the firm's product areas, lower average risks
of technical and commercial success may be a result.
Although the argument has greater validity for
basic research leading to scientific discovery than
applied /
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applied research leading to new technical knowledge, the
diversification hypothesis has been tested on the
incentive to conduct R&D generally. Scherer (1965q)
compiled an index of product line diversification for
each of 463 U.S. firms on Fortunes's list of the 500
largest industrial enterprises, measuring the number of
technologically distinct product lines out of a
possibility of 200. A diversification index was then
introduced into regression equations relating 1959 firm
patenting to 1955 firm sales for 14 broad industry
categories and similar equations relating 1955 R&D
employment to 1955 sales for seven two-digit industry
groups. Scherer found positive and in some instances
highly significant partial correlation coefficients
between diversification and inventive activity in a
number of industry groups which in general did little
R&D. However, in interpreting this finding Scherer
did not view diversification as a stimulus to research,
but as a structural indicator that firms were looking
for richer.opportunities for pursuing research and
developing new products. Negative and statistically
unsignificant results in the electrical equipment and
chemical and drug groups, led Scherer to conclude that
there is little evidence that diversification is
conducive to especially vigorous R&D activity.
Comanor (1965), in his study of 57 U.S. pharmaceutical
manufacturers, found the index of firm diversification
to be inversely correlated with R&D productivity or
new /
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new drug product sales in the first two years after
introduction. Here the diversification index was
measured by the firm's participation in forty therapeutic
markets defined on the basis of the apparent medical
useage. Comanor concluded that inefficiencies can
result when a firm spreads its research efforts too
thinly over many lines.
Grabowski's results (1967) were somewhat more positive
concerning the diversification hypothesis. Examining
U.S. firms in the chemical, petroleum and drug industries,
in all three groups he found R&D spending as a percentage
of sales to increase with the number of five-digit product
lines in which the firms operated. The coefficient for
diversification however, was only significant in the
chemical and drug sectors.
In a more recent study, Link and Long (1981) , criticise
previous empirical work which mis-specifies the original
diversification hypothesis of Nelson, which was related
to basic research rather than total R&D. They correct
this error, by testing the influence of firm product
diversification (the number of four digit industries
in which the firm operates) on the basic research intensity
(basic research spending as a percentage of sales) of
250 U.S. manufacturing firms. Accounting for a number
of other influences on basic research, Link and Long find
the coefficient for diversification to be positive and
statistically significant at the .05 level.
In /
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In conclusion, it can be said that while there is
some U.S. support for diversification as an influence on
basic research, there is little support for its
contribution to the production of technical knowledge.
In the U.K. there have been no statistical tests upon
which to make a judgement.
5.7 The Influence of Factor Costs
It has been hypothesised (see section 4.7) that
firms will have a greater incentive to produce new
knowledge related to production processes, the more
factor prices change. This is because as input prices
go up, firms act defensively and increase research on
production techniques in order to preserve profit
margins over time.
While a number of U.S. studies (see for example
Fellner, 1971, and Binswanger, 1974) have attempted
to estimate the influence of factor price changes on
the bias of inventive activity, or in other words to
test the Hicks induced invention hypothesis, little
effort has'been made to test the effect of factor
price changes on the overall level of inventive activity.
However in a recent study of Schmookler's demand pull
hypothesis, Scherer (1982) extends his analysis to
include a number of other possible influences on patenting
activity. He hypothesises that one influence on the
efforts toward labour-saving capital goods inventions
might be an unusually rapid increase in wages. To test
his /
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his hypothesis, Scherer estimates the reaction of capital
goods patents classified by industry of use to the
percentage change in using industry worker wage payments
over five years and to two measure of demand-pull
influences. Using a sample of 443 large U.S.
corporations in 245 industries, his tests reveal no
stimulating role for rapid wage increases in using
industries.
5.8 Influence of the Product Cycle
The product cycle hypothesis, as it relates to
innovation, predicts that the stage of development
reached by a productive segment has a strong influence
on its propensity to host particular types of
innovations. Product innovations are expected to be
dominant at the early stages of the cycle, with attention
to process innovation following when production cost
reduction becomes more important. This leads to a
related hypothesis (see Wilson, 1977) that firms will
'trade-off' product innovations against process
innovations. At the mature stages of the cycle,
inflexible capital intensive production methods make both
types of innovations very costly.
Although there have been a number of case studies
stressing the influence of the product cycle on
innovation, variables representing the stage of development
have not been included in econometric tests at the firm or
industry level. In a few studies, for example, Griliches
(1980) /
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(1980b)and Waterson and Lopez (1983), capital intensity
has been used as a variable, but it has not been linked
to the stage of industry maturity. In both studies
capital intensity is found to increase innovative effort,
which is contrary to the product cycle hypothesis.
As was previouslymentioned (see section 6.3),in the
only empirical test related at all to the 'trade-off'
theory, Mansfield (1963) found that firms that did
considerable innovating with respect to process also
did considerable innovating with respect to products.
5.9 Summary
Generalising, with respect to the major variables
which have been tested it can be concluded that both demand
and technological opportunities available to firms
influence inventive and innovative activity. More work
is needed however, to find proxies which more closely
fit the technological opportunity variable. While
inventive activity has been found to be associated with
firm size, most evidence shows the relationship to be
less than proportional, except in the chemical industry.
A recent study however has challenged some of the
earlier results on firm size. As far as industrial
concentration is concerned, U.S. economists have suggested
a complex relationship between market structure and
innovation. The issue has not been pursued to any
extent by U.K. economists. While there is less evidence
available on these variables, there appears to be a role
for /
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for technological rivalry in influencing inventive
decision-making but not one for either firm diversification
or changing factor input prices. While the product cycle
hypothesis has been given some attention at the theoretical
level, it receives little more than a mention at the
empirical level.
While this thesis will not attempt to fill all of the
noted gaps in empirical knowledge, hopefully the study
will add to the understanding of inventive activity among
U.K. firms. Clearly evident from the preceding discussion
is the dearth of studies using U.K. data. Also, taking
account of Stoneman's (1983, p.46) criticism that most
empirical work in the area is based on 'ad hoc theorizing',
this thesis proceeds by first developing theoretical
models of inventive activity and then applying empirical
tests to these models. The theoretical models are
developed in chapter six. The thesis also adds to the
small amount of work done on distinguishing




THEORETICAL MODELS OF PROCESS AND PRODUCT INVENTION
In this chapter a number of firm decision-making
models with respect to invention are developed. These
models point more precisely to some of the general
theoretical predictions discussed in chapter four.
They also serve as a basis for the empirical work in
chapter eight.
The procedure will be to develop separate models
for process and product invention and to compare their
characteristics. A model which combines the two types
into the total patenting activity of the firm will also
be presented. The assumptions and technique used are
eclectic, drawing from a number of sources. The recent
work of Stoneman (1983) however is especially helpful.
There are also some additions to fit the purposes of this
thesis. The development of the models proceeds from the
simplistic to the slightly more complex and realistic.
6.1 Basic Assumptions
It is assumed that the firm produces output (Q) using
the traditional inputs of labour and capital and also its
existing stock of technical knowledge (A). In order to
focus on the technological input, we assume that capital
and labour are used in fixed proportions as a composite
input (L). Therefore:
[6.1] 0 = g (A, L)
Technical /
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Technical knowledge not only affects the output which the
firm produces but also the firm's production costs.
Process inventions lower costs to the firm, increasing
the productivity of the conventional factors. Therefore
we also have:
[6.2] C = h(Q,A)
where C represents the firm's total production costs.
It is assumed that the firm produces and uses its
own technical knowledge. It does not license its
knowledge to other firms and it does not have free access
to the knowledge of other firms.
The stock of technical knowledge (A) used by the
firm in its current goods production period (t) can be
expressed as follows:"'"
[6.3] A, = A. , + dA,t t-1 t
The expression above states that the technical knowledge
available to the firm for use currently is equal to the
stock /
1. Schott's (1978) work on the technical knowledge
production function is useful here. Schott's
equivalent of [6.3] above also includes a term
representing technological obsolescence in the
last period, or -dAfc_^. It is excluded from
the model here due to difficulties in empirical
measurement.
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stock at the beginning of the period > plus any
additions to the knowledge stock in the current period
(dAfc). While is predetermined in [6.3], it is
actually the result of the same process as noted in that
equation or: At-1 = At-2 + ^At-1*
In addition to its goods production function, the firm
faces a knowledge production function, whereby it can
generate new technical knowledge. The output of the
firm's knowledge production function will be represented
in this thesis by the number of inventions (Xt) generated
by the firm over a specific time-period (t).
Inventions (Xfc) are the output of a flow of applied R&D
expenditures (R) and the available stock of basic
scientific knowledge (B) associated with the industry.^
Although a small percentage of basic knowledge is produced
by firms, we assume here that it is an exogenous variable
supplied as a result of the efforts of university or
government research teams. If we hold the level of
2
basic knowledge constant for all t then:
[6.4]' dAt = Xt = f (B,Rt,Rt_1,Rfc_2 )
As /
1. As noted in chapter one, the relationship between
the growth of basic scientific knowledge and technology
has been questioned by a number of economists. A few
have suggested that technology tends to build on itself
or that the stock of current technical knowledge (A^_)
should also be an input in the production function
shown. This of course has implications for assumptions
concerning diminishing returns.
2. Schott (1978) includes a technical uncertainty parameter
Y, into her equivalent of [6.4] so that X = yR .
She does not include the input of basic scientific
knowledge however. As we pointed out in chapter three,
the majority of firms tend to make small incremental
changes, subject to very low technical risk. Since
patent data, used in this thesis, reflect these sorts
of changes, the uncertainty parameter is excluded in [6.41
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As an alternative to [6.4] above, one might specify
that the level of R & D expenditure required for an
invention of a particular quality depends on the level
of basic knowledge available, B or:
[6.5] Xfc = f[Rt(B), Rt_1(Bt_1) 'Rt_2(Bt_2)
with R'(B) = &R/3B < 0
Here as basic knowledge or technological opportunities
increase, technical knowledge production becomes less
expensive.
Substituting [6.4] into [6.3] we arrive at:
[6.6] A^. = + f (B, R^ , R^._^ ,R^_2 . . . . )
Recognising that inventions in the current period
are produced by a flow of R & D expenditures over several
time periods, a simplifying assumption will be made
rendering subsequent analysis easier to handle. It is
assumed here that the firm chooses an R & D programme
in the current period which produces inventions in the
current period and no other period. Thus we are
condensing the R&D flow into a single time period."*"
Nordhaus (1969a,p.18) who uses this technique, explains
that the assumption means that 'the model is static in a
rather special sense'. R&D is conducted immediately
with /
1. In theory the choice of time period becomes
tautological or valid by definition. If a time
period is chosen which is long enough to encompass
all R&D expenditure and all the results of such
expenditure, then there will in theory be no
accumulation of technology over that time period.
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with the programme bearing fruit immediately . The
static nature of the model prevents the consideration of
an accumulation of technology. Stoneman (1983) who
also uses this technique, notes that in each time period
a firm has to reinvent the technology it had in the
previous period. If we make the assumptions described
above, then [6.6] becomes [6.7] below:
[6.7] Afc = Xfc = f(B,Rt)
Where with B fixed: (i) X^'(R^) > 0
(ii) Xt'' (Rfc)< 0
The second condition in [6.7] above states that
there are diminishing returns to R & D expenditure in
the production of new knowledge or inventions. There
are valid reasons for expecting the returns to R & D to
diminish. Given a number of production problems to be
solved, inventors may address themselves to the easier and
least costly first. As the intensity of the R&D effort
increases, the more difficult and costlier problems are
attacked. Also for a given R&D project, as additional
conventional inputs are added to a constant science base
(B), diminishing returns to conventional inputs set in.
Another reason for diminishing returns to R & D,
explored by both Nordhaus (1969a)and Evenson and Kislev
(1976) , arises out of the uncertainty of the inventive
process. Applied research may be seen as a search process
within /
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within a distribution of a random variable with inventors
choosing independent research projects. As the number
of projects increases, the likeLihood of a successful
invention increases, but at a decreasing rate. Eventually
the distribution becomes exhausted and technology stagnates.
As Evenson and Kislev (1976) note, diminishing returns
may be checked by new scientific knowledge, which widens
the gap between basic knowledge and the current level of
technology in practice. New basic knowledge can shift
the mean of the distribution mentioned above, or provide
new distributions to search. The same authors add
that technological exhaustion should be carefully
distinguished from obsolescence. On this point it was
Schmookler (1966) who argued that the exhaustion of a
field's technological opportunities may never be
approached. This is because long before diminishing
returns to R & D set in, an industry experiences a
diminishing demand for its product and hence adjusts
its R&D expenditure downwards.
Assuming basic knowledge to be constant, we can
illustrate the invention production function in the
Cobb-Douglas form below:
[6.8] X = B R°
Taking the first derivative of the function with respect
to the R&D input gives:
[6.9] X '(R ) =3X /3R = aBR""1 = oX /R
where a = 3X / 3R or the elasticity of invention
—— —— with respect to R & D
Xt Rt
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Clearly the marginal product of R & D is greater than
zero if a is greater than zero. It is also clear from
[6.9] that the marginal product is directly related to
the elasticity of knowledge with respect to R & D
expenditure and inversely related to the R&D input
as a proportion of output or inventions. The level of
basic scientific knowledge is in addition a positive
influence on the marginal productivity of R & D.
The second derivative of the knowledge production
function is as follows:
[6.10] X ' ' (R ) = (°) (a~1)(xt)
R
The requirement that X"(Rfc) be less than zero in [6.7]
is satisfied in [6.10] above if a , or the elasticity
of invention with respect to R & D is less than one and
greater than zero. Since under the restrictions of the
Cobb-Douglas function elasticity is constant, if
diminishing returns set in, they set in immediately.
Another consideration, arising from chapter four
(section 4.3) is the possibility of economies of scale
in research inputs (R). Since it is assumed that
basic knowledge is constant in [6.7], the model restricts
R & D to diminishing returns. In reality however,
breaking the composite R&D input down into labour and
capital, it is not unreasonable to expect some economies
in the scale of the research operation, at least up to a
po i n t /
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point. While the issue is extremely important, the
lack of R & D data makes it impossible to pursue
empirically. Therefore, the relationship between R&D
inputs and inventive outputs is not explored further.
The relationship between inventive outputs and the
overall size of the firm is also an important issue
and will be pursued empirically.
We can now proceed to analyse the firm's decision to
produce process and product inventions. The firm's
decision to invent in the models presented is separated
from its other decisions, for example on investment and
advertising. In reality however, the allocation of
resources to R & D is a simultaneous decision on the part
of the firm, weighed against the costs and benefits of
other investment opportunities. It is also assumed
in the models below that the firm can accurately predict
the costs as well as the future benefits associated with
its inventive activity. If this is true then a profit-
maximising firm will produce new technical knowledge
up to that' point where the surplus of expected revenues
from invention over expected costs is maximised, both
streams discounted to their present value.
6.2 The Firm's Decision to Produce Process Inventions
The benefit of process inventions to the firm is
the resulting fall in the firm's costs of production. This
increases the firm's profits at any given output and also
may be a means of expanding sales through price reductions.
The /
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The firm may or may not choose to expand its sales
depending on the response of market demand to price
reductions and on the response of rival firms in the
market.
Strictly cost-reducing inventions In the first
model presented, the assumption is that the firm regards
its process inventions as strictly cost-reducing. An
example of this situation would be a firm in an
oligopolistic industry which fears retaliation by rivals
if it attempts to drop price in order to expand output.
Instantaneous benefits to the firm of inventing and then
using the new techniques to lower costs may be seen
graphically in figure 6.1. The figure shows the firm's
demand curve to be kinked at the current profit maximising
point B. If we assume that rival firms immediately
match any price reduction, the portion of the demand
curve below B (BD) is the firm's constant share-of-the-market
curve. This portion of the curve is of course less
elastic than that above B(DB) , where other firms do not match price changes.
From profit-maximising point B in figure 6.1, the
firm invents a new process which lowers its constant
unit production costs from k^ to k^. Since the new
cost curve cuts the firm's marginal revenue curve on
its vertical section, the firm maintains its output at
Q-^ with price, P-^ after generating its invention. The
firm still receives a benefit from its invention in the
increased profits from production. This is calculated





the firm's output level, Q1. If this gain is greater
than the expenditure on R & D required to generate the
new invention, the firm will gain a positive net benefit
and therefore decide to proceed with the invention.
Figure 6.1 clearly shows that the total benefit
derived by a firm from a cost-reducing invention is
directly related to firm size. This is simply the
'demand-pull' hypothesis or 'extent of the market'
argument discussed in chapter four. If the R&D
necessary to generate a given level of cost-reduction is
fixed, then the more units over which the cost-reduction
is spread, the greater the benefit to the firm. While
the effect of firm size on the incentive to produce process
inventions is clear from the diagram presented, the
relationship of other variables, such as technological
opportunity, need examining more closely. In order to do
this we proceed to the development of profit maximising
models of firm inventive activity.
In the first model presented, as in figure 6.1, it is
assumed that the firm faces constant unit production
costs (k). Research and development activity (R) may be
viewed as resulting in additions to production process
knowledge or process patents, or Xc = f(R), which in
turn /
1. The statement implies that there are no costs
involved in utilising the new technology in the
production process. In fact the firm may have
to invest in new capital equipment or retrain
workers to use its new technique. These costs
would also have to be considered in any decision
to proceed with an invention.
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turn reduce k, or k = k (Xc) . The profits associated
with cost-reducing inventions are fully appropriable by
the firm from t = 0 to t = T, after which they fall to
zero. At T the firm's patent on the process expires or
the process becomes obsolete. In reality the profits
from an invention are not likely to be eliminated so
abruptly, with a gradual decline in profits over time
more likely. While the firm does not attempt to increase
its market share, it s sales may grow or even decline due
to an underlying growth or decline in total market demand.
We assume here that the growth or decline in market demand
occurs at a constant proportionate rate of g.
The net present value to the firm of its process
inventions is expressed in [6.11] below:"*"
T
V = / PQi - Qik(Xc) e~{r_g)t dt - R
t =0
V = present value of invention's net benefits
p = price of product
Q^= output of firm i
k = constant per unit cost of production
X = the number of process patents produced
in the current period
r = firm's discount rate
g = constant rate of growth or decline in
market demand
T = the invention's life
R = expenditure on R & D activity
and where Xc = f(B,R) from [6.7] and:
r > g for convergence
Integrating and rewriting gives:
1. This model incorporates the features of a number of
models including Barzel (1968), Nordhaus (1969a). f





Setting the discount factor, i-e-fr-glT equal to <J>,
r-g
the first-order conditions for a profit maximum with
respect to R & D is:
[6.13] V' (R) = 3V/3R = 0 = -Qi 3 k/3Xc 3Xc/3 R c)> - 1
Rearranging and with k'(R) = -3k/3R we can write:
Equation [6.14] states simply that the value of the
marginal product of R & D must be equal to its marginal
cost, or in this situation R&D expenditure itself, if
profits from invention are to be maximised. The value of
the marginal product, as the right-hand-side of [6.14]
shows, is the rate of cost reduction k'(R) due to the
production of additional knowledge evaluated at the firm's
level of output (as in figure 6.1). The result again
demonstrates that the rewards from cost-reducing invention
are directly related to firm size.
Equation [6.13] shows the role of R & D clearly, as
an input which produces another input, process knowledge.
From /
1. The result here is equivalent to that of Kamien
and Schwartz (1969, p.673), who view process




1 = Q. k' (R) cj>
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From [6.13] and [6.9] it can be seen that the amount
of new technical knowledge produced depends on B, the
level of basic scientific knowledge or technological
opportunity. Unsurprisingly, the value of invention
varies positively with the invention's life and with
the rate of growth of output and inversely with the
discount rate, r, and the rate of decline in output
(e.g. if g < 0).
Equation [6.14] gives a result concerning profit
maximisation with respect to R&D expenditure for strictly
cost-reducing inventions. The more interesting case
however, is where the firm may use its new production
technology to expand its output and lower its price.
It is from this case that the empirical model of process
patenting is developed and to which we now turn.
Expansion of Output with Process Inventions As a
result of a cost-reducing invention, a firm, firm i, may
be in a good position to lower its price and increase its
level of output. The firm will therefore move to a
new profit-maximising equilibrium, at a higher output, a
lower price, and a lower unit cost, if the increase in
profits is greater than the R&D expenditure required to
produce the cost-reducing invention.
In an oligopolistic situation however, the level of
profits from such a move by firm i depends on the
reactions of rival firms. As a result of firm i's
invention, other firms in the market may decide to engage
in /
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in R & D enabling them to match the inventing firm's now
changes until their new processes are developed, firm i may
be able to capture a greater market share while the price
differential lasts. Here firm i finds itself on demand
curve dd in figure 6.2. As a result of an invention,
unit costs are reduced from k^ to k^ and price from p^ to
The increase in profits in this situation is due both to
cost-reduction (K^-K^) and expanded output (C^-Q^) / as shown
by the shaded areas in the figure.
In the model of process invention developed below,
it is assumed that the firm, firm i, maximises profit not
only with respect to R & D but simultaneously with respect
to output. Cost reductions due to the firm's R&D
expenditures therefore affect the firm's equilibrium
position with respect to output and price. Using the
same terms as in the previous model, the net present
value to firm i of output-expanding process invention
is expressed below:
lower production costs. If these firms hold back price
T
[6.15] V = / p(Qi)Qi
t=o
k(X )Q. ec' 1
again where: X = f(B,R)
and r > g for convergence
Integrating, setting the discount factor cj> = i-e-lr-gjT
r-g
and rewriting gives:
[6.16] V = [p(Q.)Q. - k(Xc)Q.] cj) - R






Increase in profits = j/ / /[ less hC/01
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[6.17a] V' (R) = 0 = -3k/3R Q. cj> - 1
[6.17b] V' (Q) = O = lp + Qi3p/3Qi - k] 4
Simplifying and rearranging [6.17a] and [6.17b] respectively
we have:
[6.18a] 1 = k'(R) cj>, where k'(R) = -3k/3R
[6.18b] 1/n = p-k/p
where n = -3Q./3P p/Q• or the price elasticity
of demand for firm i's product
Equation [6.18a] is exactly the same as the previous
first-order condition for the strictly cost-reducing case
expressed in [6.14]. On the other hand, equation [6.18b]
is the familiar profit-maximising relationship between
a firm's price and its marginal cost. Taking equation
[6.18a] and multiplying both sides by R and the right hand
side by k/k gives:
[6.19] R = -3k/3R R/k Q..k cj>
Setting e^' = -3k/3R R/k, the elasticity of unit cost
reduction due to R & D expenditure, it follows that:
[6.20] R = eR Qi k cj>
However, from [6.18b], k = p(l - 1/n). Therefore
substituting for k in [6.20] gives:
[6. 21] R = ek pQi (1-1/n) cj>
Expression /
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Expression [6.21] shows the optimal level of research
when a firm directs R&D expenditure toward reducing
costs and expanding output. To arrive at an expression
for optimal process patenting, which is more useful for
empirical purposes, both sides of [6.21] are multiplied by
Xc/R giving:
[6.22] Xc = Xc/k (-3k/3Xc3Xc/3R) pQ.(l-l/n) cj>




[6.23] Xc = ek, 3Xc/3R pCX (1-1/n) cj>
c
where again e, . represents the elasticity
c
of unit cost reduction with respect to
additional process inventions.
Expression [6.23] states that the amount of inventive
activity undertaken by a firm is related to: the response
of unit production costs to changes in inventive activity;
the marginal product of R & D with respect to invention;
the level of firm sales; a price elasticity term and the
discount factor. Th=e result for optimal invention in
[6.23] is very similar to that in [6.21] for optimal
research. There is a slight adjustment in the unit cost
elasticity definition in [6.23] to allow for inventions
rather than research as the independent variable. An
added /
- 216 -
added term is the marginal product of R & D (sX^aR),
showing the number of inventions to also be a dependent
variable. The two terms together, as explained
previously, represent the technological opportunities
available to the firm. The marginal product of R & D
is shown in [6.9] to be positively related to a fixed
level of basic scientific knowledge. The number of
additional patents generated is however not in itself
indicative of technological opportunity as the quality of
the process patents produced may vary substantially.
The elasticity term reflects this quality by showing the
responsiveness of production costs to new process knowledge
as measured by patents.
As with the previous result for strictly cost-reducing
process inventions, inventive activity in the output-
expanding model is related to the discount factor
l_e-(r-g)T
9 = . There is a positive relationship between
the level of invention in a firm and the rate of growth
of output and the life of the inventions. The discount
rate, r, is. negatively related to invention or patenting
activity. Unsurprisingly there is also a positive
relationship between the level of inventive activity and
the level of firm sales.
Equation [6.23] shows the firm's price elasticity
of demand to be positively related to its inventive
activity. This result is valid for all values of price
elasticity greater than one. If price elasticity is
equal to or less than one, the firm would not be able to
increase /
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increase revenues by expanding output and equation [6.23]
is not relevant. Instead the strictly cost-reducing case
is appropriate.
The positive association between inventive activity
and the firm's price elasticity of demand shown in result
[6.23] is intuitively appealing. The invention-induced
price reduction results in a greater expansion in output
for the firm with the more elastic curve. As previously
explained, the total reward to the cost-reducing invention
increases as it is spread over a greater amount of output.
A number of economists, including Needham (1978) have
demonstrated that the firm's price elasticity of demand
depends on a number of factors. These include the firm's
market share, the price elasticity of total market demand
for the firm's product, and the reactions of rival sellers.
The price elasticity of the firm's product will be greater
the more price elastic is total market demand. If
however, the firm expects rival sellers to increase the
quantity of output they produce in response to a price
reduction by the firm, the firm's demand curve will be
steeper than that of the market demand curve. Given
the price-elasticity of the market demand and the
reaction /
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reaction of rival sellers, the lower the firm's share
of the market, the greater it's price elasticity of
demand."'" This is because the lower the firm's share
of the market, the larger will be the p/Q^ component
of the firm's price elasticity of demand. Intuitively
the smaller the firm's share of total market demand, the
greater the potential for winning some of the larger
share held by rival firms.
The relationship between firm and industry price
elasticity of demand can be seen more clearly by comparing
the result for optimal R&D intensity obtained by
Stoneman (1983) with our own result or equation [6.21],
Stoneman makes the Cournot assumption that the decision¬
making firm does not expect rivals to react to its
increase in output as the result of R & D devoted to
process changes. The Stoneman (1983, p.34) result,
using the terminology of this paper is as follows:
[6.24] /
1. Needham (1978, p.59) shows the formal relationship
between a firm's price-elasticity of demand, its
market share, market elasticity of demand, and
rivals' reactions in the following expression:
E, = E /Sc + E S /Scd m' f s r/ f
where E, and E represent firm and market price elasticitiesd m c ^
respectively
and represent the market share of the firm and
its rivals respectively and;
Eg represents the elasticity of rival's supply
- 219 -
[6.24] R/pQ. = ek (1 - Sf/nm)
where: n is the price elasticity of market
demand and
represents firm i's market share
The difference between equation [6.21] and [6.24] is in
the use of firm price elasticity in [6.21] and industry
price elasticity in the Stoneman result. Equating the
two expressions, 1/n = Sf/nm or n = n^/S^. Firm i's
price elasticity of demand is equal to market price
elasticity divided by firm i's market share when there
is no expected reaction on the part of rivals. This i
equivalent to the Needham formula for firm price elastic
previously described.
It is useful to note here that firm i's price-cost
margin, equal to the reciprocal of its price elasticity
of demand, will from the above formula depend on market
elasticity and firm i's share of the market. The lower
this share,the higher the firm's price elasticity and
therefore the lower the optimal excess of price over
marginal cost. This infers that the greater the
ability of the firm to hold price above marginal cost
the lower process patenting intensity.
From the discussion above it can be demonstrated that
when there are no reactions on the part of rivals, the
firm's price elasticity of demand will decrease
continuously with increases in concentration. Higher
levels of concentration here imply a higher market share
Sf, /
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S^, for firm i, which may be regarded as the typical
firm in the market. Therefore, in this respect, increases
in concentration have a strictly negative influence on
process patenting intensity. While the assumption
concerning rival reactions is plausible at low levels of
concentration, as the number of firms decrease,firm' s
become more interdependent and it is more likely that a
price decrease by any one firm will be matched. If this
is the case then firm's maintain their market share with .
price changes and therefore industry price elasticity
becomes the firm's price elasticity. Increases in
concentration in this situation have no effect on firm
price elasticity, and therefore process patenting intensity.
It can be predicted therefore that process patenting
intensity will decrease as concentration increases up to
that point at which price matching becomes normal and
thereafter there will be no further decreases in patenting
intensity.
6.3 The Firm's Decision to Produce Product Inventions
The distinction between process and product technology
is that while the former may affect demand through the price
variable, the latter affects demand directly through its
quality enhancing characteristics. Therefore any
competition/
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competition in process technology between firms may be
viewed as price competition, while product quality
competition may be considered true technological
*. • 4- • 1competition.
The benefit of product inventions to the firm is the
resulting increase in demand for the firm's products, which
in turn increases its profits, market share or its rate
of growth of output. Product inventions may open up
entirely new markets to the firm with new product
introductions. Alternatively product quality improve¬
ments may have the effect of increasing the firm's market
share at the expense of its rivals. Product quality
improvements may also move the industry demand curve out
at the expense of other products. Since most inventions,
as has been emphasised, fall in the category of minor
improvements, we focus on product quality improvements
here. However, the analysis is similar to that for new
products, since new and improved products replace existing
products, just as new improved product characteristics
replace existing characteristics.
As with the case for process inventions, the instantaneous
benefits to the firm from using its newly produced knowledge
to increase product quality can be shown graphically.
Assuming constant unit costs of production, figure 6.3 shows
the rightward shift in firm i's demand curve, from
d-^d^ to <^2^2, due to the use of its product-enhancing
invention. /
1. This is not strictly correct since improvements in
production processes may enhance product quality




Increase in profits gg
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invention. If we assume no changes in production cost
due to the new invention, the firm's profits increase from
P^BGk^ to P^CHk^, or by the shaded area in the figure.
Figure 6.3 shows that increased profits as a result
of product invention are due both to an increase in output,
C>2-^1 and an increase in the margin between price and
average cost, P2~P1' As "it*1 Process patenting, the
benefits of product patenting are related to firm size.
The graph shows clearly that the more units over which
the price increase, resulting from enhanced quality, is
spread, the greater the total benefit to the firm."'"
In the case presented in the figure, the profit-
maximising firm would go ahead and invent if the increase
in profits due to the invention, or the shaded area in
figure 6.3 is greater than the cost of developing and
using the invention. It should be pointed out that the
assumption has been one of no increase in unit costs of
production due to invention. If however unit costs were
to increase, for example from k^ to V. ^ in figure 6.2,
as a result of the new technology, post-invention output
would be reduced and post-invention price increased with
the effect of reducing post-invention profit. In the
extreme /
1. Usher (1964, p.282) demonstrates this using
indifference analysis. He shows that the inventor
of a new product with a patent grant restricts output
of his new product so as to create a gap between
the marginal rate of substitution in use between
the new and old product and the marginal rate of
transformation in production. The output of the
inventor weighted by the gap between the two
prices is the inventor's revenue.
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extreme case production costs could be increased to the
point of making the product improvement unprofitable.
In reality, in such cases the firm may have to develop
a new production technology to enable it to offer the
improved product at a profit-making price. As in the
previous section on process inventions, we turn to the
development of the firm-decision-making model for
product inventions.
In the model of product patenting below, the firm
competes both on the basis of its price (p) and on the
basis of its product technology, represented by the
number of product-enhancing patents(X^) produced through
the R&D process or = f(R,B). The firm's level
of output therefore depends both on its price and its
product technology. While this model takes no
explicit account of rivals, it should be remembered that
the gains to the individual firm from product patenting
depend on the reaction of rival firms. Unlike process
patenting however ,where rivals are immediately able to
match price' cuts, it is expected that improved products
take rivals some time to develop. The firm's unit cost
of production (k) is again assumed constant against
output. It is also assumed that production costs remain
constant with quality changes."'" Similar to the analysis
of process invention we assume an underlying growth or
decline /
1. An assumption of a change in production costs due
to the product enhancement would make only a small
difference to the analysis. As seen from figure
6.3, a production cost increase would reduce the
post-invention profits of the inventing firm.
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decline in market demand for the firm's products of
constant proportionate g; and a life for the firm's
invention from t = 0 to t = T.
Using the same terminology as that used for process
patenting the net present value to the firm of its product
2
invention is expressed in [6.25] below:
T
[6.25] V =/ p (Q. ) 0- (X.) - k Q. (X,) e dt - R
t=o 1 1 d 1 d
where: = f(B,R)
Q'(Xd) = 3Q/3Xd > 0
r > g for convergence
p-e" {r"9)T
Integrating, setting the discount factor, '
equal to it and rewriting gives:
[6.26] V = [p (Q.) Qi(Xd) - k Qi(Xd)] cj> - R
Maximising V jointly with respect to R&D(R) and output (Qi) gives:
[6.27a] 3V/3R = 0 = cj> [p3Qi/3Xd 3Xd/3R - k 3Qi/3Xd 9Xd/aR] - 1
[6.27b] 3V/3Qi= 0 = 4 [3p/3Qi + (p - k)]
Rearranging, simplifying and dividing both sides of [6.27b]
by p gives:
[6.28a] 1=4 3Qi/3R (p-k)
[6.28b] p-k/p =-3p/3Qi Qi/p = 1/n
where the right side of b is equivalent to the
reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand
(n) for firm i's product.
Taking /
2. The model presented here is very much like that of
Needham (1975). Needham does not consider the
intermediate input of patented technology, only
the basic input of R & D.
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Taking equation [6.28a] and multiplying both sides by R
gives:
[6.29] R = [cj> 3Qi/3R R] (p-k)
If the right-hand side of [6.29] is multiplied by Q^/Q^
and if:
aQi/aR R//^i eQ(R) the elasticity of output with respect
to R & D devoted to product quality
then:
[6.30] R = [cj> eQ(R) Qi] (p-k)
However, from [6.28b], p-k = p/n. Therefore substituting
into equation [6.30] gives the following expression for the
level of optimal research:
[6.31] R = 4 eQ(R)/n pQ.
Since the data used in this study is patent data
rather than R&D data, an expression for patenting
activity with respect to product quality is needed.
Multiplying both sides of [6.31] by X^/R gives:
[6.32] Xd = 4 PQi Xd/R [l/n3Qi/3Xd3Xd/3R R/Q^
If: 3Q^/3Xd Xd/Q^ = e . the elasticity of output with1 ' 1
d respect to product enhancing
patents
then substituting into [6.32] we arrive at:
[6.33] xd = 4 PQi 3Xd/3R (eQ(xd)/n)
Expression /
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Expression [6.33] states that the level of the
firm's patenting activity is positively related to the
marginal product of research and the ratio of two
elasticities: the elasticity of output with respect to
product patents and the firm's price elasticity of demand.
As with the expression developed for process invention,
invention concerning product improvements is positively
related to the underlying growth in industry demand and
the life of the inventions generated and negatively
related to the discount rate. Also as with process
invention, the level of product invention is positively
associated with the level of firm sales (p Q^). The
influence of the ratio of the two elasticities in both
the patenting expression [6.33] and the R&D expression
[6.31] is like the ratio of elasticities in the expression
for advertising intensity developed by Dorfman and Steiner
(1954) . Before exploring the significance of the
elasticity terms further, the differences between [6.33]
and [6.31] the expressions for patenting and R&D activities
respectively should be noted.
The results for R&D activity in [6.31] and patenting
activity in [6.33] are very similar. In the latter
expression, the fact that product technology or patenting
is the output of the R&D process which is in turn used
as /
1. Dorfman and Steiner (1954) demonstrate that the
profit-maximising firm should set its advertising-
sales ratio equal to the ratio of its advertising
elasticity of demand to its price elasticity of
demand.
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as an input in production, must be accounted for.
This is accomplished through the additional term in
[6.33] , the marginal product of R & D or aX^/aR. Also,
demand responds to additional patents in [6.33] or we have
eQ(X.) instead of e_/r>. in1 [6.31], with demand respondinga y (K)
directly to R & D.
As with process patenting the marginal product of
R&D represents the technological opportunities available
to the firm. The greater the level of basic scientific
knowledge, where X^ = f(B,R), the greater the number of
patents of a given quality due to any additional R&D
expenditure. The elasticity of output with respect to
patenting e^.n., represents the response of consumersU (R)
to the improved product. The expression therefore
reveals something about the quality of the additional
product inventions as judged by consumers. Unlike its
counter expression e^, . in the process patenting
c
equation [6.23] , showing the response of unit costs as a
measure of patent quality, e„/v , does not measure
Q(Xd)
product quality directly but only in terms of its value
in the market place. In this respect the elasticity
term points to the opportunities available for technological
competition on the basis of product characteristics. As
discussed in chapters four and five, a number of economists
have made the distinction between technological opportunity
on the supply side and the opportunities for technological
competition on the demand side."'"
Evaluating /
1. See for example Comanor (1967) or Shrjeves (1978)
or the discussion in section 5.2 of this thesis.
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Evaluating the influence of the ratio of the two
elasticities e^.v /n in equation [6.33] in more depth,
Q(XdJ
it is important to recognise that both are relevant to
the individual firm and not to the industry as a whole.
In the case of a monopoly, the firm and the industry
are identical so no distinction is necessary. However,
for other market structures, the distinction is important.
First it should be noted that the relationship
between the firm's price elasticity and product patenting
intensity is negative in [6.33], while the relationship
was positive in the case of process inventions [6.23].
The negative relationship however, becomes intuitively clear
when we consider that the inverse of price elasticity
of demand (1/n) is equal to the price-cost margin (p-k/p).
Therefore the lower firm price elasticity, the higher the
price-cost margin and therefore the higher the increase
in profits due to an increase in sales as a result of product
improvements.
As with process patenting, it is instructive to relate
the firm's price elasticity of demand in equation [6.33]
to market price elasticity of demand. The firm's price
elasticity (as explained in the case of process patents)
will be higher, the higher market price elasticity, the
lower the firm's market share and the smaller the reaction
of /
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of rival firms to firm i's price decreases."'" These
three factors are negatively related to product patenting
intensity. If we assume no reaction on the part of
rivals, concentration, which increases with the market
share of typical firm i may be seen to be positively
related to product patenting intensity. At some point
however, the level of concentration may itself have an
effect on rival reactions, therefore complicating its
effect on product patenting intensity. The influence of
concentration is further complicated by its relationship to
0
Q(X^) which is now explored.
The relationship between the responsiveness of
demand to product improving inventions en,v . is
d
obviously positive. It is useful however, to consider
any factors that may affect this responsiveness.
An increase in product quality may affect the firm's
sales in a number of ways. Total market demand for the
product might increase, benefiting the inventing firm.
Also, the firm may increase its share of the market at the
expense of 'rivals. If rivals retaliate by engaging in
their own R & D to generate product inventions, then
the initial inventing firm may not benefit from as large
an increase in sales. A possible result however,
is /
1. This assumes of course that rivals change output
in the same direction as the inventing firm, firm i.
If rival firms were to decrease their output as a
result of an increase in firm i's output this would
mean a higher price elasticity for firm i.
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is that the rival's new inventions will boost total
market demand further. If this is the case, retaliatory
action need not be so damaging. Therefore both the
market elasticity of demand with respect to product
inventions and the reactions of rivals influence e0,v ..
Q(Xd)
Market elasticity of demand with respect to product
quality may be related to the type of product produced.
If the product is one which can be differentiated with
respect to technical characteristics then competition
is more likely to be technological rather than on
the basis of price.^ As a number of economists have
suggested, durable consumer goods and capital goods
generally fall into this category.
It has already been noted that the level of
concentration has a positive relationship with product
patenting intensity, through the price elasticity
relationship. What remains to be explored however, is
the relationship between e_,„ . , , , . . . . . . ,
Q(X^), demand elasticity with
respect to.product patenting and market structure.
A number of economists have suggested that
technological competition under oligopoly will be
particularly intense. It is argued that here firms
anxious to avoid price competition, will turn to non-price
forms, including technological competition. Also, with
increased /
1. It is possible that a firm might use product quality
improvements as a means of lowering its price
elasticity and providing an opportunity to increase
prices.
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increased interdependence, the reaction of rival firms
to any product quality changes by an individual firm
will be strong. The question is whether this
increased interdependence, leads to a higher or lower
patenting intensity.
Needham (1975) demonstrates that the expected
reaction of rivals can lead to a lower product patenting
intensity on the part of the profit-maximising firm."*"
If rivals increase their own R & D as a result of an
initial invention from firm i, and thereby generate
their own product improvements, firm i's benefit will be
lower. The reduction in patenting intensity therefore
is due to diminished appropriability of the rewards of
patenting.
The prediction above however, needs to be qualified.
It is based on the assumption that the decision-making
views R&D activity strictly as an offensive strategy
for increasing profits. If R & D activity devoted to
product/
1. Needham (1975, p.254) shows that the profit-
maximising research intensity of a firm is as
follows:
R/pQ = ER + Econj ERr
Ed
where E and E represent firm i's demand elasticityK Kr
due to R & D expenditure by the firm itself (R) and
its rivals (Rr) respectively. E . represents^ 1 conj ^
conjectural variations concerning rivals R&D and
E^ represents firm i's price elasticity.
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product improvements is necessary on the part of the
firm to protect its profits and/or market share, this
must increase the patenting intensity of the firm.
In other words firm i would itself react to product
changes initiated by other firms. Defensive type of
R&D spending on the part of both firms leads to a prisoner's
dilemma situation, where both firms fail to maximise
profits due to high R&D expenditure.
The arguments considered concerning the relationship
of oligopolistic interdependence and patenting intensity
may be summarised by referring to Scherer's (1980, p.429)
remark concerning the 'clash of structural propensities.'
While rivals stimulate R&D spending for defensive
reasons, they also discourage invention if due to rival
reactions few benefits of the invention are expected to be
appropriated.
6.4 The Firm's Decision Concerning Overall Inventive
Activity
It is useful both from a theoretical and empirical
standpoint.to consider the firm's decision to produce
inventions overall or both product and process inventions.
Here the firm undertakes R&D with the goals of lowering
costs through product invention and/or expanding output
through product or process invention. The decision¬
making model in this case becomes a combination of the
product and process invention models previously developed.
The net present value to the firm of its total
inventions, /
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inventions, continuing to use the same terminology, is
given in [6.34] below:
T
[6.34] V =1 p(Q. )Q (X) - k (X) Q. (X) e"(r_g)t dt - R
t=o i
where: X = X^ + Xc = f(B,R)
Q.'(X) = 3Q/3X > 0
k ' (X) = 3k/8X < 0
r > g for convergence
Again, integrating, setting the discount factor
1 - e ^r g^T, equal to cj> and rewriting gives:
r-g
[6.35] V = [p(Qi)Qi(X) - k (X) Q. (X) ] cj> - R
Maximising V jointly with respect to R & D (R) and output
(Q^) we have:
[6.36a] 3V/3R = 0 = [p3Q./3R - k 3Q./3R -Q3k/3R] d> - 1i i i
[6.36b] 3V/3Q = 0=[p + 3p/3Q^ - k] cj>
Simplifying and rearranging gives the following:
[6.37a) 1 = [ (p-k) 3Q./3R cj>] - [Qi 3k/3R ^]
[6.37b] 1/n = p-k /p
Equation [6.37a] is a combination of the first-order
conditions for process and product patenting expressed
previously in [6.23] and [6.33] respectively. Again,




Multiplying both sides of(6.37a]by R gives:
[6.38] R = [ (p-k) 8Qi/3R R cj>] — [Q^k/sR R cj>]
If on the right-hand side of expression [6.38], the first
bracketed expression is multiplied by Q^/Q^ an<3 the
second by k/k, this leads to:
[6.39] R = [ (P-k) (Qi) (eQ(R)) cj>] - [Q. k ek(R) cj>]
Here e_,_. and e, ,D>, as before, equal the elasticitiesy ( K) K ( K ;
of output and cost with respect to research. Substituting
from expression [6.37b] for both (p-k) and k in (6.39]
gives:
[6.40] R = 4 PQi [(eQ(R)/n) + (eR(R)(1-1/n))]
As expected, total research activity is simply a
combination of the expressions for research devoted to
process changes and that devoted to product changes
or [6.31] and [6.33] respectively. This result is
equivalent to that of Stoneman (1983) although in
somewhat different form.^"
In order to convert research activity into inventive
activity, both sides of [6.40] are multiplied by X/R
giving:
1. Stoneman's model incorporates a number of
additional features including the possibility
of scale economies in the R&D process,
technological obsolescence and the output
response of rivals to firm i's new process
knowledge.
giving:
[6.41] X = 4 PQ.3X/3R [(eQ(x)/n) + (ek(X)(1-1/n))]
The elasticity terms in [6.4ll now relates to additional
patenting activity rather than R&D directly.
The result in [6.41] shows that total patenting
activity varies with the impact of additional patents
on either output (eQ(x)) or production costs (eK(x)^*
As with the product and process patenting equations,
technological opportunity or the productiveness of
R & D in generating additional patents is positively
associated with total patenting activity. The
relationship of price elasticity of demand (n) to total
patenting activity however, is indeterminate in [6.41].
Price elasticity has a direct relationship to process
patenting activity and an inverse relationship to
product patenting activity.
6.5 The Possibility of No Inventive Activity
The discussion up to this point has surrounded the
relationship between a number of variables and the level
of research or inventive activity. In anticipation of
the possibility of obtaining zero values for firm
patenting activity in the empirical analysis to follow,
it is worth pointing to the theoretical justification for
no patents.
From expressions [6.23] and [6.33] for process and
product invention respectively, it can be seen that if
one /
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one of the terms on the right-hand side of the expression
is zero, then patenting activity must be zero. Since firm
sales is not expected to be zero, the problem must lie
with one of the other variables. On the supply side, the
reasons for no firm patenting activity could be due to
technological opportunities which are nonexistent. The
exhaustion of a firm's science base, may mean that the
marginal product of R & D (3X/3R) is zero or that the
response of unit costs (in [6.23]) or product quality
(in [6.33]) is nil. Also, in reality, there may be
some risk involved in inventive activity, which when
combined with other factors leads to a decision not to
invent.
On the other hand, the reason for a decision
'not to invent' might be on the demand side. If for
example, in the case of product patenting, price
elasticity were close to infinity, or very competitive
markets existed, then product invention would tend toward
zero. This does not hold for process patenting when
price elasticity is close to zero however, as the
firm can still increase its profits by cost-reduction
as in [6.14]. The empirical difficulties associated
with zero values for firm patenting activity are
discussed in chapters seven and eight.
6.6 Summary
The models of process, product and total patenting
activity developed in this chapter by no means incorporate
all of the complexities of the inventive process.
Simplifying /
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Simplifying assumptions which render the models
empirically tractable, also have the effect of reducing
realism. The exclusion of such items as technological
obsolescence and uncertainty, while justifiable from an
empirical standpoint, reduce the comprehensiveness of this
theoretical section. Another noticeable feature in the
development of the models, is the isolation of inventive
decision-making from other aspects of firm decision¬
making, such as investment. In reality capital invest¬
ment and investment in knowledge production may compete
for funds; or decision-making may be simultaneous.
The chapter, nevertheless, has provided more
rigorous justification for the inclusion of particular
variables in any empirical analysis of patenting activity.
The following chapter discusses the difficulties encountered
in measuring or choosing proxies for these variables.
The theoretical models also suggest a functional form
for estimating the patenting equations. This is also
dealt with in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EMPIRICAL MODELS OF PROCESS AND PRODUCT INVENTION
In the previous chapter a number of firm decision-making
models were developed with respect to inventive activity.
Assuming that the firm seeks to maximise profit from its
inventive activity over time, results can be derived
showing the optimal number of process, product, and total
inventions to be generated by a firm. While the variables
affecting optimal inventive activity follow logically
from the theoretical decision-making models, many are not
directly measureable. In this chapter therefore, the
equations for optimal invention are developed into
directly testable forms.
The two basic equations which shall be referred to in
this chapter are the previous [6.23] for process invention
and [6.33] for product invention. These shall be
re-numbered as [7.1] and [7.2] respectively as shown
below. The total patenting equation [6.41], renumbered
here as [7.3] is comprised of the same terms as are
either in the process or product equation.
[7.1] Xc = (pQ.) (3Xc/3R) (ek) (1-1/n) (cj»)
[7.2] Xd = (pQ.) (3Xd/3R) (eQ/n) (cj>)
[7.3] X = (PQ.)(3X/3R) [eQ/n +(ek (1-1/n))] (cj.)
The /
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The terminology used remains unchanged from the previous
chapter, with a small exception. The elasticities e^
and e^ represent the response of output and unit
production cost respectively to invention as opposed to
R&D. Since R & D is not considered directly here,
the subscript (X) denoting invention in the last chapter
is dropped.
Prior to discussing the measurement of the variables
in equation [7.1], [7.2], and [7.3], it is useful to
address the functional form which the estimating equations
should take. Since the expressions in the equations
enter multiplicatively, this implies that the empirical
tests should be conducted in logarithmic form. Trans¬
forming the process patenting equation [7.1] gives:
[7.1a] log X = log pQ. + log(3X /8R) + log e, + log(l-l/n)CIO K
+ log[l-e g^T] - log(r-g)
-(r-q)T
where 1-e ^ has been substituted for
r-g
the discount factor 4.
If we assume that the firm's inventions have an
infinite life, or T is equal to infinity, then
- (r-q)T
[log [1-e ] is equal to zero provided r is always
greater than g. While this assumption is obviously
unrealistic, it is a convenient method of reducing the
equation to a simpler form. Also, data on the life of
inventions for different firms and industries is not
available, /
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available, so T, at least must be assumed constant
across industries."1" Making the T = infinity assumption,
[7.1a] becomes [7.1b] below:
[7.1b] log X = log pQ. + log(3X /3R) + log e, + log(1-1/n)-log(C 1 C K
If the same steps are taken in transferring [7.2] and [7.3]
to logarithmic form, this gives:
[7.2b] log Xd = log pCb+log(3Xd/3R) + log eQ - log n - log(r-g)
[7.3b] log X = log pCK + log (3X/3R) + log [e^/n +(e^ (1-1/n))]
- log(r-g)
The procedure in this chapter will be to discuss the
measurement of the variables in the two equations, [7.1b]
and [7.2b]. Because many of these variables cannot be
directly measured, proxy variables must in some cases
be developed for use in their place. While this adds
to the difficulty in interpreting results and in the
precise determination of a functional form, it cannot be
avoided in a study of this nature.
The variables discussed are in some cases measured
at the firm-level and other cases at the industry-level.
In the instance of industry-level variables, the proper
classification of a firm into an industrial category is
very /
1. Schott (1976) provides data on the lifespan of
innovations from her survey of applied R & D in the
largest U.K. firms. The lifespans are broken down
by durable and non-durable goods however, which
amounts to the same type of distinction used in our
industrial class dummy variable explained in 'Section 7.4.
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very important and not always an easy task. This
aspect of the study is stressed later when the empirical results
are analysed. The sales variable is discussed first, because
it is on this basis that firrrswere selected for the
study.
7.1 The Sales Variable (p Cb)
In order to test equations [7.1] and [7.2], the
largest manufacturing firms in the UK were selected from
The Times Top 1000 1 9 7 2/73- This annual publication ranks
the largest firms in the country by turnover in the
proceeding years. While chapter eight, which follows,
discusses the rationale for the selection of firms for
the study and the characteristics of those firms, here
the emphasis is on the sales variable itself.
The initial firm sales variable used in the study
is turnover in 1971.^ This year is important in that
a number of other variables are defined so as to be
consistent in terms of time period. Regression equations
are also tested however using sales values for 1972, 1973
and 1974, which are taken from subsequent years of
The Times Top 1000 publication. Due to the time-
consuming task of tabulating patent data for more than
one time period, any lag period between the sales and
patent data is fixed by altering the year for the sales
figure.
The /
1. Sales data is reported by firms for either the year
ending January 1972 or the year ending March 1972
in The Times Top 1000 197 2/73.
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The year 1971 was chosen for the initial sales
variable to provide a four year lag of patenting
activity on sales (patents are counted from 1975). The
assumption here is that sales is a demand variable
providing a stimulus to inventive activity. Patents are
generated however only some time after the initial stimulus
to account for research and development time and for the
official processing of patent applications. The lag of
four years is on average consistent with information
concerning the length of R & D projects and the period
of time lapsed between patent application and acceptance
and publication.
A survey of the largest 300 U.K. firms by Schott
(1976) shows that the majority of applied R&D projects
undertaken in industry are short-term in nature. Sixty
per cent of the projects successfully completed were
finished in two years or less with only eleven per cent
requiring four years or more> (Schott, 1976, p.85-86).
The results of the survey support the hypothesis that
most industrial R & D is dedicated to relatively minor
advances.
Information from Taylor and Silbertson (1973, p.13)
reveals that there is a one and one-half to two and one half year lag
between patent application and acceptance by The Patent
Office. If the two time periods, the R&D period and
the acceptance lag, are combined, this results in a four
and one-half year lag between the initial demand stimulus
and /
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and resulting patented inventions. The patent data,
described in the following section are taken from a
fourteen month period from late 1974 to early 1976.
The 1971 figure for sales therefore provides approximately
the correct lag, considering the information available.
The four year lag of patenting on sales or the
demand variable, chosen for the initial estimates of
patenting activity in this study, is generally equal to
or greater than those used in similar studies concerning
patenting or R & D activity. Stoneman (1979) for
example, in his U.K. industry-level study of patenting
activity, tests a number of lag periods and also
Koyck transformations. He reports that the results from
his use of a simple one-period lag 'indicate the flavour
of all the results generated' (Stoneman, 1979, p.39).
And while Scherer's (1965a) earlier firm-level study of
patenting activity in the largest U.S. firms provided for
a four year lag of patenting on sales, in his later
industry-level study (Scherer, 1982) his best results
are obtained with patents lagging demand-pull variables
by only two years. Scherer explains that these results are
either due to chance or a tendency for corporate inventors
to anticipate favourable demand conditions even before
they fully materialise.
Pavitt and Soete (1980, p.48) have gone so far to
suggest that due to the very nature of patenting activity,
'the search for time-lags is unnecessary and could even
be misleading.' The view here is of patenting activity
undertaken /
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undertaken to protect innovations over the entire life-
cycle. The pattern is one in which a major innovation
results in a master patent and following that a cluster
of improvement patents.
Further information is provided by Hall, Griliches
and Hausman (1984) in a recent study concerning both
the patenting and R&D behaviour of 642 US firms. In
attempting to characterize the lag structure of the
patents to R & D relationship, the authors find a strong
contemporaneous relationship between R&D expenditures
and patenting. The relationship does not disappear when
firm size is controlled for.
Considering the discussion above a fixed four year
lag for patenting on the sales variable can be questioned.
To account for possible variations in time lags in this
study therefore, sales values for the three years
following 1971 are substituted into the regression
equations and results compared.
7.2 The Measurement of Inventive Activity (X) or Number
of Patents
Inventive activity in this thesis is measured by the
number of patents registered by a firm in The Patent Office
of the Department of Trade and Industry over a given period
of time. As explained earlier, the use of patent data
suits the purposes of the study, in both a theoretical and
a practical sense.^ The discussion below describes the
step by step procedure undertaken to arrive at the
number /
1. See chapter one, section 1.4 for a justification of
the use of patent data.
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number of product patents and process patents for a
firm. All of the patent data used in this thesis was
compiled from U.K. Patent Office publications available
in the Edinburgh Central Library.
A total number of patents was first assigned to
each firm with reference to the Index of Patentees.
This lists the names of firms and individuals applying
for patents in alphabetical order, and for each name
the patent specification numbers (six figure serial
numbers) of all specifications accepted by the patent
office in the time period covered by the particular
volume of the index. Although accepted by the patent
office, the patent is only sealed after a period of time
in which it may be challenged. It is reported by
Boehm (1967, p.76 ) that 96 per cent of U.K. patent
acceptances are sealed.
In compiling patent data for the firms used in this
thesis, two volumes of the Index of Patentees were
referred to. ^ This resulted in a count of patents
for each firm over a period of fourteen and one
half months covering all of 1975. A patent count over
a longer period of time would have been preferable in
order to average out any short-term fluctuations.
Mueller (1966), for example has suggested a three to
five year period for cross-sectional analysis. However,
because /
1 . The first volume refer to patent specifications
1375001 to 1400000 published between 27 November
1974 and 2 July 1975. The second volume refer to
patent specifications 1400001 to 1425000 published
between 9 July 1975 and 11 February 1976.
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because of the intent to separate the firm's product
patents from its process patents, any longer period of
time would have required a prohibatory amount of work.
As a crude test of the consistency and reliability
of the patent data over a short period of time, the number
of patents assigned to a firm from the first volume of the
Index of Patentees was correlated with the number of
patents assigned to a firm from the second volume of
the index. The resulting correlation coefficient was
.967. This implies a stable pattern of patenting
activity on the part of firms over this short period
of time.
A particular problem faced in assigning a total
patent count to a firm is the separate listing of a
firm's subsidiaries in the Index of Patentees. The
names listed are those of the patent applicant. If a
parent company applies for a patent on its own behalf
or the behalf of a subsidiary, the name of the parent
will be listed. However, if a subsidiary applies for
a patent on its own behalf, only the name of the
subsidiary is listed."1"
In order to accurately assign patents to the parent
firms selected for the study, a knowledge of the
subsidiaries of each parent company was required. To
obtain this information the 1971 U.K. edition of
Who /
1. This was confirmed in a letter from The Patent Office
to the author - Judith Sullivan, Examiner,
Classification Section, The Patent Office to
Ms P A Siler, 30 July 1981.
- 248 -
Who Owns Whom was consulted."'" The 1971 volume was
selected because it is consistent with the volume of
The Times Top 1000 from which the firms used in the study
were taken. The patent specifications for each of the
firm's subsidiaries were then added to those listed under
the parent's name to arrive at a total count for the
2
parent company.
It should be recognised that some inconsistency can
arise from using a 1971 ownership structure for firms to
assign patents in 1975. For example, if a parent firm
sold major subsidiaries with significant patenting activity
during the period the patent count would not reflect
the existing ownership of the firm. If however, the four
year lag discussed in section 7.1 is valid, or patents
abridged in 1975 are influenced by 1971 demand variables,
the procedure followed is theoretically sound. Whether
or not they are still owned by the parent, patents produced
by subsidiaries should reflect demand variables at that
time when they were under the relevant parent or in 1971.
1. A benefit derived from the Who Owns Whom search was
the classification of parent firms in the publication
into general industrial categories. This was of use
in assigning values to each firm for a number of
industry level variables used in the study.
2. The pattern of patent application varied widely. In
the case of some firms almost all of the patents were
applied for under the parent's name (Unilever is an
example). In the case of others,patent applications
were divided among the parent and major subsidiaries
(GEC, for example).
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An empirical problem in identifying these demand-led
patents arises however, if the patenting policy of the
firm changes with ownership. For example, the patents
of the subsidiary may be registered under the new
owner's name.
It should be noted that while demand variables for
years other than 1971 are tested, e.g. sales, 1972, 1973.
and 1974, the 1971 ownership structure is retained for
assigning patents. To the extent that there were major
changes in ownership during these years, the patent
count less accurately reflects demand variables in these
years.
After a total patent count had been assigned to a
firm, patents were separated into those concerning the
firm's products and those concerning the firm's processes.
This was a time consuming activity. For those firms
with under 100 patents registered, all of the patent
specifications were checked and the patents classified
into either the product, process or unidentified category.
For firms with over 100 patents registered, one-half of
the patent specifications were checked."1" The proportion
of product or process patents for those checked was then
applied to the firm's total number of patents to arrive
at a total figure for each category.
In /
1. There were nine firms in this category: ICI, Unilever
GEC, Ford UK, Dunlop, Lucas, Phillips, Plessey and STC.
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In order to classify patents, reference had to be made to the
patent abidgements themselves. The procedure of the
patent office under pre-1977 legislation, relevant to
this study, was for the examiner to prepare an abridgement
summarising the disclosure of information contained in the
patent specification."'" At the same time the patent
specification and its abridgement were classified under
one or more units of a classification key. The
classification system used by the patent office, as Boehm
(1967) noted, is based on the technical content of the
specification and has no relationship to the Standard
Industrial Classification which is based on products and
materials of which products are made.
The classification key used by The Patent Office is provided
in Appendix 7.2A. The abridgements for a particular period
of time are published in 25 volumes, each covering one
or more of the 40 divisions of the classification key.
A Divisional Allotment Index to Abridgements lists the
divisions under which each six figure patent specification
number falls.
For the majority of patent specifications, the
separation of product and process inventions was time
consuming /
1. Legislation in 1977 requires the applicant to provide
an abstract identifying the technical subject of the
invention, replacing the old-style abridgement.
Information on the facilities and procedures of the
UK Patent Office is contained in the publication,
Patents A Source of Technical Information, published by
The Patent Office, 1979.
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consuming but not exceedingly difficult. The patent
abridgement often makes the division quite clear. For
example, it is obvious from the patent abridgement
describing tobacco feeding - 'tobacco fed to a cigarette-
making machine' - that this is a process invention for
the applicant, British American Tobacco (BAT). On the
other hand the abridgement describing smoking articles -
'filter cigarettes product' clearly refers to a product-
enhancing invention for BAT."'"
In a few cases, where the patent abridgement refers
both to product changes and production process changes,
both a product and process invention was recorded for
the firm.^ Often such a patent specification and
abridgement are classified under two quite different
divisions in the classification key. An example is the
abridgement for a Rank Hovis McDougal patent concerning
the improvement of the cold water solubility of gelatin.
The abridgement is found in the 'food preparation'
category (division A2) and is counted as a product
patent in this study. However, the specification is
also counted as a process patent here because it is
further classified to the division for 'physical and
chemical apparatus and processes' (B2^ * T'le abridgement
in this division describes the characteristics of
'a /
1. Abridgements for patent specifications 1397847 and
1378145 are referred to.
2. The double counting of a specification implies that
two separate specifications should have been
assigned because two inventive steps were involved -
one for the product and one for the process.
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'a spray gun for spraying aqueous gelatin solutions1."'"
The counting of a specification twice, once as a product
invention and once as a process invention is an exception
to the general procedure.
For a number of patents, the distinction between a
product and process invention required information beyond
that contained in the abridgement. This was particularly
true of patents of engineering firms, where the apparatus
described in an abridgement could either refer to a product
sold by the firm or be used in the firm's own production
process. In such cases, if the equipment described was
a product of the firm, the patent specification was
classified as a product invention. An example is the
case of Dunlop Ltd., which has a number of patent
specificationsreferring to conveyor belts. Since this
is an industrial product of Dunlop, the specifications
are classified as product inventions.
A number of sources were used to gain information
concerning the products sold by firms. The Annual Cards
provided by Extel Statistical Services Ltd., giving
company profiles compiled from annual reports were
particularly useful for this purpose. In a number of
cases the company annual reports were also referred to.
In addition the publication Kompass - 10th edition and
the /
1. The particular patent specification discussed,
1411751, is assigned to three divisional units,
the two listed in the text above, and a third, ,
macromolecular compounds. The applicant was
Heiner and Sons, a subsidiary of RHM Ltd.
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the Department of Trade and Industry's Directory of
Businesses from the 1968 Census of Production also
provided information on the products of particular firms.
Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, there were a
number of patent specifications where the distinction
between a process and product invention could not be
made. In these cases the patents were classified as
'unidentified'. In a few situations the patented
invention did not correspond to any of the products sold
by the firm or fit into the firm's production process."*"
The greater problem was in classifying a patent which was
both specific to the firm's production process and which
was related to products sold by the firm. For example,
the patents registered by British Oxygen Company (BOC) are
difficult in this latter respect, due to the nature of the
firm's sales. The company sells industrial gases but also
plant and equipment for the separation of gases. In a
patent related to the liquefaction of hydrogen, accepted
from BOC, the invention could be concerned with the firm's
owr production process or oriented toward the market for
2 . .
its plant and equipment sales. While the invention
might serve both purposes; to classify it to both process
and product categories implies two inventive steps, which
it is not. The patent therefore is classified as
unidentified. /
1. An example is a patent (1408203) registered by BAT
concerning a printed circuit card. This patent did
not fit into any product line or production process
of either the parent company or its subsidiaries
under the time period covered.
2. Patent specification 1408203 is referred to here.
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unidentified.
Patents were hard to classify for a number of firms
in the chemical industry."'" Besides the volume of patents
registered by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), the
separation of product and process patents was made more
difficult by the scientific descriptions of chemical
compounds and processes in the abridgements. Despite
this however, the abridgements do give clues as to the
proper assignment. For example they describe 'mixing
methods' or 'devices for circulating liquids' or 'a
process for continuous production' which imply an improved
process of production. Also, the divisions to which the
patent specifications are assigned are helpful.
If a specification is assigned to a mechanical as well as a
chemical division, it is likely that there is a new
physical production process involved. However despite
these clues, the product-process distinction was more
difficult fcr chemicals than other industries.
A particular problem in dealing with general chemical
firms such as ICI was with patents relating to catalysts.
These could be used in chemical production processes
within ICI or sold to customers. The 1972 Annual Report
for ICI reported for example, that a current R&D project
was the development of car exhaust catalysts for use by
car /
1. This was not true of all firms within the chemical
industry however. Firms manufacturing
pharmaceuticals registered patents which were
relatively easy to classify.
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car manufacturers. Unless a catalyst invention was
specifically related to a product or process in the
abridgement, it was classified as an unidentified patent.
While the breakdown of product and process patents
for individual firms and industries in this study is
discussed in the next chapter, it is useful here to
provide some check on the accuracy of the classification
procedures used. This is done by considering the
average proportion of 'identified' firm patents which are
classified as product or process. For all of the firms
in the study, 68 per cent of patenting activity on average
was undertaken to improve products. This majority is
consistent with all other studies referring to the
product-process breakdown.
It is also useful to compare the 32 per cent process
patenting figure with the findings of Schott (1976)
who conducted a survey of allied R&D expenditure
among the largest U.K. firms. Schott's survey showed
that 37 per cent of R & D expenditure went toward process
innovations-, (Schott, 1976 , p.85). The author notes
that this figure is higher than the fifteen per cent
figure generally assumed and based on earlier U.S. surveys.
A plausible hypothesis is that the percentage of
R&D devoted to process inventions should be higher than
the percentage of process patenting. This is because
firms have a greater financial interest in and therefore
a greater propensity to patent products which are highly
visible /
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visible to competitors than processes which may be
easier to keep secret. If this is correct, the average
product patenting percentage using our data is roughly
in line with Schott's findings, but significantly lower
than the U.S. estimates.
There is no doubt that the procedures used to classify
patents to product and process categories are not
error-free. It is also true that, had more resources
been available to devote to the activity, both in terms of time
and expertise? more confidence could be placed in the
results. However, given that patents are an index
rather than a precise quantification of inventive
activity and given that most patents were relatively easy
to classify, the procedures followed here should give
results which reflect the breakdown of inventive
activity directed at products and processes. Appendix
7.2B gives examples of firm patent specifications which
have been classified as product, process and 'unidentified'
inventions.
7.3 Technological Opportunity (3X/3R) (e^)(e^)
Technological opportunity, from chapter four on the
theory of invention, may be defined as the advance in
the underlying basic scientific knowledge associated
with an industry. In this sense it represents the
supply side of the inventive process. The higher
the technological opportunities, the lower the cost of
producing an invention of a particular quality.
As explained in the previous chapter, technological
opportunity /
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opportunity is associated in equations [7.1] and [7.3]
with the marginal product of R & D (3X/3R) weighted by
the quality of inventions generated. This quality is
shown by e^ for cost-reducing inventions and e^ for
product-enhancing inventions. As noted in chapter six,
because there is no direct measure of product quality
increases in our model, the response of demand, e^, is
used. However, this term goes beyond the supply notion
of opportunities somewhat to indicate the opportunities
for technological competition.
The technological opportunities available to a
firm are not directly measurable due to a lack of data.
While information on patented inventions exists, neither
R&D expenditurertor the number of R & D employees are
available at the firm level. Therefore neither the
marginal/7or average product of R & D activity can be
calculated. The lack of firm-level data in itself
however, is not bothersome, as the advance in under¬
lying basic scientific knowledge is defined as an
industry-wide variable. A possibility therefore, is
to use the industry technological opportunity variable
developed by Stoneman (1979) in his U.K. study.
Stoneman represents the differences in industry
technological opportunities by R & D expenditure per
patent produced. He argues that industries with
extensive opportunities would have lower R&D costs
per patent than those with limited opportunities. In
the terminology of this thesis, the Stoneman index is
the /
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the reciprocal of the average product of R & D expenditure.
It is constructed, using the patent data converted by Boehm
into an industrial classification scheme. Applying
government published R&D data, Stoneman derives two
sets of observations on R & D expenditure per patent,
one for 1956 and one for 1959, both of which cover
fourteen industries.
There are a number of problems in using the Stoneman
index to represent technological opportunity in this
study. One such problem is that Boehm's industrial
classification of patents stops at 1960. This would
mean that the technological index used would be somewhat
old considering the mid-1970's patent data used here.
Another potential problem is that the industry break-down
used by Stoneman may be too broad. This is due to R & D
expenditure data being available only for some industries
only at the industrial order level of the SIC.
However within a general industrial classification, such
as textiles, there may be some subclasses, such as
man-made fibres with substantially higher technological
opportunities. The general category of electrical and
engineering also contains firms in the electronics
subcategories, which are likely to have had greater
opportunities in the 1970's than other firms in the
general category. It is preferable therefore to adopt
a technological opportunity measure from data which has
greater potential for a break-down by industrial subclasses.
In this study the technological opportunities
available /
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available to a firm will be measured by a proxy variable.
This is the density of qualified scientists and engineers
(QSE's) employed in the major industry in which the firm
is engaged. Information on QSE's in industry is obtained
from the Census of Population. Data from the 1971
Census will be used here because it reflects the
technological opportunities available at that time when
the firm, according to our theory, is initiating projects
generating patent specifications in 1975-76. The
Department of Industry derives its industry tables on
QSE's by processing a 10 per cent sample of census forms
for Great Britain for persons aged 18 or over and
falling within the Department's definition of a QSE.
The Department of Industry defines a qualified
scientist or engineer as a person holding a first
qualification at degree level or above in engineering,
technology or science. QSE's are published by industry
of employment and by subject area under the general
categories of science, technology and engineering.1 Data
is available at the three digit SIC level. The figures
for density of QSE's by industry are obtained by dividing
the QSE values by the number of employees in the particular
2
industry in 1971, published by the Department of Employment,
and /
1. Department of Industry, Persons with Qualifications
in Engineering, Technology and Science, Studies in
Technological Manpower No. 5 (London: HSMO, 1976).
Table 1, pp.43-49.
2. Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics
Yearbook, 1971, (London: HSMO, 1973), table 57,
pp.132-139.
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and then multiplying the result by 100. This gives
the number of QSE's per 100 employees in the industry
or the density figure used in this study.
As noted previously, there may be some question as
to how widely or narrowly the industry technological
opportunity variable should be defined. In this study
the QSE variable is measured and entered into the
regression equations at both the three digit SIC level and
at a broader industrial order level. The broader
definition does however have subclasses for electronics
and aerospace, two industries where the science and
engineering base is stronger than that of the industrial
order as a whole. Appendix 7.3 contains a table
showing the density of QSE's by broad industrial orders
broken down by scientists and engineers and technologists.
A potential problem with the wider industry measurement
is the association between the QSE variable and
industrial class dummy which is explained in the following
section.
It may be argued that the number of scientists,
engineers and technologists employed within an industry
merely reflects the demand for inventive inputs and
therefore cannot be used as the supply variable,
technological opportunity. Bosworth (1981) however,
makes the point that qualified scientists and engineers
within a firm are involved in a much wider range of
activities than R&D. These activities include
production, installation and testing of new capital
equipment /
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equipment, advertising and marketing. While the QSE figure
for an industry may therefore partially depend on the
demand for inventive inputs in an industry, it also
reflects the extent to which an industry is science-based.
It is assumed here that the greater the density of QSE's in
an industry, or the more QSE's per 100 industry employees,
the greater the science base of the industry, or the
greater the technological opportunities available.
A further consideration is whether the total figure
for both qualified scientists and engineers should be
used in calculating the technological opportunity proxy.
If we return to the original concept of technological
opportunity, it is regarded as the exogenous advance in
science which opens up new opportunities for applied
research.1 In this case the use of qualified scientists
alone in deriving the industry technological opportunity
variable seems justified.
A number of economists however, have asserted that
technology may not be closely related to science but
subject to laws of its own. This would imply that the
appropriate measure of the 'cumulative technological base'
of an industry would be measured by the density of engineers
alone. A more complex view, that of Nelson and Winter
(1982), distinguishes between industries with 'cumulative
technologies' and those with 'science-based' technologies.
Fortunately /
1. See the theoretical discussion of technological
opportunity in Chapter 4, section 4.2.
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Fortunately the QSE data allows us to separate the
density of scientists from the density of engineers
and technologists in an industry to accommodate the
theoretical differences concerning the concept of
technological opportunity.
Each firm in our sample of the largest firms in the
U.K. is assigned several technological opportunity
variables for use in the empirical tests of the patenting
activity equations. The technological opportunity
variables assigned depend on the industry into which the
firm is classified. The classification of a firm into an
industry therefore is again stressed as a very important
feature in the study. The initial industrial
classification of a firm is by major product. The major
product however, in the case of a number of diversified
firms may not accurately reflect the technological
opportunities available to the firm in its other industries.
Therefore a second technological opportunity measure is
used which is the density of QSE's in the highest density
QSE industry which the firm supplies.
Another variable which may reflect the technological
opportunities available for production process changes
is the degree of productivity already achieved in the
industry. This approach to technological opportunity
may be traced back to the theory of the product cycle and
its relationship to technological change explained in
section 4.8. The theory suggests that in the latter
stages /
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stages of the product cycle, when production processes
become highly capital intensive and productivity is high,
the opportunities for production process changes may be
diminished} Nordhaus (1969) used this method, predicting
the level of industry productivity to be negatively
associated with the number of inventions generated in an
industry.
As an alternative technological opportunity variable
in estimating patenting activity, an industry productivity
variable is used. The same prediction is made as that
by Nordhaus above; that the productivity level has a
2
negative influence on patenting activity. The productivity
level used is output-per-operative in the major industry
in which the firm operates. Output-per-operative
figures were obtained for three and four digit SIC levels
3
from the Census of Production (1971). The firm's major
industry, used in assigning the productivity level variable,
is the same as that used to assign the QSE variable.
7.4 Price and Product Quality Elasticity of Demand
(n), (eg)
The response of demand to both a change in the firm's
price/
1. This neglects the possibility of a completely new
production technology, perhaps with a different
science base, being adopted.
2. It should be noted that Waterson and Lopez (1983)
make the opposite assumption; that technological
opportunity and capital intensity are positively
related.
3. These figures were taken from Wood (1976) , who
compares productivity among U.K. industries.
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price and a change in its product quality are important
determinants of patenting activity. In equation [7.1]
the firm's incentive to generate process patents is
positively related to its price elasticity of demand.
On the other hand, product patenting in equation [7.2]
is directly related to the elasticity of demand with
respect to inventions generating product quality improve¬
ments and negatively related to the price elasticity of
demand.
Unfortunately, for the purposes of this study,
the
neither of elasticity variables are directly measurable.
While some data has been generated on the price
elasticity of demand for particular products, the data
is by no means comprehensive over the wide range of
industries represented here. The measurement of the
response of demand to product quality improvements has
been attempted in only a few studies using hedonic price
indices (see for example Cowling and Rayner, 1967).
Considering these restraints, a proxy variable must be
developed to represent both types of elasticity in this
study.
The proxy variable used to represent both price
and product quality elasticities faced by the firm is
the firm's industrial type. Two general industrial
categories are defined for the purposes of this
variable: (1) those in which products are differentiated
and sold on the basis of their performance characteristics;
and (2) those in which products are homogenous, being sold
largely on the basis of price. The former are industries
which /
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which primarily sell either capital goods or consumer
durable goods. The latter are industries which sell
primarily either material inputs or consumer non-durables.
The firms selected for this study are categorised into
either the durable or nondurable types described above on
the basis of their industrial classification in The Stock
Exchange Official Yearbook 1971. A list of industrial
classifications is provided in appendix 7.4. The yearbook
is useful for our purposes because it groups industries
into the more general categories of capital goods, consumer
durables and consumer nondurables. Although building
material industries are classified as capital goods in
the yearbook, the industries are reclassified for this
study into the non-durable material inputs category."'" Firms
not having a stock exchange listing in 1971 were classified
into an industry type on the basis of their major products.
Information concerning the major products of firms was
obtained from The Times Top 1000 and also the publication
Kompass, which lists the SIC numbers into which a companyL-S
products have been classified.
The firm's basic industrial type is entered as a
dummy variable in estimating both product and process
patenting activity. Taking the process patenting equation
[7.1] first, the assumption made here is that firms in the
nondurables category (building materials and consumer
nondurables) have relatively high price elasticities.
This /
1. A few industries in the 'other' category in the
stock exchange listing were also reclassified for
our study-drugs and chemicals to non-durables
and office equipment to durables.
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This in turn has a positive influence on their process
1
patenting activity. As explained in chapter six, this
is because for any fall in price due to cost-reducing
invention, firms with higher price elasticities are
able to spread the benefits of the invention over a
greater number of units, other things equal. On the
other hand, it is assumed that firms in the durable
goods category (either capital goods or consumer
durables), have a relatively low price elasticity and a
relatively high elasticity with respect to product
quality.
The proxy variable developed here is only in the
broadest sense representative of the various elasticities
firms actually face. However, a variable distinguishing
industry type seems necessary, especially in estimating
the product patenting equation. As explained in chapter
four, firms in industries in which products are highly
differentiated are more likely to engage in technological
competition.
7 . 5 Industry Concentration
A further influence on the elasticity terms (n)
and (Gq) in equations [7.1] and [7.2] is the level of
industry concentration. As explained in the previous
chapter,if rival reactions are negligible,the level of
industry concentration should have a negative effect on
price elasticity and a positive effect on product
quality elasticity of demand. It follows therefore,
from /
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from the equations, that concentration should be negatively
related to process patenting activity and positively
related to product patenting activity.
As explained in chapter Six however, the predictions
above may be too simplistic, when the relationship between
concentration and rival reactions -is considered. For
example, it was demonstrated that if, after a certain
level of concentration, a price decrease on the part of
one firm was matched by rivals, then further increases
in concentration would have no effect on firm price
elasticity and therefore process patenting. For product
patenting intensity it was explained that in oligopoly
situations, expected reactions of rivals could reduce the
appropriability of an invention and therefore the propensity
to patent for the firm.
From the discussion above, it is evident that it is
difficult to predict a clear role for a concentration
variable in estimating [7.1] and [7.2], However despite
this unclarity, a measure of industry concentration is
entered in both the process and product patenting
equations. The measure used is the five-firm
concentration ratio in terms of output of the firm's
major industry. Figures are taken from the 1970 Census
of Production."*"
7. 6 The Industry Growth Rate., g
The /
1. See: Department of Industry, Business Monitor C 154,
1970 Report on the Census of Production Summary Tables,
London: HMSO, 1976, Table 9, pp.110-197.
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The underlying increase in industry output, g, is
1
positively related to both process patenting intensity
and product patenting intensity, due to its inclusion
e-(r-g)T
in the discount factor q> (1- ) . IndustrialT
r-g
growth rates are calculated from yearly sales figures
available at the three-four digit SIC level from the
Census of Production. Here we use the 1968-72 average
/
compound rate of growth for the firm's major industry.
7.7 Summary
The discussion in chapter seven can be summarized
by reviewing the variables to be used in testing
equations [7.1] through [7.3]. They are as follows:
Inventive Activity
Sales or Firm Size
Technological
Opportunity
Price and Product (1)
Elasticities of Demand
Xc,X^, the number of process
and product patents registered
by a firm over a 14 and 1/2
month period covering 1975.
Firm sales for 1971, 1972,
1973 or 1974, depending on the
lag used for patenting on sales
The type of industry (Stxclass)
in which the firm produces,
either consumer durables and
capital goods or consumer
nondurables and intermediate
goods.
The density of qualified
scientists and engineers in the
firm's major industry (QSE) or
the level of output-per-operative
(QperOp) in the firm's major
industry -1
(2) The five-firm concentration
ratio (Cone) in the firm's
major industry
Industry Growth Rate The average compound rate of
growth, 1968-1972 (I Growth)
of the firm's major industry.
1. For Sources, see Business Statistics Office
(1977 , 1972) .
- 269 -
While equations [7.1] and [7.2] for process and
J
product invention are to some extent distinct in form,
the variables used in their empirical estimation are the
same. A number of variables - sales, technological
opportunity and industrial growth - enter the two
equations in the same way, so it is not surprising that
there is some similarity. However, due to the unavoidable
use of proxy variables to measure such factors as price
and product quality elasticity of demand, the two equations
are estimated using all of the same variables.
The influence of the variables may differ however,
depending on whether product of process inventions are
being considered. For example, while industry type
(Stxclass) is used as a proxy for both elasticity
variables, the type most favourable to either product or
process invention differs. The influence of industrial
concentration also changes, although the influence of
this variable on both product and process patenting is
complex.
Following the logarithmic form specified in [7.1b]
and [7.2b], the empirical estimating equation for both
product and process patenting is:
log X =a+b^log Sales + b2log QSE + b^Stxclass
+ b^log Cone * bj. log Growth
It should be noted that the interest rate has been dropped
from equations [7.1b] and [7.2b], under the assumption
that they are equivalent for all firms. The estimation of
the /
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the total patenting equation [7.3b] also follows the
form above.
A potential problem in estimating the product and
processing equations is that a number of the independent
variables may be interdependent. For example firm size
or sales may be directly related to the level of
concentration in an industry, depending on the overall
market size. Also, given that the technological
opportunity (QSE) and technological competition (Stxclass)
variables are difficult to separate in theory, they may
also be related empirically. These and other problems of
estimation are taken up in chapter eight where the
results of the empirical tests are reported.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF FIRM PATENTING ACTIVITY
In this chapter the firm-decision making models
concerning patenting activity, developed in Chapters
six and seven, are examined empirically. Results of the
estimates of the product, process and total patenting
models are reported, analysed and where relevant compared
with those of previous studies. The equations were
tested using data applicable to the largest 180 manufacturing
firms in the UK based on 1971 sales. The multiplicative
form indicated by the theoretical models leads to the use
of ordinary least square (OLS) methods of estimation on
logarithmic transformations of the variables. A number
of general econometric texts were consulted in this
respect. The books by Kmenta (1971) and Pindyck and
Rubinfeld (1981) were especially helpful.
To better interpret the regression results, it is
useful to consider in a bit more detail the firms
selected for the tests. In the first section of the
chapter therefore, the distribution of the firms in the
study by industry type is presented, with the characteristics
of each industry type emphasised. In the next section the
problems encountered in estimating the patenting activity
equations are discussed. Highlighted here is the problem
presented by firms which have no patenting activity or the
problem of zero values in the dependent variable. The
implications for the OLS estimates are explained.
The /
- 272 -
The next three sections of the chapter, sections three,
four and five, present the results of the regression
concerning product, process and total patenting activity.
The results are evaluated and related to the theoretical
models of inventive activity. A sixth section considers
the explanatory value of the models developed in this
thesis, while a seventh section presents regression results
broken down by industrial class. In a final section
of the chapter an overview of the empirical work is offered.
8.1 Characteristics of Firms Included
Selection Process The models developed for firm
inventive decision-making in chapters 6 and 7 were tested
on the largest 180 manufacturing firms in the UK. The
firms are listed in order of size in appendix 8.1. Also
listed is the breakdown of product and process patents for
each firm and the general industrial category (Stxclass)
in which the firm was placed for purposes of the study.
There are a number of reasons for the choice of firms,
which are briefly outlined below.
A first justification is related to the applicability
of the theoretical model to different size classes of
firms. The inventive decision process developed in
chapter six is a formal one; the firm considering both
the expected costs of invention in terms of R & D
expenditure and expected benefits, in terms of demand
factors. The patent or product of the inventive process




As noted in chapter two (tables 2.4a and 2.4b),
R&D expenditure and employment are highly concentrated
in a few large firms in the UK. It is therefore these
large firms whose decision-making process is most likely
to fit our regression models. The patenting activity
of small and even medium-sized firms, where inventions may
be the by-product of the production process, is less
likely to be relevant here.
A further justification for considering firms in the
largest size class is by virtue of their share of
inventions and innovations. As pointed out in chapter two,
while smaller firms contribute more to innovation than
their formal R&D expenditures would suggest, it is
still true that firms in the largest size classes introduce
the majority of innovations (table 2.4c). As far as
invention is concerned, the patents registered by the
180 largest manufacturing firms, used in this study,
represent approximately 44 per cent of all patents
accepted from U.K. applicants in the time period
covered."'"
, Considering that a number of very large
firms primarily engaged in extraction (e.g. B.P.) with
considerable patenting activity are excluded, the figure
points to a high level of concentration in patenting
activity, although not as high as that in R & D.
A /
1. Over a 14% month period from 27 November 1974 to
11 February 1976, the selected 180 firms had 4885
total patents accepted by the Patent Office.
According to the 93rd report of the Controller
General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, patent
acceptances by all UK applicants numbered 9120 in 1975.
If this annual total is prorated over a 14% month period,
the firms in our sample would have contributed 44%.
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A practical reason for not testing our inventive
decision-making models on a sample of firms of all
sizes is that most firms undertake no patenting activity
at all. A preliminary test of patenting activity
among firms of different size classes showed that the
majority of firms in seven different industry groupings
registered zero patents over the time period covered in
our study.^ Even among the top 180 firms selected for
the study, twenty-eight had no patents accepted by the
Patent Office. The number of firms with zero patents
rises slightly as we move out of the top twenty firms
in terms of size and then is steady until the final
2
twenty firms when the number increases considerably.
Of the largest 20 firms only one (Allied Breweries)
failed to register a single patent over our 14% month
time period. However, eight of the smallest twenty firms
selected failed to register patents. The increasing
number of firms which would have had zero values as smaller
firms were included was one reason for limiting the number
3
of firms to 180.
The /
1. A random sample of ten firms was taken from each of
seven industry groups and a patent count conducted.
The majority of firms in each group (7 to 8 out of
10) had no patents registered over a period of a year
and a half.
2. The distribution of the twenty-eight firms with zero
patents is presented in table 8.2 in section 8.2 of
this chapter.
3. Another related reason is the considerable amount of
work involved in checking parent and subsidiary
firms for patent specifications even when values are
zero.
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, The 180 firms used in the study were selected on the
basis of their turnover in 1971 as reported in
The Times Top 1000, 1972/73^. it should be emphasised that
the firms included are only those whose primary activity
was manufacturing in that year. Since a patented
invention by definition applies to 'a manner of new
manufacturing', it was felt that firms selected for the
tests should at least be primarily engaged in this general
activity. As noted above, as a result, some of the
largest firms in the U.K., such as those engaged primarily
in extraction activities, are not represented in the
study.
The study does include firms which are U.K.
subsidiaries of foreign parents, such as Ford U.K. In
fact a few such firms are among the largest generators
of patents in the sample. Phillips, the Dutch controlled
electronics firm, with 553 patents is second only to
ICI in terms of total patenting activity. Regression
equations are estimated with and without foreign
subsidiaries and the results compared. A plausible
hypothesis is that firms with foreign parents might have
propensities to patent which differ substantially from
domestic firms.
Profile /
1. Firms which were among the largest 180 firms in
1971, but which were taken-over by other firms
between that year and 1975, the year of the
patent count were excluded from the study.
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Profile of Firms in the Study It is useful before
l
going to the regression results to look briefly at the
industrial structure of the 180 manufacturing firms
included in the study. Table 8.1a shows the distribution
of the firms according to their general stock exchange
classification, from the Stock Exchange Yearbook 1971.^
Also shown is the industrial distribution in each of three
size classes of firms.
It is clear from table 8.1a that the greatest
percentage of firms in the study are in the capital goods
category followed by firms manufacturing consumer
nondurables. Perhaps the most interesting comparison
coming from the table is the complete reversal in the
relationship between size class and the relative frequency
of capital goods firms and size class and the relative
frequency of consumer nondurable goods firms. For the
largest 50 firms, the greatest numbers are found in the
2
consumer nondurables category.
The relative frequency of the consumer nondurables category
decreases as firms get smaller. Capital goods firms,
on the other hand, do not dominate the largest 50 firms
as they do the other two size categories. The table
also shows consumer durable and chemical firms to have a
fairly /
1. Firms which were not listed on the U.K. Stock
Exchange were assigned to a category based upon
their major products.
2. The table underlines a fact pointed out in a number
of studies, for example George and Ward (1975, p.55).
This is the dominance of U.K.companies in the food,
drink and tobacco sectors (all nondurables) among






























TOTALS 100 100 100 100
he Stock Exchange Yearbook (STX) classification scheme is used with
o exceptions. Building materials are classified under capital goods
the Yearbook, while in the table above they are a separate class,
so a small number of office equipment firms under 'other groups' in
e Yearbook are under capital goods in the table.
ercentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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fairly consistent representation throught the size
/
categories. It should be pointed out that amongst the
consumer durable firms are a number of electrical and
electronics giants, such as Thorn, Phillips and Plessey.
It is also worth noting that although the largest
manufacturing firms in the U.K. have been chosen for this
study, even among these firms there is a good deal of
variation in size. Sales turnover in 1971 for firms in
the study ranged from £1.85 billion (BAT) to £32.0 million
(CIBA-Geigy U.K.). The range of total patenting activity
varies from ICI at 622 to twenty-eight firms with no
patents registered. Both the sales and total patent
distributions are skewed to the right, with the patent
distribution having the longer right tail. While the
mean value for 1971 sales among the 180 firms was £167
million, median sales were £71 million. The average
total patent value was about 27, while the median value
was 7.
Sales values, patent values and those associated with
a number of other variables used in the regression
equations also differ considerably depending on the firm's
industry type. Again, using the Stock Exchange's general
categories, table 8.1b shows the mean values of a number
of the variables used in the regression equations by industry.
The table shows that firms in the consumer durable and
chemical industries have the highest average patenting
activity, considerably above the mean for all firms.


















































































































































































































































slightly below the mean value for all firms, consumer
nondurable firms and building products fall well below
the mean.
While table 8.1b presents the means of absolute
patent values by industrial class, it is also useful to
look at patenting intensity or the patent to sales
ratio. Mean values for patenting intensity are shown
in table 8.1c along with means for the percentage of
total patents which are product patents and the
percentage of total patents which are unidentified.
When patenting intensity is considered capital goods
firms, along with both chemicals and consumer durables
are above the average for all firms.
The low level of patenting activity in consumer
nondurable firms is predictable. These very large firms,
as confirmed by their high sales value, produce standardised
products (tobacco, food products and drink) with little
opportunity for product changes. The group has the
lowest QSE value of any of the industry categories and the
higher than average productivity value (Qperop) is
consistent with highly standardised volume production
(see table 8.lb).
The very high level of patenting activity for
consumer durable firms is less predictable if based on
previous findings. This industrial category is
dominated in terms of numbers by motor vehicle and










































































in the group. The firms in these two subcategories register
average total patents of 56.4, which is significantly
above the average for all firms."1" In terms of patenting
intensity, motor vehicles has a patent per £ million sales
ratio of . 249 which as seen from table 8 .ic is above
average for all firms. This high level of patenting
activity for the motor vehicles industry contradicts the
findings of another U.K. study.
Taylor and Silberst on (1973) contrast a relatively
high R & D/output ratio in U.K. motor vehicles with a
relatively low patent/output ratio. They (Taylor and
Silberst on, 1973, p.62) suggest, in reference to motor
vehicles?that 'these industries are not in general highly
"patent conscious" in the way that many branches of the
chemical and engineering industries are.' They add that
one explanation for the low level of patenting in vehicles
is the industry's orientation toward design rather than
technological modifications.
The results presented here point to the opposite
conclusions as far as patenting activity in motor vehicles
is concerned. Far from being mere design modifications,
an examination of the patents registered by these firms
shows considerable activity in improving vehicle braking
systems /
1. Joseph Lucas, the motor vehicles components
manufacturer is one of the largest generators
of patents, with 476, among the 180 firms. The
consumer electronics firms bring the overall
average in the general consumer durables category
up to an even higher level of patenting activity.
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V
systems, engines, batteries, indicator switches, gearing
systems, etc. Based on this review of patent abridge¬
ment, the industry seems to exemplify that theory of
technological change described as 'cumulative synthesis,'
or continuous small adjustment (see for example, Parker,
1974, p.20). This view is supported by Jones (1983)
in his article on technology in the automobile industry.
Jones argues that modern automobile design is becoming
much more dependent on the results of innovative activity.
An explanation for the inconsistency between the two
studies as concerns motor vehicles, lies in the methods
used to classify patents to their industry of origin. In
this study patents are identified by the firm registering
them and then the firm is placed in an industrial category based
on its major products in terms of sales. Taylor and
Silberston use the industry level data developed by Boehm
(1967) to calculate their patent/output ratio for motor
vehicles. Boehm didn't deal with the individual firm,
but instead placed patents into industries based on their
classification in the patent abridgement volumes. As he
himself noted, this could be misleading because the patent
classification scheme, based on technical content, is not
at all compatible with the standard industrial
classification scheme."'"
It /
1. A review of patents accepted from motor vehicle firms
shows that this is particularly true in this industry.
Many patents fall into the 'electric circuit elements'
and 'electric power elements'categories of the patent
classification scheme rather than the transport category.
Therefore patents attributed to the electrical engineering
industry according to the Boehm scheme would in this
analysis be attributed to motor vehicles.
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It should be emphasised that while contradictory
to other evidence, the high level of patenting activity
in consumer durables is consistent with a theoretical
point developed in chapters six and seven. Because of
the nature of their products, it is expected that
durable goods firms will base their competitive strategy
on technological competition thus leading to a high level
of product patents. On the other hand^firms within this
general category have approximately the same science base
or technological opportunities (QSE) as all firms taken
together, (see table 8.1b). These characteristics point
the two dimensions of a firm's technological environment:
(1) the richness of opportunity resulting from exogenous
advances in science; and (2) the ease with which product
characteristics can be changed (see section 7.2).
The chemicals group predictably has a very high
level of average patenting activity. It also has by far
the highest average technological opportunity level.
Table 8.1b however, points to some inconsistencies in
the relationship between chemicals and other industries
which make chemical firms difficult to classify with
respect to our regression equations (see section 7.4).
The chemical firms fit generally into the nondurable
or intermediate goods industrial category where the
products tend to be homogenous and sold on the basis of
price. The very high productivity level (Qperop) for
the chemical industries is consistent with their high
volume production techniques. With chemicals however,
products /
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products can be easily changed by 'manipulating
molecules', leading to a high degree of product change.^
The high level of product patenting done by the
chemical firms in relation to that of other industries
is seen in table 8.1c, which shows the average ratio of
product patents to total patents of firms in different
industries. This high ratio is consistent with the
findings of Mansfield et al. (1977) who found a much
greater role for large chemical firms in product than
process innovation (see section 5.3). Given that
chemical firms have the highest average ratio of product
patents of all industrial categories, their placement in an
industrial,category representing standardised products
is questionable. Table 8.1b shows also that chemical
firms have on average the highest number of patents which
could not be classified as either a product or process
patent. In a number of respects therefore, chemicals
present difficulties for the study. This means that
results including these firms have to be treated with
caution.
From table 8.1c it is also clear that capital goods
firms have an above average ratio of product patents
to total patents as compared to all firms. This is
expected, since these firms sell new product technology
which can have the effect of reducing costs for purchasing
firms. /
1. The patent abridgements describe many of the
inventions of the chemical firms as 'novel
compounds'.
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firms. Although they exhibit a high level of
technological competition, capital goods firms are
about average in terms of existing technological oppor
tunities or QSE density (table 8.1b).
Firms in the building products industries - brick
cement, glass, etc. - resemble consumer nondurablesin
their below average patenting activity, below average
QSE values and higher than average productivity levels
(table 8.1b). Firms in this industrial class are
on average smaller than consumer nondurable firms and




Errors in Measuring the Dependent Variable It must
be recognised that errors are likely to exist in measuring
the dependent variable or inventive activity in the models
developed, if patent numbers are used as an index of
invention. This is especially true of the breakdown
of product versus process patents where, as noted in section
7.2, a number of patents had to be classified as 'unidentifiable'.
There are also likly to be some errors in measuring overall
inventive activity. For example, for firms having a large
number of subsidiaries, it is likely that some patents were
not traced and attributed to the parent firm. Also a firm
which has successfully invented may not apply for a patent
on the invention. The firm may decide that a patent is not
necessary to protect its invention or it may decide that
among many imitating competitors, a patent is not worthwhile.
A patent count can also overvalue inventive activity in a
firm, depending on the quality of the inventions patented.
For example, a firm might engage in profuse patenting of
minute inventive steps which, using a count of patents,
overstates its inventive activity. Recognising the
existence of these measurement errors, it must be asked how
they affect the properties of the estimated regression
parameters.
The effect of a measurement error in the dependent
variable can be evaluated by the addition of the error to each
side of the estimating equation for inventive activity as in
the expression below:"*"
Log /
1. The analysis here follows the Pindyck and Rubinfeld
(1981, p.176) discussion of 'errors in variables'.
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★
Log Patent =8^10983163 + 02log QSE + B^Stxclass
+B^logGrowth + 6,-logConc + loge^ + 1°9 ^
★
Here the variable Patent is obtained in a measurement process
and may not be the exact number of patents accepted from the
firm or:
★
Patent = (Patent) yi
where yi is the measurement error.
If the measurement error in the multiplicative model
does not have a mean of one or a log of zero, then the
estimating equation needs an intercept term. Intercept
terms are provided in the estimated regressions in this
study."'" As long as the measurement error and the
independent variables in the regression are uncorrelated
however, the estimated regression parameters will be unbiased
and consistent. The presence of the measurement error does
increase the estimated residual variance, which reduces the
significance of the estimated parameters.
An important question for the estimated regressions in
this study is whether or not the measurement error associated
with total patenting activity is correlated with an
independent variable. As noted in section 1.4 of this
thesis, a number of economists have argued that the propensity
to patent may be inversely correlated with firm size. If
this /
1. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981, p.140) note that econo-
metricians do not usually consider the assumption that
an error term has a zero expected value. This is because
if it has a nonzero expected value, the estimated regression
slope parameters remain unchanged while the intercept
picks up the effect of the nonzero expected value.
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this is the case, the influence of sales on firm inventive
activity would be underestimated by the patent measure.
Also, in a recent study, Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1984)
argue that the patents variable is such that it is subject to
relative imprecision at small values?" As long as these
small patent values are randomly distributed among firms
however, this type of imprecision is not overly troublesome
to the estimates. The possibility that firms having zero
values may be concentrated among smaller firms is discussed
in the next subsection.
The measurement error in total patenting activity may
also be correlated with independent variables in the
equation other than size variable. For example, a likely
hypothesis is that firms which are in more concentrated
industries will have a lower propensity to patent. Firms
in this situation may use their market power rather than the
property right provided by a patent to protect their
inventions. The measurement error here would lead to some
downward bias in the estimated concentration parameter.
There unfortunately is little to be done in this study
to overcome the possible bias of the measurement error.
Hopefully, the errors are too small and random to destroy
the validity of the estimated parameters. Caution however,
should be exercised in interpreting the parameters, with
the possibility of measurement bias in mind.
The /
1. The authors find that even among 642 US firms with
high research intensity, 20 percent of the firms did
not apply for patents in 1976 and more than half
applied for less than five (see Hall, Griliches and
Hausman, 1984, p.7)
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The likelihood of measurement error in the product
and process patenting counts for firms is greater than
that for total patenting numbers. This is due of course
to a classification procedure which is subject to human
error. It is to be expected therefore that the residual
variance will be greater in these regressions where the
patents are broken down into products and processes,
leading to lower significance levels than in the total
patenting regressions. There is also some reason to
predict that measurement errors will be greater in particular
industries, such as chemicals, where the largest number of
'unidentified' patents are found. To the extent that this
is true, the error terms may be correlated with the industry
level variables, giving bias to the estimates of these
variables in the regression. In this case the direction
of the bias is not easy to predict or to accommodate. It
should be stressed again that patent values are not intended
to measure inventive activity directly but to provide an
index of its volume. Hopefully the size of the errors in
measurement is not so great to render even cautious
interpretation of results meaningless.
Zero Values for Patenting Activity In the discussion
of the theoretical model in chapter six, it was pointed out
that zero patenting activity on the part of the firm may be
consistent with profit maximising inventive activity. For
example, the absence of technological opportunities might
lead the firm to a decision not to undertake R&D. More
realistically very low technological opportunities combined
with /
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with some technical risk might mean that R&D effort
results in no patentable inventions. It should be
restated that while our theoretical model in its multipli¬
cative form does not allow for the possibility of negative
patenting activity, alternative approaches might lead to
this phenomena. For example a stock adjustment type
of model might lead to the firm allowing its current stock
of knowledge to become obsolete without replacement.
Besides the theoretical rationale mentioned, there are
empirical reasons why a zero patent count might be observed.
As explained in the last subsection, errors in measurement
of inventive activity, using the patent index is a likely
cause.
The observance of zero values is particularly a problem
in estimating the models of patenting activity developed,
as they imply the multiplicative or logarithmic form. As
Scherer (1965b) has argued, the test on size is not valid
when in logarithmic equations firms having no patents are
dropped. This'-Sbecause if there is any tendency for the
smaller firms in the distribution to undertake no
patenting activity, this may result in underestimating the
influence of firm size. In order to evaluate the
difficulties presented by zero values in this study, first
the magnitude of the problem and then its implications are
addressed.
Table 8.2 shows the total number of firms having zero
process, product and total patents and also the distribution
of these firms by firm size.
- 292 -
Table 8.2
Distribution of Firms with




























Total 28 35 91
292a
It can be seen that 28 firms 15.6 percent of all firms
in the study had no patents accepted by The Patent Office
in the time period covered. About nineteen percent of
firms in the study, or 35 registered no product patents
and just over half of the firms in the study, 91, registered
no process patents. The much higher number of firms
registering no process patents is to be expected considering
that firms may have an option of purchasing new process
technology embodied in their capital goods. Also there
may be less incentive for firms to patent in-house process
inventions which may be easier to conceal from competit ors
than product inventions. On the other hand, firms may choose
to obtain either product or process knowledge by licensing
rather than by investing their own resources in R & D.
The presence of zero values in the dependent variable
is not unique to studies of patenting activity and R&D.
In fact models where the dependent variable is truncated
with a lower limit of zero are quite common and estimating
techniques have been put forth to accommodate them."'" In
our models, while the dependent variables are not truncated,
in transforming patenting activity to logarithmic form,
the cases with a zero patent count are excluded from the
estimation. The possibility of bias in the simple least
square regression parameters therefore, due to the exclusion
of the 'zero-value' cases, must be explored. The case is
somewhat /
1. Here the reference is to the familiar Tobit analysis.
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somewhat similar to that outlined by Killingsworth (1983),
i
concerning estimation of the labour supply function using
a sample limited to workers. The question here, as in
the labour supply example, is whether simple regression
estimates will suffer from sample selection bias. To
answer this question, some indication of the selection
bias is needed, along with a judgement as to whether it
is substantial enough to be worth worrying about.
Using Killingsworth's (1983) method of evaluating
the problem the sample selection rule imposed by the
multiplicative or logarithmic form of the estimating
equation can be considered."1' The selection rule of
course is that patenting activity be above zero in value.
Using only one independent variable, sales, for simplicity
and because it was important to the selection of the 180
firms as a whole, the estimating equation may be seen
in terms of expected values as follows:
E[log Patent/logSales] = E[Bq + 3-^logSales +
log e/logSales, with Patents > 0].
It can be pointed out from the expression above, that the
E [loge/logSales] will only be equal to zero if the criteria
for sample selection (patents> 0) is uncorrelated with the
error term, log e. However by excluding firms with no
patenting activity, some observations with negative error
terms /
1. See chapter 3 of Killingsworth for a discussion of
selection bias.
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terms (leading to patenting activity of zero) will be
excluded from the regression. The error terms for
those observations remaining in the sample will tend to
be positive and correlated with the selection criteria.
In this case the error term is not a mean-zero random
variable and this leads to biased estimates. In other
words simple linear regression methods lead to drawing
a line through the middle of a scatter of points without
the points with negative error terms and on the horizontal
axis being included. If these observations tend to be
clustered, for example, in a particular size range, this
leads to bias.
It should be stressed that the 180 firms included in
the study were selected on the basis of an explanatory
variable, firm size, and not on the basis of the dependent
variable. Due to the multiplicative or logarithmic form
chosen, which excludes firms with no patenting activity,
and the fact that firms with no patents are more heavily
distributed at the lower end of the size distribution, the
question of' downward bias in the estimated sales parameter
arises.
If the bias discussed in the previous paragraph exists, then
it is expected that, within the sample of positive patent
value firms, the error term will be negatively correlated
with sales. As sales increase a firm can have a negative
value error term, still have patents above zero and therefore
still be included in the sample analyzed. In this
sense the sample has not been selected exogenously,
but /
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but on the basis of a variable (sales) which is correlated
*
with the error term.
As the firms in the study are in sequence in terms of
size, the relationship between the residual for each
observation and the sales variable can easily be subjected
to test. The results of Durbin-Watson test statistics
for the product, process and total patenting activity may
give us some indication of selection bias due to the
exclusion of firms with no patenting activity. The results
of these tests are reported along with other results in the
following sections of the chapter.
Another worthwhile procedure is that suggested by
Scherer (1965b). He compares the estimated regression
coefficients for patenting activity when the zero value
firms are excluded from logarithmic regression analysis and
when the firms having zero values are assigned a low
patenting value of one. This procedure is followed here
to give further indication of the direction of any bias.
Results are reported in the following sections of the study.
It should be noted that Scherer, in the same study, also
recommended nonlinear regression, using squared and cubic
values of the sales variable to overcome the logarithmic
1
restriction on zero values. These forms were tested on the
data in this study as an alternative to the multiplicative
model, with results reported in the following sections.
We now turn to the regression results for firm product
patenting.
1. Scherer's models are nonlinear only in the independent
variables and not in the parameters.
- 296 -
8.3 Regression Results for Product Patenting
The OLS regression results for product patenting are
discussed first, as they are somewhat richer than those
for process patenting. Equations [8.1] and [8.2] below
provide regression estimates for product patenting activity"1".
Equation [8.1] results when only 145 firms having positive
product patenting activity are included in the regression.
Equation [8.2] results when all 180 firms are used, with
those firms having zero values for product patents being
assigned a value of one. The second equation is listed
as an aid in evaluating 'selection bias' in the estimates,
discussed in the last section.
Log
Constant LogSales.-,^ LogQSE Stxclass Loggrowth Cone
[8.1] Log Product = -7.44 .800 .791 .550 .221 -.347
Patenl
n=145.
pat-pn1- *** *** *** * **t c





adj r =.411 -8.36 .858
***
(8.52)
.830 .648 .263 -.382
k k k k k k
(6.62) (3.58) (1.60) (2.03)
note: *** denotes significance at the one percent level, ** at the
five percent level and * at the ten percent level.
In both equations listed only those patents which could be
identified as product patents were included in the dependent
variable. /
1. The majority of estimates listed in this chapter were obtained
through the use of the SPSS computer programme, (see Nie, 1975).
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variable. Regressions were undertaken where 'unidentified'
patents were attributed to the product patent category in the
same proportion as identified patents. Due to the small
percentage of unidentified patents, results were very
similar to those presented above. These results are
presented in appendix 8.3.
It should be noted that the equivalents of equations
[8.1] and [8.2] were also re-estimated excluding those firms
which were subsidiaries of foreign parents (for example,
Ford UK). Such firms, it might be argued, would have
patenting policies with respect to the UK which would be
different from domestic firms. In fact, excluding foreign
firms makes little difference to the results and therefore
these firms are retained in the estimating equations.
Estimates excluding foreign subsidiaries are also presented
in appendix 8.3.
Comparing the two equations, [8.1] and [8.2], it can
be seen that the estimates are very similar. The coefficients
in the second equation are slightly higher and attain a
higher level of significance. The equation which includes
the firms with zero product patenting activity [8.2] also
2
achieves a slightly higher explanatory level or adjusted r
Sales Both equations show the logsales coefficient
to be significantly different from zero at the .01 percent
level. The exclusion of zero value firms in the product
patenting model [8.1] does however, result in a slightly
lower coefficient with respect to firm size. This
suggestion of downward bias was predicted by Scherer (1965 b)
for total patenting activity. When one-sided confidence
intervals /
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intervals are calculated for the logsales coefficients at
the .05 percent level, it is found that the coefficient
representing all firms in [8.2] or .858, is not significantly
different from one, the upper limit being 1.02. The
logsales coefficient in [8.1] or .800 has an upper limit of
. 991.
In some respects the log sales coefficient is acting in
the regression both as an indicator of the influence of
demand or the size of the market on product patenting and
as an indicator of supply conditions concerning knowledge
production. The profit maximising model with respect to
knowledge production, developed in chapter six, suggests
a proportional relationship between sales and patenting
activity. Assuming the objective of the firm is correctly
specified, a coefficient significantly less than one would
indicate diseconomies in production of knowledge arising
from the increase in firm size. It should be stressed
again that the results say nothing about economies of scale
in the R&D unit within the firm itself. Of course the
model may be misspecified for a number of firms. For
example, a firm might take a strictly defensive attitude
toward invention rather than following a profit maximisation
hypothesis. In this case demand would not have the same
strong /
1. One-sided confidence intervals for logsales give upper
limits calculated as follows:
[8.1] .800 + t _,-(std error e )
. U5
.800 + (1.65) ( .117) = .99
[8.2] .858 + (1.65) (.101) = 1.02
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strong influence.
Taking the two results together, [8.1] and [8.2] and
considering some potential for downward bias in the logsales
parameter, there is scarce evidence for diseconomies of
scale in product patenting among the largest UK firms.
Of course, on the other hand, there is no evidence at all
for any positive economies of scale.
It should be noted that while in comparing equations
[8.1] and [8.2] , some downward bias in the OLS logsale
estimate is suggested, there is no simple or standard
procedure to identify the amount of bias associated with
an estimated coefficient."1" The arbitrariness of the
assignment of the value of 1 patent in equation [8.2] to
firms having no product patents, can be seen when values
even closer to zero are assigned. If, for example, an
even smaller value of .5 product patents or .1 product
patents is assigned to the zero value firms, the coefficient
2
for logsales increases further. These results point
to the difficulty of handling firms with zero values when
the form of the estimating equation is multiplicative.
Although one and zero are close in value, the logarithmic
values of the two numbers differ by negative infinity.
Because it is a difficult and important issue, the possibility
of /
1. It is possible that an unbiased estimator could be
calculated through the Tobit iterative solution of
maximum liklihood equations. Also Fair (1977) has
proposed an alternative procedure which he regards
as somewhat simpler. However due to the time-
consuming nature of either approach, with no
guarantee of solution, neither of these procedures
were undertaken.
2. The logsales coefficient increases to .936 when .5
patents is the arbitrary value assigned and to 1.06
when .1 patents is the arbitrary value.
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of selection bias in the logsales estimate for product
patenting needs to be pursued further.
The issue of bias in the logsales estimate can be
further evaluated by observing the pattern of residuals when
firms with zero patent values are excluded from the
regression. As explained in section 8.2, a tendency for
the error term to be negatively correlated with size
in terms of sales would indicate a downward bias in the
estimates. A plot of standardised residuals however,
shows a fairly even distribution about a mean of zero, with
no pattern emerging. When a Durbin-Watson test is carried
out on the regression equation in [8.1], with firms
sequenced from the largest to the smallest, the result is
close to 2 or 2.23. This indicates that a null hypothesis
of no positive correlation between residuals can be
retained and lends support to the conclusion that no serious
selection bias results from excluding zero value firms."'"
The Durbin-Watson test however, is not a strong test for bias
in the OLS estimate, as bias could still exist along with a
randomly distributed residual for firms included in the
regression test.
The analysis with respect to firms having zero values for
product patenting activity may be carried a step further, by
predicting their patent values, using the coefficients shown
in equation [8.1], or using the coefficients for non-zero
value firms. The predicted value for the firms with no
product /
1. A Durbin-Watson statistic above two indicates some
negative correlation of the residuals.
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product patents are displayed in table 8.3, listed by
firm size from largest to the smallest. The mean of the
predicted dependent variable, the log of product patents,
for firms in the table is 1.48. Considering that the
standard error of the regression is 1.13, if the firms listed
in table 8.3 registered 1 product patent (or a log product
patent of zero), thirteen of the predicted values would be
within one standard error of their actual values while 30
would be within two standard errors* "hile the predicted
values of the excluded firms are not> therefore substan¬
tially off-target, the table does indicate considerable
overestimation when regression equation [8.1] is used on
the 'zero-value' firms. It should be noted that the errors
between predicted and actual values are, if anything,
smaller at the lower end of the distribution of firms
shown in table 8.3 than at the upper end, suggesting no great
downward bias in the estimates when zero value firms are
excluded. This analysis however is too simplistic and
other variables in the equation must be considered.
What is immediately striking from table 8.3 is the
concentration of consumer nondurable firms, especially in
the food and drink category at the top of the distribution.
In fact the largest twelve firms in the table are either
in the consumer nondurable or building materials industries
where technological opportunities are low. The positive
predicted patenting activity for these firms suggests
that the proxy used for technological opportunity may be








Firm Industry Patent Patents
Allied Breweries CND 2.51 12.30
Bass Carrington CKD 2.42 11.25
Ready Mix Concrete Mat 2.51 12.30
Spillers CND .90 2.46
Tarmac Mat 2.27 9.68
Carrington Viyella CND 1.13 3.10
Scottish & Newcastle CND 1.76 5.81
Rowntree Macintosh CND 1.56 4.76
United Biscuits CND .78 2.18
J. Bibbey CND 1.71 5.53
Heinz CND 2.06 7.85
Nestle CND 1.22 3.39
G. Cohen 600 Kap 2.36 10.60
Thomas Ward Kap 2.07 7.92
Michelin CD 2.00 7.39
C & J Clark CND -0.15 .86
NCR Kap 1.88 6.55
Associated Biscuits CND 0. 36 1.43
Caterpillar Kap 1.90 6.69
Manbre CND 0.96 2.61
Rugby Portland Cement Mat 1.02 2.77
Burroughs Kap 1.62 5.05
Bond Worth CD 0.33 1.39
Dupont Chem 2.37 10.70
Crown House Kap 2.00 7.39
Singer CD 1.89 6.62
Paul's & Whites CND 1.03 2.80
London Brick Mat 0.79 2.20
Trebor Sharps CND 0.61 1.84
Int Harvestor Kap 1.50 4.48
CPC CND 1.12 3.06
Rockware CND 1.24 3.46
FH Lloyd Kap 1.48 4.39
Harland & Wolff Kap 1.63 5.10
Kraft CND 0.83 2.29
Mean Value CO•r—f 5.38
Notes: Firms are listed in order of size, the largest
firm first. Industry types are as follows: CND(consumer
nondurables), CD (consumer durables, Kap(capital goods), Mat
(building materials), Chem (chemicals).
Predicted values shown were calculated using the TSP computer
package (see Hall and Hall, 1980).
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industry.
As one moves down the distribution of zero-valued
*
firms in table 8.3, more capital and consumer durable goods
firms appear. Such firms are not as inhibited by lack of
technological opportunities and are predicted to be
product changers for competitive reasons. Lack of
sufficient market size becomes a more logical reason for
their non-patenting activity. The pattern here is not
pronounced however; there are a number of consumer
non-durable firms at the lower end of the 'zero value'
distribution also. The non-patenting activity of the
smallest firms is not likely to be exclusively related to
size.
A potential solution to the problem of zero values
outlined above is the adoption of another functional form
for the regression which doesn't restrict the dependent
variable to positive values. With this in mind a number of
alternative functional forms were tried, including the
nonlinear model suggested by Scherer (1965b), which includes
both squared and cubic values of the sales variable.
Unfortunately the nonlinear results are not an improvement
especially in terms of their explanatory value. A problem
with this form, also mentioned by Scherer is the high
degree of multicollinearity between the sales variables,
giving low levels of statistical significance to the
coefficients. An advantage of the form is that it allows
for/
I The equations referred to here are nonlinear in the independent
variables. They are not inherently nonlinear in that they do
xend themselves co linear regression.
Results for other functional forms are shown in appendix 8.3*
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for both increasing and decreasing return to scale over the
range of firms tested.
Results from the nonlinear regression show that for the
180 firms in the study, first increasing and then decreasing
returns to scale are observed with respect to product
patenting activity. The inflection point occurs at
approximately the 2.7th largest firm in the study in terms
of size'*'. These are in contrast to Scherer's (1965a) U.S.
results where decreasing returns were observed except for
a few giants. While the results are interesting, the low
significance levels for the sales variables leads to
caution in accepting them.
It is useful to compare the nonlinear regression
results for the 180 firms as a whole with those when only
firms with positive product patent values are included in the
test. For the 145 firms with positive patents, continually
2
decreasing returns to scale are observed. This implies
that the inclusion of zero value firms has the effect of
raising the proportionality factor between product patenting
and sales. As stated previously, the results must be
interpreted /
1. The nonlinear equation, shown in full in appendix
8.3, has a positive sales^ term and a negative cubic
term for sales.
2. The nonlinear equation, when only the 145 firms
with positive product patenting are included, has
both a negative sales^ term and a negative cubic




The evidence compiled suggests that there is a small
amount of downward bias in the logsales estimate in
equation [8.1] , when firms which do no product patenting
are left out of the sample. This small amount of
downward bias lends support to the conclusion that the
relationship between product patenting and sales for the
largest UK firms is not significantly different from a
proportional one. This conclusion is not general
however, in that it would not necessarily apply if a wider
range of firms in terms of size had been included in the
study.
While on the subject of the sales variable, it
should be noted that the 1971 sales values used in
equations [8.1] and [8.2] provide a four year lag of
patenting activity on sales, with sales representing the
demand variable. This lag is consistent, it was pointed
out in chapter 7, with the information available on the
length of R & D projects and the length of time it takes
to process patent applications. A number of other sales
years, 1972', 1973 and 1974 , were entered into the
equivalent of equation [8.1] to test for the appropriate
lag. As sales years were entered which were progressively
closer to the patent year (1975) , the coefficients for
logsales declined with lower significance levels. Appendix
8.3 contains results for the 1972 sales year for example.
The superior performance of the 1971 sales year over
the others may have as much to do with the construction of
the /
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the patent base as with the correct specification of the
lag. As explained in section 7.1, the lag of patenting
on sales was changed by changing the sales year rather
than the patent year. Therefore, while the patent numbers
reflect the firms'ownership structure (in terms of
subsidiaries) in 1971, the sales variable may reflect a changing
ownership structure over time. The superiority of the four
year lag is therefore accepted with caution.
When all of the sales years were entered into the
regression equations simultaneously, a good deal of multi-
colinearity became evident in high standard errors for the
regression parameters."'" The coefficients of the
individual sales years also demonstrated rather wild
overestimation and then underestimation in successive
years. The failure of the explanatory power of the
regression to increase when all sales were entered together
suggested that attempts to establish a distributed lag would
not prove productive.
QSE having established demand or sales as an important
and significant variable with respect to inventive activity,
the supply side of the knowledge production decision can
now /
1.
The successive sales values for the 180 firms are
highly correlated. The logsale 1971 variable and
the logsale 1972 variable have a correlation
coefficient of .99. Correlation coefficients
between log 1971 sales and log 1973 sales and
log 1971 sales and log 1974 sales are .88 and .97
respectively.
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now be discussed. The proxy used for technological
opportunity, the density of qualified scientists and
engineers in the industry in which the firm's major
product is classified, is significant in its logarithmic
form in both equations [8.1] and [8.2]. It should be
noted that the log QSE variable was entered into the
regression equations using both a narrow (3 digit SIC)
industry and much wider industry (industrial order)
definition."^* The wider industry definition gave
slightly better results and it is these results which are
reported in the equations shown. This wider industry
definition also fits the concept of technological
opportunity better in that a science base such as chemistry
overlaps a number of different chemical industries.
The coefficient for the logQSE variable suggests that
an increase in the density of QSEs in the firm's general
industry category has a somewhat less than proportional
effect on its patenting activity. Not too much importance
should be placed on this effect however, since QSE density
only broadly represents the concept of an exogenous science
base.
The regression results for product patenting do show
that both demand factors and supply or technological
opportunity factors are important in determining patenting
activity. This conclusion is consistent with that
resulting /
1. As previously noted the QSE density data by industrial
order is provided in appendix 7.3. As shown in the
appendix, a few of the orders are broken down to capture
those industries which are particularly high in
technological opportunities, such as electronics.
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resulting from the UK industry level study of Stoneman
(1979), w/here the concern was with total patenting
intensity.
It should be pointed out that the technological
opportunity variable is diminished in terms of size of
coefficient and significance when chemical firms are
excluded from the regression equation. If equation [8.1]
is repeated without including chemical firms the following
regression results:
Constant LogSales LogQSE Stxclass Loggrowth LogConc
[8.3]
Log Product
Patent = -6.84 .745 .633 .770 .281 -.346
no, (6.09) (2.98) (2.73) (1.39) (1.67)n — x z b
adj r2 = .346
The explanation lies in the combined high QSE levels and high
product patenting activity of these firms, as shown in table 8.1b.
At the same time, [8.3] shows that the stxclass variable
grows in influence when the chemical firms are excluded from
the sample. This relationship is further explored in the
discussion related to the industry type dummy variable.
As discussed previously, the notion of technological
opportunity is a difficult concept to deal with empirically.
For this reason a number of slightly different proxies were
tried in the estimating equations. The original concept
of technological opportunity, may be better represented by
using /
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using only qualified scientists in the calculation of
the industry density figure?" On the other hand, if
technology is subject to 'laws of its own', the density
of qualified engineers may more accurately reflect industrial
opportunities.
Regression results show the density of engineers alone
to have a stronger influence on product patenting activity
than scientists and a stronger influence than the QSE
variable as a whole. This might be expected due to the
nature of patenting activity. It should be emphasised
again that patent data is a better measure of 'run of the
mill' advances as opposed to the far reaching kind which
may be associated with a scientific breakthrough. The
estimates merely show therefore that a strong engineering
and technological base enhances the kinds of continuing
small advances reflected in the patent data.
When entered into the regression equation however,
the density of engineers alone is quite strongly correlated
with the industrial type dummy or stxclass, with a
correlation coefficient of .59. The industrial class
dummy in fact becomes weak and loses its significance.
The high correlation between the two variable? stxclass and
the density of engineers, is predictable since firms in the
durable goods industrial class have a strong engineering
base /
1. This assumes that only those qualifying with a science
degree reflect a scientific discipline. In fact
chemical and electronic engineers might also reflect
the science base of an industry.
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base. Results from these experiments concerning the
technological opportunity variable are reported in appendix
8.3. The results also show that the density of scientists
when entered on its own as the technological opportunity
variable is less influential than the QSE variable including
both scientists and engineers. Since the experiments
offer no superior measure of technological opportunity,
the original variable is retained.
A more positive step is taken in changing the technological
opportunity variable to better reflect firms' diversified
product line. A case in point is Unilever, whose major
sales place it in the food industry, where technological
opportunities are relatively low. However, a considerable
portion of Unilever's sales are in detergents, which is a
subcategory of the chemical industry and which has
substantially richer opportunities. A breakdown of Unilever's
patents by product show the largest category to be in
detergents.1
1.
Unilever's industrial classification is based on a
breakdown of its 1972 sales available from the
Extel cards. A breakdown of both patents and sales
by the firm shows the following distribution:
Sales Patent Total
Margarine & other fats 29.5 3.5







A much better account of a firm's technological
opportunity could be attained by taking a weighted average
/
of the richness of its opportunities in all of its product
lines. A cruder and less ambitious test pursued here is
to consider only the opportunities available to the
firm in that industry in which it is significantly involved,
in which the density of scientists and engineers is greatest.
Significant involvement in an industry was arbitrarily set
at fifteen percent of its sales. The regression equation
[8.1] was repeated using the firm's highest 'opportunity'
industry (QSE-high) in place of the QSE for the firm's
major industry. Equation [8.4] below presents the
results of this regression
Log
Constant LogSales High-QSE Stxclass LogGrowth LogConc
[8.4]
Log Product
Patent = -7.34 .770*** .902*** .530*** .198 * -.392*
n=145 (7.78) (7.71) (2.93) (1.30) (2.11)
adj r^ = .457
Equation [8.4] shows that the substitution of the firm's
highest opportunity QSE industry raises the explanatory power
of the product patenting equation. In addition the new
QSE variable has a higher coefficient and a higher level of
significance than the QSE variable associated with equation
[8.1]. At the same time the coefficient of the sales
variable is slightly reduced. Overall the result points to a
stronger role for the supply side variable of technological
opportunity when more products other than the firm's major
product are accounted for. The result should be viewed
with caution however, in that the procedure used to
accommodate /
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accommodate diversification was a crude one based on only
one of the firm's products other than its major product.
It is also likely that the influence of other variables
such as industrial growth would be strengthened by
considering growth rates in industries outside of that
of the firm's major product. The task of improving the
representation of all of the industry variables by a
weighting process was considered to be too great for the
purposes of this study. The influence of diversification
into high opportunity fields on the part of a firm
however is shown to be worthy of further study.
Stxclass The stxclass dummy variable in this study
represents the degree to which competition is based on
price or product technology. Recalling the theoretical
model in chapter 6, the variable is a proxy for the
price and/or product quality elasticity of demand faced
by the firm. In equations [8.1]thru [8.4] the stxclass
dummy is given a value of one for those firms in the
consumer durables and capital goods industries and a
value of zero for firms in other industries. The dummy
variables in the logarithmic equations shown have the
effect of altering the intercept of the regressions. The
variable is positive, as predicted and significant at the
1 percent level in all four equations presented, [8.1]
thru [8.4]. This suggests that the type of industry
or the type of competition in an industry has a systematic
role in determining the extent to which a firm changes
the technical characteristics of its products.
The insertion of a dummy variable into equations
C8.1] through [8.4] which are in the logarithmic form,
has /
has the effect of an added intercept term. In the case
of equation [8.1] , for example, the effect is to raise
the log of product patenting by .55 for those firms in
the capital goods and consumer durables industries.
In terms of absolute patent numbers the effect is
stronger at larger logarithmic values than smaller."1'
The significance of both technological opportunity
variables(QSE) and the industrial class dummy (Stxclass)
in the product patenting equations point to the dichotomy
in the firm's technological environment identified by
Comanor (1967), Wilson (1977) and Schrieves (1978)
(see section 5.2). These are: the richness of
opportunity arising from the exogenous advances in science
and technological product rivalry arising from the ease
with which the physical characteristics of products can
be changed. While the two influences are related, with
the logQSE and Stxclass variable having a correlation
coefficient of .25 for the 180 firms, the relationship
is not strong enough to ignore the separate influences.
This is important as a number of economists have used
industry duinmy variables to represent technological
opportunity (for example, see Scherer 1982 ).
1.
This is the equivalent to a scalar effect in the
multiplicative form of the theoretical model.
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The support for the dichotomy in the firm's
technological environment must be modified however,
when again the regression results are considered
without the chemical firms included. Comparing
equations [8.1] and [8.2] with [8.3] which excludes
the chemical firms, it can be seen that the coefficient
for stxclass increases when the chemical firms are
removed. This is logical since these firms are
both in the nondurable stxclass (dummy = 0) and are
highly active in product patenting. Corresponding,
as previously mentioned, the QSE coefficient is lower
in [8.3] without the chemical firms, than in the
other two equations. It is also important to note
that the correlation coefficient for logQSE and the
stxclass variable goes up to .63 when the chemical
firms are excluded from the regression.
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Industrial Growth. The theoretical model of product
patenting activity discussed in chapters 6 and 7 suggests that
the firm's inventive activity should be proportional to
the overall rate of growth in its industry. Since most
firms operate in more than one industry, the three digit
industry in which the firm's major product lies was used in
the calculation of the rate of growth of industry sales.
The growth rate was calculated over the years 1968-1972.
The regression resulis in [8.1] and [8.2] indicate
that industrial growth has a modest, far less than pro¬
portional effect, on product patenting activity. The
coefficients for the industrial growth variable are
significant in the equations shown at the ten
percent level. The results imply that while overall
growth provides a moderate stimulus to product invention,
current levels of demand, represented by the sales variable
have a much greater influence. This conclusion was
also reached by Scherer (1982) in his study of patenting
activity at the US industry level. The information in
table 8.2 supports this conclusion. Industries with
above average growth rates, for example building materials,
are not necessarily active generators of product patents,
although they can be as in chemicals.
Industry Concentration. The final variable, and one
of the most problematic, to be discussed in relation to
the product patenting equations is the concentration
variable/
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variable. From the theoretical consideration of the
variable in previous chapters, it may be recalled that the
structure of a market can have opposing influences on the
incentive and innovative effort by a firm. On one hand
market power can mean a greater degree of appropriability
for the firm's inventions, while on the other hand, a lack
of rivalry can render the firm complacent.
The results in equations [8.1] and [8.2] show the
concentration variable to be significant and to be exerting
a moderately negative influence on product patenting
activity. The negative sign for the concentration variable
suggests that the lack of stimulus from competitors
overrides any increased appropriability of invention due to
increased market power. It must be noted, however, that
the patent application process itself, rather than inven¬
tion, might also be affected by industrial concentration.
It is plausible that firms in heavily concentrated industries
feel less pressure to protect their inventions from rivals
by taking out patents.
In the only other U.K. study to test the influence
of concentration on inventive activity, Waterson and Lopez
(1983) conclude that R&D intensity is at least not positively
related with concentration. It is also useful, however,
to compare the results of this study concerning the
concentration variable with those from U.S. studies,
where most of the work has been done. A number of U.S.
economists, particularly Comanor (1967) and Shrieves (1978),
have suggested that there may be a more complex relationship
between inventive activity and concentration. They
identified/
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identified a strong positive relationship between concen-
1
tration and technological factors (see section 5..4)
which concealed the true relationship between concentration
and inventive effort. They found that if technological
factors were not accounted for, the positive, but weak,
influence of concentration on research is overstated.
In this study when two technological factors are
accounted for, the concentration variable has a negative
influence on patenting activity. However, unlike the
US studies, here among the top 180 manufacturing firms,
there is no strong positive association between concentra¬
tion and technological opportunity (QSE). In fact, the
two variables have only a slight positive association,
with a correlation coefficient of .15. The only other
independent variable with which industrial concentration
is moderately correlated is firm size, the two having a
correlation coefficient of .37.
The discussion above suggests that more empirical
work needs to be done in the U.K. on the relationship
between inventive activity and concentration. The
relationship might be further explored by using measures
of concentration other than the proportion of output
produced by the five largest domestic firms in the firm's
major industry. For example, a measure adjusted to
allow for foreign trade could be used since imports are
an important source of competition in U.K. markets. The
literature on the subject of concentration ratios (for
example, see Curry and George, 1983)suggests that indices which
accurately/
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accurately reflect the foreign sector are not very easy
to construct, given current data availability. Pursuit
of this topic therefore is left for further study.
8.4. Regression Results for Process Patenting Activity
It should be stated firstly that the OLS regression
results for process patenting activity are more difficult
to interpret than those for product patenting. This is
due to the fact many more of the 180 firms, just over
half in .fact, have zero values for the dependent variable
or zero process patents. It should also be recalled
that the average number of process patents among the 180
firms is 3.5 compared to 22.3 average product patents.
The median value for firms with positive process patents is
only two. Here the statement in the Hall, Griliches and
Hausman (1984) paper, that patent counts tend to be
imprecise for small values must be considered. The
situation also presents a problem in the assignment of
a small value to the 'zero value' firms, as was done in
the case of product patents. One patent is not a
particularly small number as far as process patenting is
concerned. For this reason the arbitrary value of .5
is assigned to the zero value firms to obtain some basis
of comparison.
The OLS regression results for process patenting,




shown in [8.5] and [8.6] below. Equation [8.5] results
when only the 89 firms with positive process patenting
activity are used in the regression. Equation £8.6]
results when all 180 firms are used, with those firms
having zero values for process patents being assigned an
2
arbitrary value of .5 process patents.
While the estimated coefficients in [8.5] and [8.6]
above are similar on the whole, there are some notable
changes in individual coefficients particularly for
stxclass and concentration. This is somewhat expected
given the large number of firms excluded from [8.5].
As noted previously, this makes the of interpreting
the influence of the dependent variables on process
patenting somewhat more difficult. The explanatory
value of the estimated regression, does increase slightly
as with product patenting, when all 180 firms are included
in the test.
Sales. As with product patenting the sales variable
is shown to be highly significant in both the process
patenting equations [8.5] and [8.6]. Unlike product
patenting,'however, the logsales coefficients shown are
both/
1 Again, as with product patenting, only those patents which
could be 'identified' as process patents were included in
the dependent variable. Regressions which were undertaken
with 'unidentified' patents attributed to the process
category in the same proportion asidentified patents are
shown in appendix 8.4. The inclusion of unidentified
patents makes little difference to the regression results.
Regression results with foreign subsidiaries excluded are
also provided in the same appendix. These results are
similar to [8.5].
2
When a value of one patent is assigned to the 'zero value'
firms and the regression re-estimated, the logsales coeffi¬
























































both significantly less than one at the .05 level when
1
one-sided confidence intervals are calculated. This
implies some diseconomies of firm size with respect to
process patenting activity. This conclusion, however,
must be questioned, given the fact that downward bias
in the logsales coefficient due to the exclusion of 'zero
value' firms cannot be precisely measured. In fact,
if an arbitrary value of .1 process patent is assigned to
the zero value firms and equation [8.6] is re-estimated,
the logsales coefficient increases to 1.19. Again any
clues to the extent of bias in the process patent
estimates must be further explored.
As with product patenting, one clue to potential bias
in the logsales estimate is the pattern of residuals
when firms with zero patent values are excluded from the
regression. A plot of standardised residuals about the
mean from equation [8.5] shows no clear pattern
emerging. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic for this
equation is 1.48 meaning that the hypothesis of no positive
correlation between logsales and the residual cannot
2 ...
be accepted. While the D-W statistic is not a strong
test for a bias, it points to the difficulty when over
half of the cases are excluded from the regression.
If /
_
One-sided confidence intervals for logsales are calculated
as follows:
[8.5] .755 + t 05(std error) = .755 + (1.66) (.1 06) = . 93
[8.6] .834 + (1 .65) ( .081) = .968
2 The lower limit of the D-W statistic is 1.54 for n = 89
and 5 regressors at the .05 level.
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If table 8.2 is re-examined, it can be seen that
nineteen out of the twenty smallest firms in the study had
no process patents. Of the second smallest twenty firms,
sixteen had no process patents. This in itself poses a
case for a downward bias in the logsales estimate. Due
to the large number of firms with zero values in the case
of process patenting activity, the analysis by individual
firms, done for product patenting activity, proves
cumbersome. Some information is gained, however, by
attempting to fit the process patenting data to
1
alternative functional forms.
Results from the nonlinear regression for process
patenting show increasing returns to firm size up to the
23rd largest firm in the study and then decreasing
returns. This result is similar to the nonlinear result
for product patenting. It should be noted that when only
the 89 firms with positive patent values are included in
the nonlinear regressions, decreasing returns over the
2
entire size range of firms are obtained. This is an
indicating that the inclusion of zero value firms has the
effect of moving the relationship between process patenting
and sales closer to proportionality. Again, however,
the low significance level of the sales variables in the
3
nonlinear form prevent us from making a strong case.
1
A regression equation fitting the strictly linear form
to the process patent data is presented in appendix
8.4.
2
The nonlinear regression equation, shown in full in
appendix 8.4 has a positive sales2 term, but a negative
cubic term for sales. When only the 89 firms with
positive process patenting are included in the regression
the sales2 term becomes negative and the cubic term drops out.
3 The explanatory power of the nonlinear equation (.353) is
almost as great as that in [8.5] making it a viable
alternative in this respect.
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Given the information compiled, it cannot be stated
that equation [8.5] which indicates decreasing returns
to firm size, with respect to process patenting activity,
is unbiased. There is some information to indicate that
the logsales estimate may be biased in a downward
direction. On the other hand, the case for a proportional
relationship between process patenting and sales is not
particularly strong and there is no indication of
increasing returns to firm size. While these conclusions
are unsatisfying, they are not unexpected, given the large
number of firms which do no process patenting at all and
the difficulty of using these cases in a multiplicative
functional form.
While on the subject of the sales variable, it should
be noted that the 1971 sales value fits the regression
equation as well as, or better than, the other sales years
1
tried . Given that there is some theoretical support
for the four year lag implied by the 1971 sales year, it
is retained. It should, however, be recalled that the
performance of the sales variable in this year depends
to some extent on the manner in which the patent data
was compiled.
1
Regression results using the 1972 sales year
are presented in appendix 8.4.
- 3 2^ -
QSE. A noticeable distinction between the process
patenting results, [8.5], and the product patenting
results, [8.1], is the diminished importance for technolo¬
gical opportunity (logQSE) in process patenting. The
size of the logQSE coefficient is much lower for process
patenting and of reduced significance."'" This is not so
surprising considering the discussion of the variable in
chapters four and five (sections 4.2 and 5.2 respectively).
Most economists have related this supply-side variable to
the opportunities available for changing the characteristics
of products. Given the proxy used in this study for
technological opportunity, the density of scientists and
engineers in the firm's general industrial class (SIC
orders), there are reasons for it to be more related to
opportunities for changing products than processes. If
a product is sold on the basis of its technological
characteristics, scientists and engineers may not only
have to be employed in the R&D and production units of the
firm but also in marketing and sales. This is not true
of the standardised product, where there may be technolo¬
gical opportunities for cost reduction.
As an additional test of the influence of technological
opportunity on process patenting, an alternative proxy was
used in place of the QSE measure. This was the output
per operative employee in the firirt^ major three digit
industry. As explained in section 7.2, the prediction
is that this variable will benegatively related to
process/
1. The size of the coefficient is not altered very much
when only scientists or only engineers are used in
the density calculation (see appendix 8.4)
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process patenting. This is because in highly capital
intensive industries with high productivity levels, one would
expect the opportunities for process improvement to be near
exhaustion, unless completely new technologies are
introduced.
The regression results for process patenting with
output per operative (Qperop) as the technological opportun-
1
ity proxy are reported below :
The results show the output per operative variable
to be negatively related to firm process patenting activity
as predicted. The variable, however, may be less
representative of technological opportunities available
for process invention, than the costs associated with
applying these inventions in actual production. As
Bessant, Braun and Mosely (1980) point out in their
article on the impact of microelectronics on different
industries, high capital intensity combined with long
life plants can be a factor retarding the introduction
of microelectronics. It should be noted that Waterson
and Lopez (1983), in their U.K. industry study find
capital intensity to be positively related to research
intensity.
Stxclass. The dummy variable, stxclass, is used
in [8.5] to represent the nature of market competition
faced by the firm. The variable was given a value of
one for firms in industries competing on the basis of
price/
It should be noted that the output per operative variable
was also tried as an alternative in the product patenting
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price - material inputs, nondurable consumer goods and
chemicals. For other firms the variable was given a value
of zero. Strictly adhering to the theory developed,
the coefficient for stxclass in [8.5] has the wrong sign.
It was expected that firms in the more price conscious
industries would be more inclined to invent new and
improved processes. This hypothesis, however, may be
too simplistic. If a firm changes its product character¬
istics, this may require it to adopt new processes as
well. The negative and significant coefficient for
stxclass, which is moderately influential implies that this
is the case. It should be noted that the stxclass
coefficient loses its significance and substantial
influence when all firms are included in the regression
equation in [8.6]. As noted previously, the exclusion
of over half of the firms in the study in equation [8.5]
makes the interpretation of results difficult.
Industrial Growth. There is no indication from
the regression equations shown that general industrial
growth has a strong influence cn process patenting activity.
Here, as with product patenting, it can be said that
current levels of demand, as represented by sales, have
a much stronger influence. However, like the stxclass
variable, the coefficient for industrial growth changes
when firms with zero process patents are included in the
regression in [8.6]. The coefficient becomes somewhat
higher but with a lower level of significance.




Industry Concentration. The regression results in
equation [8.5] show industrial concentration to have the
same moderately negative influence on process patenting
activity as product patenting. Again, the lack of
stimulus from competitors seems to override increased
appropriability in influencing the firm's inventive
decision making. As with product patenting, the result
must be qualified considering the complex relationship
between invention and the propensity to patent and
industrial concentration. An additional doubt concerning
the significance of industrial concentration on process
patenting is raised when the variable loses
influence in [8.6] when zero value firms are included
in the tests.
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8.5 Regression Results for Total Patenting
The procedure followed here will be, as in the two
previous sections, to first report the regression results,
in this case for total patenting activity. However,
because total patenting activity is composed of product
and process patenting activity, a good deal of the analysis
of the regression equations is the same as that in sections
8.3 and 8.4. Rather than repeat the analysis, the
procedure will be to discuss the similarities and differences
between the total patenting results and those of product
and process patenting. Because product patenting dominates
the total patenting activity of the firms in the study, the
OLS regression results for total patenting activity are
similar to those for product patenting.
Equation [8.8] below provides estimates of the
regression of total patenting when only those 152 firms
1
with positive patenting activity are included in the tests.
Equation [8.9] results when all 180 firms are used, with
those firms having zero patents again being assigned a
value of one,, as in the case of product patenting.
|.g gj Constant Logsales LogQSE Stxclass Loggrowth LogCone
Log Total = -7.96 .872 .744 .536 .337 -.217
pci4-pj-|+" kkk k k k kkk kk k
(8.67) (6.22) (2.91) (1.67) (1.64)
n=152,
adj r = .436
[8.9]
Log Total = -9.09 .944 .780 .620 .267 -.351
Dn)-0nt- *** *** *** * ***aze z
(9.30) (6.17) (3.30) (1.61) (1.86)
n=i80„
adj r = .421
As /
Results when foreign subsidiaries are excluded from the
regression are presented in appendix 8.5.
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As in the previous two sections, the regression
result when only firms with positive patenting numbers
are tested, is similar to that when all 180 firms are
used. However unlike this comparison for product and
process patenting, the explanatory value of the equation
is slightly higher when firms with zero patenting activity
are left out of the equation. It should be recalled
here that 28 firms are left out of equation[8.8 Awhile
35 and 91 firms had zero values for product and process
patenting respectively.
Sales As with product and process patenting, the
value of the logsales coefficient increases when 'zero
value' firms are included in regression equation [8.9]
by assigning them a value of one. This suggests that
there may be some downward bias in the estimated
logsales coefficient. The distribution of 28 firms with
no patenting activity closely resembles that presented
in table 8.3 for firms with no product patents.
When a nonlinear functional form is fitted to the
total patent data for the 180 firms, the results show
increasing returns to scale up to the 16th largest firm,
after which returns decrease."*" Increasing returns
are thus present over a wider range of firms than in
either the product or process patenting equations.
This is consistent with the higher logsales coefficient
in the total patenting equation. When only those firms
which have positive patent values are included in the
nonlinear /
1. Nonlinear regression results for total patenting
are presented in appendix 8.5.
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nonlinear tests, increasing returns are observed only up
' 1
to the 32nd largest firm. While the nonlinear results tend
to support the presence of some downward bias in the
logsales coefficient in equation [8.8], due to multi-
colinearity among the sales variables and therefore low
significance levels, the nonlinear tests must be
interpreted with caution.
The coefficient of the sales variable in equation
[8.8] for total patenting is higher than its counterparts
for either product or process patenting in [8.1] and [8.5]
respectively. This may merely reflect the fact that
fewer of the 180 firms are excluded from the regression
test. While the logsales coefficient in equation [8.8]
is less than one, the coefficient is not as low as those
2
of similar studies (see section 5.3). In fact, using
a one-sided confidence interval at the .95 percent level,
it cannot be stated that the logsales coefficient is
significantly /
1. This situation is in contrast to product and
process patenting where there were decreasing
returns throughout the range of firms when
firms with zero patent values were excluded
from the nonlinear tests.
2. While not strictly comparable, Shrieves (1978)
found a logsales parameter of .604 in his US
study of R & D among 411 firms. He included
however only firms which performed R&D.
Stoneman's parameter has a high value of .731
in his regression on UK patenting activity but
this is at the industry level.
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significantly less than one."'" The results imply that
at least among the largest 180 manufacturing firms in the
UK, there is no strong tendency toward diseconomies of
scale in patenting activity. Again, it should be
emphasised that the reference is to the effect of overall
firm size on inventive activity. It implies nothing
about the returns to scale in the R&D facility itself.
The absence of significant diseconomies of scale
in the regression results is surprising in a number of
respects. As previously mentioned this result is
contrary to the consensus derived from the findings of
other empirical studies. Soete (1979) argues that this
consensus results from studies using patent data and
R&D employment data which overestimate the inventive
activity of small firms. However, in this study patent
data is used but no significant diseconomies emerge.
Another possibility, as Soete (1979) suggests, is that
the 1950's and 60's data on which the consensus has
been based is obsolete. While the 1970's data used
in the thesis is not claimed as current, it may reflect
changes in firm size and inventive activity which have
taken place since the 1960's.
Other /
1. The one-sided confidence interval of logsales
in [8.8] gives an upper limit as follows:
.837 + t Q5(std. error)
.837 + 1.66 (.1090) = 1.02
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Other Variables The influence and significance
levels of other independent variables in the total
patenting equation generally reflect those attained for
product patenting. This is due to the dominance of
product patenting in total patenting activity. The
importance of both demand (sales and growth variables)
and supply factors, in the form of technological
opportunity (QSE) are evident in the regression shown
in [8.8] The industrial growth variable has somewhat
greater influence and the industrial concentration variable
somewhat less influence in total patenting activity as
compared to product patenting activity.
Both the technological opportunity variable and
the stxclass variable are important and significant in
equation [8.8]. This implies a dichotomy in the
firm's technological environment, that was previously
discussed in relationship to product patenting (see
section8.3). However, just as with product patenting,
the role of the chemical firms is an important one in
terms of the influence of the two variables. When the
chemical firms are excluded from the test, the size of the
logQSE coefficient and stxclass coefficient are reversed.
This result is presented in appendix 8.5.
It should be noted that the explanatory power of the
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total patenting equation is slightly higher than that
1
of either the product of process patenting regressions.
This is expected, as in the case of total patents,
at least no errors result from classifying product or
process patents to the wrong category. However, even in
the total patenting regression, [8.8],the explained
variation in patenting activity remains below 50 percent.
In the next section, reasons for the rather poor
explanatory power of the regression equations are
explored.
8.6 The Explanatory Power of the Regression Equations
There are a number of reasons for the rather low
explanatory power of the regression equations. Some
are associated with the type of study undertaken. In
a cross-sectional, firm-level study of this type, many
contributing influences remain unaccounted for. A
number of these are associated with the characteristics
of the firms themselves. For example, it has often
been suggested that the median age of the firm's
managerial-'staff may have a significant influence on
the firm's dedication to research and development
activities. Even given equivalent R&D expenditure
or inventive activity, firms may have differing patent
policies, /
1. When the firm's highest QSE industry is substituted
for its major QSE industry in regression [8.8],
the explanatory value of the regression increases
to .496. This attempt at accounting for the
diversity of a firm's products was also tried on the
product patenting regression and is explained in
section 8.3.
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policies, based on their industry and their position
1
in that industry, legal advice or tradition.
It is also a fact that firms receive varying levels
of government support for their inventive and innovative
activities. As noted in table 2.4a in chapter two,
government funding for private industry R&D spending
is highly concentrated in a few firms in the U.K. The
R&D and patenting activity resulting from this
government funding may not be responsive to the market
forces represented in the model of inventive activity
developed in this thesis. Waterson and Lopez (1983),
in their UK study of R & D activity, were able to make
use of industry level data to segregate privately
financed R&D, which they were able to explain much
better than total industry R&D. Unfortunately there
is no available data on government funding of R & D at
the individual firm level. As previously noted, no
data source on total R&D spending by firms is
available.
Further reasons for the low explanatory power of
the regressions stem from the unavoidable use of proxies
to represent the original variables in the theoretical
model. For example, the stxclass dummy used, broadly
represented the price or product quality elasticity of
demand faced by the inventive firm. As discussed
previously, the technological opportunity variable was
also difficult to represent in the empirical work.
Of course the most significant proxy was that used to
represent /
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represent inventive activity itself or the number of
patents accepted by the patent office from a firm.
The potential errors associated with the patent measure,
especially when product and process inventions are
distinguished, has been stressed throughout the thesis.
The functional form used to test the relationship
between patenting and the independent variables, might
also be responsible for the rather poor fit of the
regression equations. While the empirical model was
developed directly from the theoretical model of
inventive activity, it was seen that the multiplicative
or log linear form was not completely suited to the
patent data which involves zero values for some cases.
While alternative functional forms were tested, none of
these were found to be any more satisfactory than the
logarithmic form.
Of course questions also exist concerning the
theoretical model itself. The profit-maximising hypothesis
with respect to inventive activity may not be valid.
In reality many firms may engage in defensive patenting
activity strictly to protect their current profit
levels or market shares. On the other hand, in some
industries, technological change may be essential to
the firm's desire for growth. Also, the representation
of the inventive decision process in the study was
oversimplified, in that inventive decisions were
separated from other decisions made by the firm. In




may be interlinked with inventive decisions. Therefore,
while the model used was not unsuccessful in identifying
important variables in the inventive decision-making
process, differing theoretical assumptions might have
provided models with more explanatory power.
8.7 Industry Breakdowns of Patenting Activity
Up to this point in the study, the concern has been
with the product and process patenting activity of the
largest manufacturing firms in the UK, taken as a whole.
It is useful however, to break the firms into their
respective industry groups and test the regression
equation. This has advantages both for the analysis
as a whole and as a useful comparison with other studies
which have been undertaken both in the U.S. and the U.K.
In order to minimise the number of firms excluded
due to the presence of zero values in the dependent
variable, only the regression of total patenting activity
was undertaken on the industry groups. Even in the
case of total patenting activity, the groups of
building materials and chemicals both have a low number
of cases. In the industry tests, the broad industrial
class variable (stxclass) drops out of the test as all
firms in a group have the same value.
Table 8.7 presents regression results when the
total patenting regression is re-run by industry groups.
The groups are those which have been used to define the















































































































































































nondurables. The durables group is broken down into
its capital and consumer durable components, while
nondurables are divided into consumer nondurables and
building products. The chemical firms are not
included in nondurables here, but are tested separately.
Table 8.7 shows that in the consumer durable,
chemical and building materials industries, a logsales
coefficient greater than one is estimated. Due to the
small number of cases tested however, and the rather
large standard error for the coefficients, it cannot be
stated that the coefficients significantly exceed unity
in any of the industries mentioned.^" The chemical and
consumer durables industries however, don't suffer from
having a large number of cases excluded from the tests
due to the problem of 'zero values'. There are only
two firms in this category in consumer durables and one
in chemicals. In building materials four firms are
in this category. The results for building materials
don't follow the general pattern (for example the QSE
coefficient is negative) and it must be questioned whether
they /
1. For example, if a one sided confidence interval
is constructed for the coefficient of logsales
in table 8.7, equation 3, the following results:
6 7 1.24 - t<05(23 d>r)(std error 6)
3 7 1.24 - (1.71) (.183)
3 7 .93
It can only be stated that-/? is significantly greater
than .93
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they are meaningful considering the small number of
cases.
The logsales coefficient for chemical firms in
table 8.7 lends mild support to the results of other
studies which show increasing returns to inventive
activity in this industry (see section 5.3). In
particular in the only other UK test of patenting
activity in chemicals, that of Smyth, Samuels and
Tzoannos (1972), this was also the finding. While neither
significantly increasing returns for chemicals nor
significantly decreasing returns for other industries can be
claimed here, the logsales coefficient is above one, and
above that for industries generally.
In section 8.1, it was pointed out that consumer
durable firms have on average the highest level of
patenting activity of all firms in the study. In
addition table 8.7 implies that within this industrial
category, there are at least no diseconomies of scale
as far as inventive activity is concerned. Unfortunately
there are no other studies with which to compare this
particular result. However, the pattern emerging in
this study for consumer durables is interesting, given the
previous labelling of the motor vehicles industry, which
dominates the group as non - patent conscious' (see
section 8.1).
Of the more narrowly defined industry groups, only
the capital goods industry has a logsales coefficient
substantially /
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substantially less than one.1 It is also noticeable
that, in this industry, the technological opportunity
variable (logQSE) has its most substantial influence.
This is not unexpected, in that the QSE values vary
quite markedly among the capital goods firms, depending
on whether they are mechanically, electrically or
electronically oriented. The regression result for
capital goods therefore is consistent with Schmookler's
statement (see chapter four, section 4.1), that
technological opportunities may differ with respect to
which product technologies are tapped to improve a
particular production technology.
In most of the industrial regressions shown in
table 8.7, sales is the most influential variable. The
other independent variables often are not significantly
different from zero. This is somewhat expected, in
that in these regressions, the firm's industrial variables
may be quite similar in value. For example, in the
chemical regression the QSE variable drops out altogether
as all firms are given the same industry-wide value.
It should be noted that the influence of concentration
is negative for most industries, except for chemicals,
1. Even in the case of capital goods the coefficient
cannot be said to be significantly different from
one, due to the rather high standard error. It
should be noted with respect to capital goods that
11 firms were excluded from the regression due to
zero values in the dependent variable.
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but it doesn't reach a high level of significance.
The coefficient for the concentration variable is
comparatively high and negative in consumer nondurables,
where generally concentration levels are above average
(see table 8.lb).
8.8 Summary of the Empirical Results
The empirical tests in the thesis point to a
number of important conclusions. Due to the limitations
of patent data however, particularly with respect to the
classification of product and process patents, these
conclusions must be regarded as tentative and viewed
with caution. A number of the more important empirical
findings are summarised below:
1. Both demand and supply factors are important in
explaining inventive activity of the largest
manufacturing firms in the U.K.
2. While overall industrial growth provides a
moderate stimulus to inventive activity,
current levels of demand, as represented by
the sales variable have a much greater influence.
3. The relationship between product patenting and
sales and total patenting and sales is not
significantly different from a proportional one.
The same relationship for process patenting is
difficult to evaluate due to the large number of
firms with no process patents.
4. /
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The technological factors, both opportunity
(QSE) and competition as measured by stxclass,
have a stronger and more predictable role in
the product patenting equation than in the
process patenting equation.
The technological dichotomy, pointed to by
economists in the U.S., is supported by the
findings. Both technological opportunity
on the supply side and technological competition
on the demand side have an important influence
on product patenting and total patenting
activity. The support must be qualified however
- the classification of the chemical firms have
an important influence da the result.
The negative influence of the concentration
ratio on inventive activity points to the need
for further empirical work in this area, using
U.K. data.
Amoqg the largest 180 manufacturing firms,
chemical and consumer durable firms are on
average the largest generators of patents.
Patents concerning new and improved products
dominate their patenting activity. Firms
in these two industrial categories, along with
capital goods have on average, the highest
patenting intensity or patents-to-sales ratio.
/
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8. The high logsales coefficient for the
chemical firms taken separately, lends some
support to the findings of other studies,
showing increasing returns to scale.
9. Technological opportunities are particularly
important in the capital goods industries,
which through their product inventions improve




The goal of this thesis has been to develop, and then
to test using UK patent data, models of firm decision¬
making with respect to inventive activity. A particular
interest of the study has been the distinction between
inventive activity with respect to improvements in the
firm's products as compared to improvements in the firm's
production processes. The two types of inventive decisions
have been separated in both the theoretical and empirical
sections of the study. In this final chapter, a critical
appraisal of this approach to analysing firm inventive
activity is offered. After this critique implications for
further study in the area, given the findings of the thesis,
are outlined.
9 .1 An Evaluation of the Methodology
Having reported the results of the empirical work
of the thesis in the previous chapter, it must be questioned
whether the approach used to investigate the inventive
activity of the largest manufacturing firms in the U.K.
was a useful and fruitful one. In particular, the
distinction made between process and product inventions
in the study and the use of patent data to measure these
distinct types of inventions must be evaluated. Questions
with respect to theoretical assumptions, measurement of
variables and selection of firms for the study, must also
be asked.
A distinctive feature of this thesis has been the
separate /
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separate treatment of the firm's decision to augment its
knowledge concerning its products and that concerning its
production process. The distinction is important
because the effects of the two types of inventions may
differ with respect to economic welfare. For example,
while new and improved products may enhance the quality
of consumption; a proliferation of incremental product
changes by a firm engaging in technological rivalry is
potentially wasteful. However, the importance of
product innovations in the capital goods industries and
their effect on productivity in purchasing industries must
also be emphasised.
The two types of inventions also may have different
effects on job creation or destruction. Process
inventions may save on labour and be job-destroying in
stagnant markets. On the other hand new and improved
products can be important net generators of jobs. In
fact the role of completely new industries in long-term
economic growth has recently been re-emphasised by a
number of economists. Given the differences referred
to, the decision-making process leading to the two
types of inventions should be a subject for analysis.
The firm's decisions to produce product and process
inventions were treated separately in both the
theoretical and empirical sectionsof this thesis. The
main distinctions in theoretical models of product and
process inventions were: (1) the effect of the invention -
cost /
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cost reduction or product enhancement; and (2) the
benefit to the firm of the invention - expressed in price
or product quality elasticity of demand. Unfortunately
both of these factors are very difficult to measure and
proxy variables were resorted to. The result was
empirical models of product and process patenting which
were very much the same.
The theoretical models were developed to identify
important variables in the inventive-decision making
process. In this respect former criticisms of ad hoc
empirical studies of invention and innovation with no
theoretical basis, were to be avoided. However, such
criticism cannot be avoided altogether, as the
theoretical models evolved with their future testing
in mind. More complete and realistic models of
invention might have been explored, but they would also
have been more difficult to test. For example, the
firm's decision to undertake R & D to enable it to reduce
its own costs might have been considered along with the
alternative, choice of purchasing improved, cost-reducing
capital goods. With respect to product patenting, the
influence of technological rivalry was only dealt with
indirectly in our model. Again, a more sophisticated
representation of rivalrous behaviour might have been
introduced, but again measurement posed a problem.
Therefore, while there is potential for greater
distinction in the theoretical models of product and
process patenting, testing such models on a relatively
large /
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large number of firms in different industries must be
seen as difficult.
A problem, already mentioned, with respect to product
and process inventions was evident from early in the
study. This was the role of the capital goods industry in
providing product inventions which would be used in the
production processes of other industries. The empirical
problem directly related to this is that most firms do
little process patenting themselves. The large number
of firms with zero process patents rendered the evaluation
of results with respect to this type of inventive activity
difficult.
In retrospect, given the results and the considerable
amount of time spent in the classification of product
and process patents along with the potential for error;
the usefulness of the approach must be questioned. While
a great advantage of patent data is its availability at
the individual firm level, the classification of patents
into product and process categories was somewhat ambitious
considering the number of individual patent specifications
involved. The inappropriateness of this method for one
type of study however, does not imply that it is not
useful for others, perhaps with a narrower industrial scope.
The decision to test the theoretical models of product
and process patenting activity on a large number of firms
across a wide range of manufacturing industries had
important consequences. The decision was based on a
desire to study those manufacturing firms in the U.K. generating
the /
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the largest numbers of inventions. Also, while such
studies had previously been undertaken using U.S. data,
there was no comparable work in the U.K. It was also
predicted, and correctly so, that differing industrial
environments would have an important influence on
the firm's inventive decisions. However, while a
number of important findings emerge from the study
(to be discussed in the next section), the number of
cases, to some extent, acted as a constraint on the
richness of detail which could be gathered concerning
each individual firm and its industrial characteristics.
A conclusion of the thesis is that the approach
distinguishing between a firm's decision to pursue product
as opposed to process inventions should not be abandoned.
However, the approach might be more successfully applied
within a narrower framework. Here, Schmookler's
original inter-industry approach is appealing. In terms of firms
in a final goods industry, both their own product and
process inventions and those of the industry supplying
them (e.g. capital goods industry) are important. The
inventive-decision making process for firms in both industries
must be seen as inter-linked.
Along the same line as above, it must be said that
the disadvantage of the cross-sectional approach used
in this thesis, is that it looks at variables such as
technological opportunity and the competitive
environment in a market at a single moment in time. There
may be more to be gained in future studies from considering
the /
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the effect of a changing industrial environment over time
on inventive activity. Again this suggests a more narrowly
based study than the one pursued, but allowing for inter¬
industry links with respect to inventive decision-making.
The ultimate constraint on all empirical studies of
inventive or innovative activity however, is the data
constraint. While data limitations are typical in most
empirical work in economics, the problem is exaggerated in
this subject area and particularly in the U.K. While
a conclusion of this thesis is that patent data are an
adequate measure of total firm inventive activity if
interpreted cautiously, the drawbacks of this data
base are considerable. A practical draw-back is the
time-consuming task of tabulating patent counts for
individual firms. As already mentioned, the extra
effort involved in separating a firm's product from its
process patents is not recommended for future studies
of this scale. The micro-character of patent data and
its potential should not be ignored however. For
example, it would be possible to obtain some index of
the diversification of a firm's inventive activity in
terms of its major products, through the use of patent
specifications.
The study of inventive and innovative activity
among U.K. firms would be greatly enhanced, if some
measure of research and development activity,at least
of the largest firms, were published regularly. The
existence of an available data base in the U.S. has
obviously /
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obviously influenced the large number of studies done at
the firm level in that country. While R&D figures
might, from the firm's point of view, be seen as
confidential information, from society's point of view,
they would aid in assessing the dynamic performance of
private industry. Economists should support efforts
to have the R&D activity of firms included in their
annual reports.
9.2 Findings and their Implications for Further Study
While the empirical results of the study are not
useful for predictive purposes, they do point to a number of
important factors which influence the inventive activity
of U.K. firms. A tentative finding of the thesis is
that among the largest U.K. manufacturing firms it is not
size, but concentration which presents the greatest hindrance
to inventive activity. While firms in the study generate
patents roughly in proportion to their size, the level
of industrial concentration has a moderately negative
influence on inventive activity as a whole. The pattern
described above is similar with respect to those inventions
which just enhance a firm's products. However, the
influence of the size and concentration variables is less
clear with respect to process patenting due to the
empirical problems mentioned. Overall the findings
suggest that a competitive environment is much more of a
spur to invention than any abnormal ability to appropriate
its rewards. This implies that any hesitation on the
part of the government to contain monopoly power for
technological /
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technological reasons may be misplaced. And while
firm size and the level of concentration in markets are
related, the study suggests that it is the size variable
related to the market as a whole which is important,
not size alone.
While these empirical findings must be viewed with
caution, considering the limitations of the data already
described; given the other scarce U.K. evidence available,
the role of market power in the inventive-decision making
process seems worthy of further study. An additional
point made in the analysis of the concentration variable,
was that the U.K. evidence was not consistent with that
using U.S. data. However, while differences between the
U.S. and the U.K. with respect to industrial concentration
have been explored, the effect of those differences on
technological change in industry has been ignored.
A number of directions should be pursued with respect
to the influence of concentration on invention which were
viewed as limitations in this study. These are: (1)-
the effect of international trade on the measure of
concentration and therefore on the firm's inventive
activity; (2) the dual causal relationship between
concentration and technological change in industry; and
(3) the dynamics of the relationship in (2) above as an
industry matures.
Another important empirical finding is that the
firm's inventive decision-making process is influenced
by supply-side factors or technological opportunities
along /
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along with demand factors. This finding is consistent
with those of other, similar studies. While technological
opportunity is important to the type of inventions which
dominate firm patenting activity-product patenting, the
role of the supply-side variable in process patenting
by the firm appears to be weaker.
In this study a proxy variable (QSE) considered to be
broadly representative of industrial technological
opportunities was used in the empirical work. While this
appears to have given adequate representation, further
efforts to empirically approximate this important variable
should be pursued. In particular some effort should be
devoted to determining whether technological opportunities
in industry are, as originally suggested, related to
basic scientific discoveries or whether technology tends
to build on itself. While this thesis made some attempts
in this direction, results were inconclusive in that they
appeared directly related to the measure of invention
used - the patent measure.
Another question which is raised ir> the thesis, but
not answered, with respect to technological opportunity,
is the extent of its exhaustion - if any - in an industry
over time. Again a dynamic treatment of the inventive-
decision making process could prove to be useful. It
should also be pointed out, that while technological
opportunity was considered an exogenous variable with
respect to the firm in this study, the variable is not
one which is completely exogenous to policy influence.
In /
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In an age when new discoveries in science have largely
been 'professionalized' adequate funding of basic
research
scientific - in government institutions and universities,
may be essential to technological changes in industry.
The influence of technological opportunity in the
individual industry regressions was particularly strong
in the capital goods sector. This sector is also
characterised by a higher than average number of
inventions in the product enhancement category. The
findings of the thesis are consistent with that view of
the capital goods sector exposed by Schmookler, who
emphasised the importance of differing opportunities in the
product technologies of goods used in the production
processes of other industries. The results with respect
to capital goods reinforces the need in future studies to
consider the inter-industry effects of the inventive process.
Another industry highlighted in the thesis was
consumer durable goods. It was found, contrary to other
evidence particularly with respect to automobiles, that
large U.K. firms in this industrial category have high
levels of both total patenting activity and patenting
intensity. According to the theoretical models
developed, a high level of product invention in this
industry would be consistent with the type of competition
faced - technological competition. And in fact the
empirical results suggest that this variable has a role




The dummy variable used to represent technological
competition in the empirical work in the thesis needs to
be replaced in future studies with a more precise
measure of rivalry based on product technology. The
relationship of this market variable with the supply-side
variable of technological opportunity also deserves
further exploration. While in much of the literature
a high rate of industrial inventive and innovative activity
is considered as a virtue, the possibility of overinvestment
in incremental product changes in rivalrous conditions
also deserves attention.
Finally the thesis points to the lack of comparable
empirical results with regard to other UK studies on the
firm's inventive decision-making process. Considering
the importance of technological change to private
industry and to the economy as a whole, this is surprising, even
after the data difficulties are accounted for. The
discussion in this last chapter suggests that both new
approaches to the analysis of the firm's inventive
decision-making process and new data needs to be put
forth. The subject area is one deserving of




















































































































































































































































Apparatus to cool thermoplastics
extrudate
Apparatus for printing textiles
Mixing Methods
Chemical process for purifying chorinated








Chemical process to purify diarylamines



















Apparatus for cutting cheese






















coatings to vehicle bodies
Welding carbaretter throttle levers
Unidentified 1384435
<C3)
Thermosettable powders - intermediate
material - difficult to determine






















Laminating multi-layer printed circuit
boards
Testing printed circuit boards -






























Machine tools attachments - not associated
with particular product or process
Testing sealing rings - difficult to























Etched patterns -making integrated
circuits
Flat cable - method of manufacture
Unidentified 1400120
(C?)
Electroless - deposition of copper-






















Making connectors for printed
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Fluid flow controls for respiratory
apparatus







Liquefaction of hydrogen - hydrogen
but also liquefying plant
Air separation for production of
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Density of QSEs in Employment by Industry, 1971
(Number of QSEs per 100 total employees)




Food, Drink and Tobacco .73 .51 .22
Chemicals and Allied 5.94 3.92 2.02
Metal Manufacture 1.58 .38 1.20
Mechanical Engineering 1.82 .21 1.61
Instrument Engineering 2.68 .92 1.76










Engineering 1.17 .08 1.09
Vehicles .90 .13 .77
Aerospace 4.27 .77 3.49
Metal Goods Not Elsewhere
Specified
.77 .15 .63
Textiles .71 .27 .44
Leather Goods and Fur .33 .21 .12
Clothing and Footwear .08 .04 .04
Bricks, Pottery, Glass,
Cement 1.17 .48 .69
Timber, Furniture .15 .03 .12
Paper, Printing, Publishing .56 .33 .23
Other Manufacturing Industry .99 .44 .55
Sources: Department of Industry, Persons with Qualifications in
Engineering, Technology and Science, Studies in Technological Manpower
No. 5 (London: HMSO, 1976) pp. 43-49, table 1.
Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics Yearbook 1971
(London: HMSO, 1973), pp. 132-139, table 57.
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CHEMICALS Drugs and Pharmacy
General Chemicals
OFFICE EQUIPMENT Office Equipment
Source: The STock Exchange Offical Year Book 1971
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Class Pat Patprod Patproc Unident
CND 48 30 17 1
CH 662 503 93 66
CND 143 111 25 7
CND 18 13 5 0
CD 65 39 23 3
KAP 261 239 12 10
CND 34 16 18 0
CD 149 119 19 11
CND 1 1 0 0
CD 114 83 25 6
KAP 77 52 24 1
CND 12 8 3 1
KAP 30 27 1 2
CND 9 5 3 1
KAP 48 27 21 0
CND 0 0 0 0
CND 8 7 1 0
CND 4 3 1 0
CND 1 0 1 0
KAP 47 36 8 3
CD 25 21 4 0
CND 4 2 2 0
CD 476 390 76 10
CND 8 2 6 0
CND 11 2 9 0
CD 553 499 42 12
CD 7 7 0 0
CD 149 133 11 5
CND 9 4 5 0
CND 4 3 1 0
KAP 24 22 2 0
CD 13 12 1 0
CH 60 52 0 8
MAT 0 0 0 0
CND 3 2 1 0
CND 1 1 0 0
KAP 42 40 1 1
CND 0 0 0 0
CH 3 3 0 0
CH 59 58 1 0
KAP 25 23 0 2
KAP 27 24 3 0
CH 57 56 1 0
KAP 5 3 2 0




Firm Class Pat Patprod Patprcc Unident
IBM UK CD 3 1 1 1
ENGLISH CALICO CND 6 3 3 0
CARRERAS CND 10 6 4 0
TARMAC MAT 0 0 0 0
CARRINGTON VIYELLA CND 1 0 1 0
ICL CD 32 21 11 0
S & N CND 0 0 0 0
MASSEY-FERGUSON KAP 23 23 0 0
DICKINSON ROBINSON CND 29 25 4 0
ROWNTREE MACINTOSH CND 0 0 0 0
TURNER & NEWALL MAT 22 18 4 0
ALBRIGHT & WIISON CH 46 43 3 0
PILKINGTON MAT 30 12 18 0
MARS CND 1 1 0 0
ASS ENGINEERING CD 25 25 0 0
STANDARD TELE KAP 118 104 11 3
JOHN BROWN KAP 23 22 0 1
SWAN HUISTTER KAP 2 2 0 0
UNITED BISCUITS CND 0 0 0 0
ALCAN KAP 18 3 15 0
SIMON ENG. KAP 49 48 0 1
J BIBBEY CND 0 0 0 0
CLARKE CHAPMAN KAP 20 12 8 0
WELLCCME CH 16 15 1 0
HEINZ CND 1 0 1 0
FISONS CH 61 50 7 4
BRITISH ROPES KAP 8 4 4 0
REYROLLE PARSONS KAP 29 27 2 0
GLYNWED KAP 1 1 0 0
NESTLE CND 0 0 0 0
SMITHS IND KAP 25 25 0 0
RARLEY MAT 7 5 2 0
G COHEN 600 KAP 0 0 0 0
BIRMID OUALCAST KAP 2 2 0 0
HOOVER CD 11 11 0 0
KODAK KAP 35 31 3 1
GOODYEAR CD 1 1 0 0
THCMAS WARD KAP 0 0 0 0
CHORIDE ELEC CD 19 14 5 0
GESTETNER KAP 5 5 0 0
RUBERY OWEN CD 6 5 1 0
MONSANTO CH 20 16 2 2
DAVY-ASHMORE KAP 21 21 0 0
MICHELIN CD 0 0 0 0
DUPORT KAP 10 8 2 0
C & J CLARK CND 3 0 3 0
WEIR GROUP KAP 3 3 0 0
PROCTOR & GAMBLE CH 11 9 2 0
BPB IND MAT 17 15 2 0
LAMSON CND 34 34 0 0
DECCA CD 12 7 5 0





Firm Class Pat Patprod Patproc Unider
redland mat 5 3 2 0
lead industries kap 5 5 0 0
ncr kap 0 0 0 0
bunzl cnd 6 5 1 0
smith & nephew ch 12 7 5 0
laird kap 7 6 1 0
hepworth mat 11 10 1 0
ever ready cd 10 10 0 0
stone-platt kap 39 38 1 0
cope allman kap 4 3 0 1
de-la rue cd 9 9 0 0
ass biscuit cnd 0 0 0 0
foster wheller kap 15 13 2 0
mckechnie kap 1 1 0 0
automotive products cd 52 50 2 0
caterpillar kap 0 0 0 0
westland air kap 12 12 0 0
ferranti kap 49 48 1 0
william press kap 6 6 0 0
renold kap 4 4 0 0
dcwty kap 23 23 0 0
honeywell kap 7 7 0 0
croda ch 3 3 0 0
btr kap 6 4 2 0
general motors cd 7 6 1 0
cape asbestos mat 3 3 0 0
usmc int kap 43 43 0 0
manbre & gartcn cnd 1 0 1 0
stavely kap 3 2 1 0
foseco minsep ch 43 41 2 0
chubb & son kap 6 6 0 0
lrc int ch 3 3 0 0
barrcw hepburn cnd 1 1 0 0
avosi rubber cd 5 4 1 0
bakelite ch 5 3 2 0
british titan ch 8 5 3 0
laporte ind ch 20 19 1 0
carpets int cd 2 1 1 0
wiimot breeden cd 17 17 0 0
ranscme hoffmann kap 1 1 0 0
rugby port cem mat 0 0 0 0
burroughs kap 0 0 0 0
bond worth cd 4 0 4 0
itt kap 8 7 1 0
mather & plait kap 8 8 0 0
dupont ch 0 0 0 0
william baird cnd 1 1 0 0
vanesta int mat 3 3 0 0





Firm Class Pat Patprod Patprcc Unident
EAKER PERKINS KAP 21 21 0 0
PIRELLI KAP 6 6 0 0
SINGER CD 0 0 0 0
BBA MAT 7 7 0 0
AVERYS KAP 14 14 0 0
SPERRY RAND KAP 15 15 0 0
ALFRED HERBERT KAP 4 4 0 0
PAULS * WHITES CND 1 0 1 0
NORCRQSS CND 7 4 3 0
OZALID CH 5 5 0 0
LCW & BONAR CND 1 1 0 0
AMEY GROUP MAT 2 1 1 0
BSR CD 1 1 0 0
GENERAL GOODS CND 3 3 0 0
LONDON BRICK MAT 0 0 0 0
GEORGE KENT KAP 16 16 0 0
MORGAN CRUCIBLE MAT 5 5 0 0
TREBOR SHARPS CND 0 0 0 0
FIRESTONE CD 1 1 0 0
INT HARVESTER KAP 0 0 0 0
HEAD WRIGHTSON KAP 3 3 0 0
MAY & BAKER CH 8 7 1 0
DOBSON PARK KAP 25 25 0 0
MOLINS KAP 55 55 0 0
PEGLER-HATTERSLEY KAP 2 2 0 0
CPC CND 0 0 0 0
BESTCBELL KAP 2 2 0 0
ROCKWARE CND 0 0 0 0
NOTTINGHAM MFG CND 1 1 0 0
FH LLOYD KAP 0 0 0 0
HARLAND & WOLFF KAP 0 0 0 0
KRAFT CND 0 0 0 0
APV KAP 8 8 0 0
BORG-WARNER CD 2 2 0 0
Notes: CND = Consumer Nondurables, CD = Oonsumer Durables,
KAP = Capital Goods, MAT = Material Inputs, CH = Chemicals.
Total Pat = Total Patents, Patprod-Product Patents
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